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*Originally published in:
Yearbook of International Environmental
Law, vol. 23.2012 (2013), pp. 236-249
DOI: 10.1093/yiel/yvt043*

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II. AIR AND ATMOSPHERE

3. Global Climate

(1) Introduction

The eighteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the ninth Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 8) came to a close in the evening of 8 December 2012. This report lays out the main developments in Doha and assesses the main outcomes. The first chapter outlines the overall situation coming into Doha. The subsequent chapters cover the negotiations on the future of the Kyoto Protocol, the discussions under the Durban Platform on developing a new comprehensive climate agreement by 2015 and increasing short-term ambition, and further near-term action under the UNFCCC.

(2) The Situation Before Doha

With the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol set to expire at the end of 2012, the future framework of international climate policy had been very much in doubt up to the climate conference in Durban in 2011. According to the Bali roadmap for a future climate regime agreed at COP 13 in 2007, negotiations for a future agreement have proceeded under two tracks. First, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments by Annex I Countries (= industrialised countries) under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) has been negotiating new targets for a second commitment period post-2012 as well as associated rules for accounting emissions. Second, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) has also been negotiating commitments for Annex I countries, intending to cover those that have not ratified the Protocol – that is, the USA. In addition, the LCA has negotiated on “Nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) of developing countries, which are to be supported by industrialised countries with technology, financing and capacity-building. Both the actions and the support are to be “measurable, reportable and verifiable”. The LCA has also negotiated how such support for developing countries’ mitigation actions may be delivered as well as how developing countries may be supported in adapting to the impacts of climate change.

Both tracks were to culminate in a new agreement at the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009. However, the conference nearly fell apart and only the controversial “Copenhagen Accord” emerged in the end, which was not even agreed to by all countries in the plenary.

This fallout was mainly caused by fundamental differences of opinion between industrialised and developing countries on who should contribute how much to the fight against climate change and in particular who should go first. While developing countries have pointed to the historical responsibility of the so-called developed countries for creating the climate problem and insist that Annex I countries should therefore take the lead in combating climate change, as they committed to in Art. 3.1 of the UNFCCC, Annex I countries for their part have pointed to the rising emissions in the large rapidly industrialising countries of the South and demanded that they needed to step up their efforts as well. Ideally, they wanted to have the Kyoto Protocol replaced by a new universal framework covering all large emitters. In particular Canada, Japan and Russia explicitly stated that they refused to be bound under a second Kyoto period.

After the failure in Copenhagen, the 2010 Cancún conference put the climate negotiations back on track, but with the end of 2012 approaching the question of the form of international climate policy loomed ever larger. Copenhagen and Cancún had only resulted in non-binding emission reduction pledges by countries. In addition, according to analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and others the pledges that have so far been made are far from ambitious enough to achieve the target of stabilising global temperature increase below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, as agreed as objective in Copenhagen (see UNEP's "Emissions Gap Report" at <http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgap2012/>).

In Durban, Parties therefore agreed to establish a new "Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action" (ADP). It was supposed to start work in 2012 and finish as early as possible but not later than 2015. However, the new agreement is supposed to come into effect and be implemented only from 2020. The decision therefore stipulated that the ADP was also to discuss raising the level of ambition in the period up to 2020. The key task for Doha in the ADP was to agree concrete work programmes for both work streams.

In return, the EU agreed to continue the Kyoto Protocol, which many had already written off, in a second commitment period, but the details were still to be agreed at this year's conference in Doha. The Durban conference also decided to terminate the AWG-LCA in Doha. However, many issues under the LCA had not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of developing countries, in particular on finance and technology. In Copenhagen and Cancún developed countries had committed to scaling up climate finance to USD 100 billion annually by 2020, starting with USD 30 billion over a "fast-start period" from 2010-2012. As the end of this period was approaching, developing countries demanded clarity on the way forward for the time after 2012.

(3) Agreement of the Second Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol

As noted above, the Durban climate conference agreed in principle that there would be a second Kyoto commitment period (CP2) but left the details to be decided in Doha. There was a whole basket of political and technical issues that were still controversial, the following focuses on the most important outcomes (Draft decision -/CMP.8, Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9).

First, the voluntary emission reduction pledges that countries had made for 2020 were translated into quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (QUERCs) of the participating countries for the entire commitment period, but contrary to the wishes of developing countries the level of ambition was not increased. Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia will not participate in CP2.

Also against the wishes of developing countries, Parties decided that CP2 will run till 2020 rather than 2017. As developing countries considered that the targets were inadequate they had argued that this low level of ambition should not be locked in for too long. As a concession, industrialised countries agreed to review the level of ambition in 2014.

A further thorny issue was the carry-over of billions of surplus emission allowances (Assigned Amount Units, AAUs) from CP1 to CP2. This surplus has mostly accrued because the CP1 targets were based on 1990 levels even though it was clear at the time already that actual emissions in the former Eastern bloc countries would be much lower due to their economic restructuring. The G-77 and China as well as Switzerland proposed to limit the carry-over and use of surplus AAUs while Russia and many other transition economies insisted on full carry-over in line with the original Kyoto rules. The G77 also proposed to cap the emission targets for CP2 at the level of 2012 emissions, while Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine had submitted emission targets above their current emissions.

Parties ultimately decided to maintain unlimited carry-over but CP1 AAUs may only be used by a country for compliance with CP2 targets if its emissions go above its target. In addition, acquisition of CP1 AAUs from other countries was limited to 2% of the buyer country's CP1 target. In addition, Australia, the EU, Japan, Lichtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland attached political declarations in Annex II to the decision in which they stated that they were not going to purpose CP1 surplus AAUs. Moreover, the final decision includes addition of a new Article 3.7ter to the Kyoto Protocol, according to which all CP2 AAUs above the average emissions level of the period 2008-2010 are to be cancelled. That is, countries' targets are capped at their average emissions level in 2008-2010.

(4) The Durban Platform

(A) Towards the 2015 Agreement

On negotiating a new agreement until 2015, the overarching controversy continues to be whether the so-called "firewall", the clear distinction between on the one hand binding commitments for industrialised countries and on the other hand voluntary action by developing countries, should be maintained or modified. In Durban, one of the key controversies in the final hours had been whether the UNFCCC's principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities should be explicitly referenced in the decision on the Durban Platform or not. In the end there had been no such reference due to strong resistance from the USA.

In 2012, developing countries therefore continually emphasised that the ADP works under the Convention and that all of its principles apply. Many developing countries also argued for starting a dedicated work programme on how equity would be operationalised in the 2015 agreement. Annex I countries also all affirmed that the Convention's principles apply, the question was in their view not if but how to apply them. They also agreed that universality of application would not mean uniformity of content.

Nevertheless, when it came to the wording to be agreed on, the differences between countries came back to the fore. As in Durban, the final decision does not mention these principles and even a reference to the outcome of the Rio+20 conference, which did endorse them, was deleted at the insistence of the USA. What is left is language that the ADP's work will be guided by the principles of the Convention, and in the final plenary the USA noted that in their view this provision had no relation to mandate of the ADP and that they would reject any attempt to invoke it in the ADP's further work.

The work programme that was ultimately agreed is not very specific. Elements for a negotiation text are to be in place at COP20 in 2014, and a draft negotiation text is to be on the table before May 2015. The text also notes that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon will convene a world leaders' summit on climate change in 2014 (Draft decision -/CP.18, Advancing the Durban Platform, FCCC/CP/2012/L.13, 8 December 2012).

(B) Short-Term Ambition

On short-term ambition, the EU and others reiterated their suggestions from the previous sessions to focus on initiatives that are complementary to the current national pledges, such as regulating emissions from international aviation and shipping that have so far not been regulated internationally, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, and cooperative actions on deforestation, renewable energy, energy efficiency or short-lived climate forcers such as soot. In their view the UNFCCC could recognise such initiatives, provide transparency on what

they mean in terms of closing the emissions gap, and highlight best practice. Other industrialised countries, such as Japan, New Zealand and the USA, claimed that a “huge amount of actions” was already underway, including at the regional and city level. In their view it would be useful to record and recognise these actions and explore ways for incentivising further actions by cities and private sector organisations.

Developing countries universally highlighted that increasing their own levels of ambition would depend on the provision of “means of implementation” by developed countries in terms of finance, technology and capacity building. They urged industrialised countries to take the lead in reducing emissions as stipulated in the Convention and increase their emission targets as well as their provision of support to enable further mitigation actions by developing countries.

Developing countries also stressed that complementary initiatives could be useful but not be a substitute for strengthening emission targets and means of implementation. AOSIS therefore proposed a detailed work programme consisting of a series of workshops in 2013 to discuss the available mitigation potential sector by sector. In addition, there were to be high-level ministerial meetings and a summit on pre-2020 mitigation ambition at COP20.

Other Annex I and non-Annex I countries urged to leave the work plan more vague in order to maintain flexibility. They argued that a very specific work plan might lead to very formalised discussions and thus not be a very effective exercise.

The work plan that was ultimately agreed is much weaker than requested by AOSIS and others. The ADP decided to hold roundtable discussions and workshops, but their content was not determined in advance. Instead, the ADP Co-Chairs are to set out focused questions for these discussions in early 2013 (Planning of work, Draft conclusions proposed by the Co-Chairs, Advance unedited version).

(5) Closing the AWG-LCA and Further Operationalising the Cancún Agreements

In addition to finishing the negotiations on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha conference also had the task to terminate the work under the Bali Action Plan that has in the past five years been carried out in the AWG-LCA on the main building blocks mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology. The previous conferences in Cancún and Durban had already concluded the political discussions on some issues and mandated the subsidiary bodies to carry out further technical work, which is also covered in the following.

(A) Mitigation

(i) Annex I Mitigation

As described in section 2 of this report, there is a fundamental gap between pledged emission reductions and what would be needed to stay within a 2° limit. Consequently, in the negotiations, developing countries urged developed countries to increase ambition and to reconsider their pledges or move to the higher end of their pledges.

Beyond this fundamental mismatch, another problem with the pledges is the difficulty to assess them due to conditionalities and the lack of common accounting standards. In the negotiations many countries stressed the need to present pledges as a single number referring to one common base year (1990). So far, pledges relate to different base years, for example the USA has pledged to reduce emissions by 17% compared to 2005 levels, which translates to 3-4% below 1990 levels. In addition, many countries again demanded that developed countries without commitments under the Kyoto Protocol should at least agree to emission

common accounting rules. They noted that common accounting was crucial for the comparability of efforts, one of the key objectives of the Bali Action Plan.

However, the USA again rejected all attempts to move towards common accounting. Finally, it was only decided to continue negotiations and establish a work programme within the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in 2013 to clarify the emission reduction targets, “*with a view to: (a) identifying common elements for measuring the progress made; and (b) Ensuring the comparability of efforts among developed country Parties taking into account differences in their national circumstances*”. (Draft decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, paras 4-13).

More positively, it was one of the successes of the Doha negotiations that common tabular formats for the biennial reporting for developed countries were adopted in the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) (Draft decision -/CP.18, Common tabular format for “UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties”, Advanced unedited version). The tables contain sections on historic emissions (by sector and by year) as well as sections on different scenarios of future emission developments.

(ii) Non-Annex I Mitigation

In the Bali Action Plan in 2007, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) were introduced as a key mechanism to increase mitigation ambition in developing countries. In Cancun it was decided to “*set up a registry to record nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support and to facilitate matching of finance, technology and capacity-building support for these actions*” (Decision 1/CP.16, para 53). Given that there is very little definition at UNFCCC level of what actually a NAMA is, the registry underpins the learning by doing process that is currently taking place in NAMA development: developing countries can take ownership and define which actions they propose as NAMAs for recognition and for which actions they seek additional funding.

In Doha the UNFCCC secretariat presented the status quo on the NAMA registry, a fully functional version is supposed to be presented two months before COP 19 (Draft decision -/CP.18, Prototype of the registry, Advance unedited version).

It is important to note that the registry is planned to be set-up with no mandatory fields. This rather technical detail underpins that the registry may well serve to increase transparency on the wide variety of mitigation actions of developing countries (record NAMAs) and support a matching of NAMA proposals and funding options, but it is not the intention to make the registry a tool for stringent measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of mitigation actions. MRVing of the outputs of NAMAs will most likely occur in national communications (and biennial update reports) and possibly even more stringently upon request of institutions supporting NAMAs.

More broadly the negotiations on the registry for NAMAs mirror the general situation of NAMAs altogether: Developing countries have started filling the existing registry prototype with proposals for NAMAs – however, to date, not a single funding offer has been given to the UNFCCC for registration and generally very little funding for NAMA implementation has been put on the table. Only at the end of the negotiations Germany and the UK announced the launch of a NAMA facility with funding of approx. 70 million Euro - a promising first step, but only a tiny step towards meeting the high ambitions of international support promised at Copenhagen (see section 2C on climate finance).

(iii) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation account for nearly 20% of all global greenhouse gas emissions. In the run-up to the negotiations in Doha, expectations were high that COP18 could lead to significant progress in the efforts towards establishing an international mechanism for providing incentives to developing countries for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing their forest-related carbon stocks (REDD+).

The major fora of REDD+ negotiations in Doha were the SBSTA and the AWG-LCA. Initially, Parties achieved substantial progress in the SBSTA on national forest monitoring systems (NFMS) and MRV. However, negotiations stalled when Parties touched on the issue of verification. While Norway was pushing for independent verification of actions by international experts, Brazil was opposed to external verification, arguing that MRV of REDD+ should be consistent with the process of international consultation and analysis (ICA) that was agreed for NAMAs and which is considerably less demanding of developing countries. With Parties unable to resolve this issue in Doha, the final text on NFMS and MRV remained bracketed and Parties decided to continue the work during 2013 with a draft decision to be prepared by COP19 in Warsaw (Methodological guidance for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries. Draft conclusions proposed by the Chair, FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.31).

In parallel to the SBSTA process, policy approaches and positive incentives for REDD+ were considered under the AWG-LCA. The negotiation process on so-called results-based finance was dominated by different views on incentives for non-carbon benefits and institutional arrangements. While LDCs advocated an approach to incentivise benefits beyond carbon, several developed countries such as Norway and Australia stated that results-based payments should be made for carbon only. Similarly, positions on finding an “institutional home for REDD+” also differed substantially and the idea of establishing a REDD+ Committee, brought up by Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, was supported by a large number of developing countries while most developed countries rejected the creation of new institutions in Doha and maintained that functions of such an institution should be identified first. The final text from Doha reflects these different views and Parties agreed that respective options should be explored, inter alia under a newly established work programme on results-based finance that is to finalize its work at COP19 in Warsaw (Draft decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, paras 25-40).

(iv) New Market Mechanisms

Many industrialised countries maintain that emission trading mechanisms are the most cost effective way to reduce GHG emissions globally. Against this background, several Parties are promoting the introduction of new market mechanisms in the UNFCCC context, which are to cover broad segments of the economy and should thereby leverage significantly higher emission reductions than the current Kyoto mechanisms CDM and JI.

Parties' views on this matter differ mainly on what the role of the UNFCCC should have. The EU and most developing countries promote a top-down view with regulations for a new market mechanism defined at and supervised at UNFCCC level. By contrast, others such as the Umbrella Group (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, USA, minus Norway) prefer a loose framework for bottom-up market approaches, which could include national offsetting schemes like the Japanese Bilateral Offset Crediting Mechanism (BOCM) with nationally defined (and less stringent) accounting rules.

As a result, two separate streams have evolved in the discussions. First, at last year's climate change conference in Durban, Parties decided to establish a New Market Mechanism (NMM) in principle, operating under the guidance and authority of the COP. The AWG-LCA was asked to develop modalities and procedures for this mechanism. Second, the AWG-LCA was asked to conduct a work programme to consider whether to establish a Framework for Various Approaches (FVA), which may include market-based and non-market approaches (Decision 2/CP.17, para 79).

Yet there has been little progress since the Durban COP. The major discussion points in Doha were the role the UNFCCC should have in an FVA. The Umbrella Group reiterated their wish for a rather weak role while the EU and developing countries insisted that the FVA was about the COP acting as regulator to determine and enforce common standards. As regards the NMM, the EU was rather isolated in its desire to achieve quick implementation.

In the end, Parties decided to set up a work programme to continue discussions on the purpose, scope, and procedures to ensure environmental integrity and institutions of the FVA. On the NMM, Parties "agreed to consider" a list of elements which would make the NMM a top-down, UNFCCC driven mechanism with common accounting (Draft decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, paras 41-53).

(B) Adaptation

The negotiations on adaptation were able to build on significant progress achieved over the last years: In Durban, the Adaptation Committee, which had been established one year before in Cancún, had been made operational and Parties had agreed on its composition, modalities and procedures. Furthermore, initial guidelines to assist Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the formulation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) had been established. Regarding the question on how to deal with those adverse effects of climate change that cannot be addressed through adaptation measures, such as weather extremes and slow-onset events like sea level rise and increasing temperatures, Durban had agreed on a renewal of the Work Programme on Loss and Damage.

The negotiations in Doha led to important decisions in all three areas. The future work of the Adaptation Committee (AC) was secured with the COP's approval of a draft three-year work plan, which the AC had presented together with its first report. Another important step regarding the planning and implementation of adaptation action on the ground has been made with the development of technical guidelines for the formulation and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in LDCs. In Doha, the SBI welcomed the technical guidelines for the NAP process and looked forward to their application, as appropriate. The technical guidelines will support LDCs in initiating a continuous, iterative and progressive planning process for identifying medium and long-term adaptation needs and developing the respective strategies and programmes. Doha also resulted in guidance on support for NAPs for LDCs and Parties agreed on guidance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is administering the Least Developed Countries Fund (Draft decision -/CP.18: National adaptation plans, Advance unedited version).

The dominating issue of the negotiations, however, was the question of whether an international mechanism for addressing loss and damage should be installed. While the USA and other industrialised countries opposed the installation of such a mechanism, fearing future claims for compensation of climate-related losses, developing countries wanted such a mechanism to be established in Doha. In the end, a compromise was found with the agreement to establish "institutional arrangements, such as an international mechanism" at COP19 in Warsaw, a compromise formula tabled by the Qatari COP President to be taken as part of the entire final package of decisions (Draft decision -/CP.18, Approaches to address

loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity, FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/Rev.1).

(C) Finance

Since the beginning of the climate change negotiations, one of the fundamental challenges has been the issue of financing efforts of developing countries to combat climate change and to adapt to its adverse effects. While contributions by industrialised countries to the funding mechanisms under the UNFCCC have been notoriously low, there is hope that the newly-operationalised Green Climate Fund (GCF) may fare better in this regard.

Just prior to COP 18 in Doha this year, the GCF Board chose Songdo in the Republic of Korea to host the GCF. COP 18 endorsed the decision, and requested the GCF Board and the Republic of Korea to conclude any legal and administrative arrangements. Any interim arrangements should terminate no later than COP 19 (Draft decision -/CP.18, Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and guidance to the Green Climate Fund: Proposal by the President, FCCC/CP/2012/L.17). A number of countries have pledged contributions to the administrative budget of the GCF, but so far no financial commitments for the actual activities of the GCF have surfaced.

Another issue that as yet has not been resolved is the relationship between the Green Climate Fund and the COP. A number of developing countries had proposed that the GCF should be fully accountable to and receive guidance from the COP. Contrary to the decision taken in Durban, the arrangements between the two bodies were not to be drafted by the GCF itself, but to be delegated to the Standing Committee that had been established in Durban to assist the COP in maintaining oversight of the UNFCCC's finance architecture. By contrast, industrialised countries have historically insisted on a greater degree of independence of the GCF from the COP. The COP ultimately decided that the GCF Board and the Standing Committee should cooperatively develop arrangements between COP and GCF, which are to be approved at COP 19 (Arrangements between the Conference of the Parties and the Green Climate Fund: Proposal by the President, FCCC/CP/2012/L.18).

Many discussions at this year's COP revolved around the work programme on long-term finance that had been established in Durban. This work programme is to answer the question of how to scale up climate finance to the USD 100 billion annually from 2020 promised in Copenhagen and Cancún. Parties could not find common ground to endorse the outcomes of the 2012 work programme, but extended it for another year (Draft decision -/CP.18, Work programme on long-term finance, FCCC/CP/2012/L.15).

As the period of Fast Start Finance was set to end with no agreed post-2012 pathway, developing countries called for a clear mid-term goal that would ensure an increase of financing levels, and a clear path to the 100-billion goal. However, the final outcome of the AWG-LCA only invites developed countries to submit information on their strategies and approaches for mobilising scaled-up climate finance by the next COP, and encourages them to "further increase their efforts to provide resources of at least to the average annual level of the fast-start finance period for 2013-2015". The decision also calls for a high-level ministerial dialogue for the consideration of progress on long-term finance at the coming COP (Draft decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, paras 63-73).

(D) Technology

Technology development and transfer also made only slow progress in Doha. In a brief surge of activity in Cancún, Parties had agreed to establish a Technology Mechanism, comprising a Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). In Durban, the TEC's initial modalities and rules of procedure had been agreed as well as the CTCN's terms of reference. In Doha, UNEP as a leader of a consortium was announced to host the CTCN, and a Memorandum of Understanding between the COP and UNEP was agreed outlining their respective responsibilities and initial steps in the operationalisation of the CTCN (Draft decision -/CP.18, Arrangements to make the Climate Technology Centre and Network fully operational, Advance unedited version). Parties are invited to nominate national designated entities for technology transfer, which will become part of the nascent Network. The decision also establishes an Advisory Board to the CTCN that is to act as a monitoring body. The Board will have to lay down its modalities and rules of procedure in its first session in 2013, and present them to the Subsidiary Bodies in 2013.

The relationship between the Technology Mechanism and the financial mechanism of the Convention is still unresolved. Many developing countries have long clamoured for possibilities of direct access to finance for technology support, which would mean a much stronger stance for technology support in the UNFCCC context. Equally, many developed countries refuse that the Technology Mechanism should be able to access funding directly via a technology window in the financial mechanism. The COP decided to take up the matter again in two years' time, at COP 20 (Draft decision -/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, para 62).

(6) Assessment and Outlook

At first glance the list of tasks completed in Doha looks impressive. The Kyoto Protocol as the so far only internationally legally binding emission reduction instrument will be continued, the AWG-LCA was closed, and a work programme was agreed for the new negotiation track under the ADP that is to deliver a comprehensive agreement by 2015.

However, after the defection of the USA, Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Russia the Kyoto Protocol is only a shadow of its former self and the commitments of the remaining countries are well below the minus 25-40% suggested by the IPCC. Also, CP2 will run eight years instead of five, potentially locking in this low level of ambition until the end of the decade. As a concession to developing countries, Parties are obliged to consider strengthening the commitments in 2014. However, there is currently no reason to expect that stronger political will is going to materialise over the next two years.

As for the AWG-LCA, after having started with great applause and hopes for a new climate policy future in 2007, it closed down amid strong acrimony and disappointment. The AWG-LCA has resulted in more than 80 Annex I and non-Annex I countries making emission reduction pledges and it has created a bevy of new institutions: the Green Climate Fund, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the Adaptation Committee and the Adaptation Framework. However, many of the emission reduction pledges are unclear, have conditionalities attached and cover wide ranges of possible reductions. The annual UNEP "Emissions Gap Report" has no less than four scenarios on how the pledges may play out and even the best-case scenario is a full 8 Gt CO₂-eq. above where emissions should be as a maximum in 2020 to maintain a reasonable chance to achieve the 2°C target (<<http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgap2012/>>).

And while there is a host of new institutions, they remain to be endowed with resources. The key AWG-LCA controversy in Doha was on the continuation of climate finance after the fast-start period 2010-2012. In the end, developing countries only got a

vague promise that industrialised countries will try to continue providing as least as much as during the last years, which was roughly USD 10 billion annually.

Important progress was achieved in the negotiations on how to deal with loss and damage. Despite resistance from industrialised countries and in particular the USA, Parties laid the foundation for institutional arrangements, such as an international mechanism, which, once established, could channel funds to developing countries suffering from the consequences of climate change. However, key questions including the sources of funding and how funds will be disbursed remain to be discussed at next year's COP in Warsaw.

Finally, a programme for the future work of the ADP was agreed, but it is much less specific than many had hoped and more a series of events rather than a substantive programme.

Given the deeply entrenched controversies among Parties, the road to the 2015 agreement will be a long and stony one and success seems far from assured.

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