




# Design Options for the Global Stocktake

Lessons from other Review Processes

Christiane Beuermann, Wolfgang Obergassel, and  
Hanna Wang-Helmreich



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## About the iGST initiative and this report series

**The Independent Global Stocktake (iGST)** is an umbrella data and advocacy initiative that brings together climate modelers, analysts, campaigners and advocates to support the Paris Agreement. <https://www.climateworks.org/independentglobalstocktake/>

**The Designing a Robust Stocktake Discussion Series** envisions the contours of an ideal Global Stocktake and suggests ways in which the independent community can help to achieve that vision. These papers were produced by iGST partner organizations in consultation with the broader community, but the views expressed are the authors' own and don't necessarily reflect those of the iGST initiative or associated partner organizations.



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## Disclaimer from the iGST on COVID-19

This paper was written September 2019 - February 2020, before COVID-19 had emerged as a pandemic. As of publication date (May 2020), COVID-19 has disrupted lives around the world, but its long-term impacts on the Global Stocktake and related processes remain unclear. We are cautiously hopeful that many aspects of the Global Stocktake will continue forward as planned, albeit against a backdrop of recovery and potentially heightened scepticism of global connectivity. Thus, while this paper does not account for COVID-19 related impacts, we believe that much of what was written here remains relevant.

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## + Executive Summary



While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current actions of the Parties to the Agreement fall far short of these goals. The Global Stocktake (GST), established in Art. 14 of the PA, may help narrow this gap between ambition and action: its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the collective progress of the international community towards Paris goals. While some general modalities on how to conduct the GST have been adopted, the details are still to be determined.

The objective of this report is to analyze existing international regimes as regards their review processes, the contribution of these review processes to various governance functions and, finally, to derive lessons for the GST. Processes analyzed include:

- the design of the upcoming Global Stocktake itself,
- the Talanoa Dialogue (TD) which is the direct precursor of the GST,
- the Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), which features a regular stocktaking process focused on progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
- the review processes of the UN human rights system (UNHRS) and
- the review processes and assessment panels of the Montreal Protocol (MP).

The analysis of each review process is organised in four sections: (1) political background and context, (2) technical and organisational details of the processes, (3) interface between the political and technical processes, and (4) how the review processes contribute to achieving the objectives of the respective regime, particularly governance functions of the regime (guidance and signal, transparency and accountability, and knowledge and learning).

### General observations

The report finds a broad range of technical and organisational set-ups designed to achieve stocktaking objectives. Except for the TD, all processes have regular meetings and carry out reviews according to fixed time cycles. However, beyond that review processes take diverse shapes: focus on collective action with some components related to individual Parties (TD); emphasis on collective action around thematic foci, supplemented by voluntary country reviews (HLPF); mandatory country-level and collective reviews (MP); and focus on progress of individual countries (UN HRS). In the case of the TD and HLPF, review processes have been based on voluntary submissions organised via an online platform, whereas the Montreal Protocol and the human rights system have mandatory reporting obligations. In addition to self-reporting, the HLPF and the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP) are regularly informed by mandated Assessment Reports written by a group of nominated scientists.

Although all the processes have strengths and weaknesses, some appear to have been more successful in their mission. For example, whereas the uptake of the scientific advice by the HLPF and TD has been rather muted, the MOP of the Montreal Protocol has made and implemented significant decisions to increase ambition based on Scientist Panel recommendations.



Though developed for the purpose of quite different objectives, experiences with these various stocktaking processes provide valuable insights on how they help their respective regimes achieve governance functions of aligning participants (“guidance and signal”), ensuring transparency (“transparency and accountability”) and providing a means for the regime and regime participants to grow over time (“knowledge and learning”)

### **Lessons for the Global Stocktake on “Guidance and Signal”:**

The objectives laid down in Art.2 of the Paris Agreement have been found to entail strong guidance as they signal the resolve of governments across the world to take far-reaching action on climate change. They provide orientation to Parties to the agreement and other relevant actors as to the course of action that is desired and necessary. Thus, they entail a call for more ambition if progress towards these objectives proves to be slow. In general, stocktaking processes have a guidance and signal function related to the success in achieving the objectives of a regime. The institutional design and implementation of the stocktaking process impacts on the delivery of this function.

Experience with the TD highlights that, while the procedures of how results are considered by negotiators and decision-makers are important, the societal and political discussions surrounding the stocktaking may be as important as the official outcome. Arguably, the largest impact of the TD was not the formal process but rather the discussions generated by the IPCC special report on the 1.5°C limit, which had been elaborated as scientific input to the TD.

The experiences with the HLPF process show that high-level messages reflecting the latest information from reviews can help processes advance forward. However, political leadership and momentum can be limited if high-level declarations do not reflect on the results of the review process. Thus, timing and coordination is important.

Under the Montreal Protocol, linking observations (ozone hole) with mandated reviews on substances and sectors appears to have strengthened guidance and signal in the negotiation and decision-making processes: review processes and consultation with the Expert Assessment Panels have been decisive for decision-making.

In the UN human rights system, the participation and inclusion of independent experts seems to have strengthened the regime. For example, experts have been mandated to develop authoritative interpretations and make recommendations on how to implement treaty provisions and to conduct thematic studies.

### **Lessons for the Global Stocktake on “Transparency and Accountability”**

Collecting and analysing relevant data in a stocktaking processes of international regimes may enhance the transparency of the actions taken by their Parties. It helps to identify and address problems in implementation of agreed rules and standards.

Like the GST, both the Talanoa Dialogue and the Agenda 2030 HLPF assess collective progress and not the performance of individual Parties. Submissions from individual Parties (TD) and Voluntary National Reports (HLPF) are publically accessible but analysis is limited to collective progress. To increase transparency, strategies should be developed to alleviate the limitations of this collective review approach, e.g. by breaking down the stocktake to sectors.

Experiences with the HLPF indicate that participation rights and procedures for stakeholder involvement, as well as the science-policy interface, have to be not just rhetorical but

enshrined within official processes. In the Montreal Protocol, structured expert dialogues have had a decisive role in the assessment-based decision-making procedures of the Meeting of the Parties.

### **Lessons for the Global Stocktake on “Knowledge and Learning”**

International institutions may create knowledge as well as platforms for individual and social learning. The aim is the creation and diffusion of scientific, economic, technical and policy-related knowledge on the understanding of and/or possible solutions to the problem at hand.

Under the Montreal Protocol, knowledge and learning have been robustly institutionalised by the Assessment Panels. This arrangement is said to have stimulated the invention of innovative alternative substances in industry and enabled strong phase out/phase down schedules for ozone depleting substances.

The TD mobilised Parties to voluntarily submit inputs and participate in exchange with other Parties and stakeholders at different governance levels. However, the capacity of Parties to process the multitude and variety of submissions is limited, suggesting better information integration procedures may be needed.

Experiences in the HLPF show that knowledge and learning benefits from scheduling sufficient time for exchanges among Parties, experts and stakeholders.

The following sections take the lessons from the review of the above processes and considers what they suggest for a GST process that helps deliver on promises of the Paris Agreement. These recommendations do not necessarily consider all the political or practical realities that constrain the GST process, but rather seek to sketch potential components of an idealized GST.

### **Conclusions on the GST design and institutional setting:**

- As the experience from the HLPF shows, the timing and coordination of various processes appears significant for ensuring a robust stocktaking process that delivers on all three governance functions. Analytical work needs to be completed before the high-level phase, otherwise the results of the analytical work cannot be taken up appropriately by decision-makers.
- An open question for the GST is how to ensure that Parties fully engage with the information of the stocktaking process and incorporate lessons learned into their national policies. It might be helpful if the GST was designed in a way to engage all relevant national ministries, not only the environment ministries represented at the climate negotiations.
- As in the HLPF, the GST could have a high-level session at the level of Heads of State and Government. Ideally, they should highlight key outcomes of the GST process and commit to taking the outcomes into account in the subsequent NDC development process.
- The GST could adopt the sectoral approach which is being applied under the MP. Similar to how the MP review bodies have been developing recommendations for phase-outs of specific substances, the GST could break the long-term emission target of the Paris Agreement down to the sector level and develop



recommendations and roadmaps for how such sectoral decarbonisation targets could be achieved.

- Within such a sectoral approach, the GST could have dedicated work streams on each sector with strong involvement of independent experts (e.g., from the IPCC) and stakeholders to develop recommendations on how to enhance ambition.
- As the experience from the TD and the HLPF shows, the GST should provide outcomes that enable not only high-level political messages on the need to step-up efforts, but also detailed recommendations on how to do so. The outcome of the GST should therefore include a detailed technical summary of available options, best practices and recommendations, and the final CMA decision should engage with and endorse these results.

### **Conclusions on the science-policy interface**

- Similar to processes under the MP, the GST could be linked with latest IPCC scientific knowledge on observed climate change impacts in order to make a visible link between the review of policy progress and state of climate impacts. In particular, the GST could highlight that substantial climate impacts are already occurring and that they are going to get far worse. Such a signal could help to underscore the need to step up on mitigation, adaptation, and finance.
- A sectoral approach to stocktaking, similar to that used in the MP, has the potential to highlight additional mitigation potentials and to promote knowledge and learning on how to tap into these potentials. In a structured expert dialogue that includes industry experts, best practices can be exchanged, highlighted and translated into relevant recommendations. However, the GST would need to go beyond purely technical considerations to carefully consider social, economic, political and institutional implications.
- Parties will hardly be able to digest all the information that is supposed to be drawn on in the GST. The UNFCCC Secretariat is therefore mandated to provide synthesis reports. Beyond such synthesis reports, direct involvement of independent experts could also help Parties process the information. The technical dialogue, which Parties are supposed to engage in as part of the GST, would be an appropriate framework for integrating their participation

### **Conclusions on participation**

- Several of the processes reviewed in this paper have been criticised for a lack of meaningful stakeholder participation. Strong participation by civil society will be important for the GST to fully mobilise all available knowledge and account for differing perspectives in the stocktaking process.

# 1 Background



The purpose of the Global Stocktake (GST) according to Art. 14 of the Paris Agreement (PA) is to review the implementation of the PA in order to “assess the collective progress” towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals. The outcome shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support, in a nationally determined manner.

COP24 in Katowice in 2018 adopted modalities for the GST, but these are relatively generic. Much will depend on how the modalities will be further fleshed out by Parties and the chairpersons that will preside over the first GST in 2022-23.

Against this background, the purpose of this report is to review other multilateral policy processes within and outside the UNFCCC. How is stocktaking organised in these processes and what lessons are to be learnt for the organisation of the GST?



## 2 Approach for Reviewing Lessons from Similar Processes



The following processes have been analysed as regards the organisation of their stocktaking procedures:

- The Global Stocktake itself is discussed to serve as point of reference for the review of the other processes.
- The Talanoa Dialogue is the direct precursor of the GST, lessons learned should therefore be directly applicable to the organisation of the GST.
- The Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum is of interest because of its regular stocktaking process regarding progress of the SDGs.
- The review processes of the UN Human Rights system were deemed to be of interest because of their possibilities for civil society participation.
- The review process and Assessment Panels of the Montreal Protocol are generally deemed to have been a key factor for the success of the agreement.

The review of the processes is based on a uniform review framework (see [Annex 6.1 for more details](#)) to ensure consistent comparisons. It consists of four parts and is based on generic questions:

Part A describes the process itself and the context in which it was established in order to understand the overall setting and objectives.

Part B describes the technical and organisational details of the processes. What is the subject of the review and how is progress measured?

Part C looks at the interface between the political and technical processes. How is it organised in order to enable consideration/implementation? What are the factors that have allowed recommendations from technical processes to be taken up in political processes and translated into political decisions?

Finally, in Part D the paper discusses for each of the review mechanisms to what extent they contribute to achieving the objectives the underlying regime is meant to achieve. This discussion is based on the concept of governance functions. Oberthür et al. (2017) identify five functions international governance institutions may perform in general to help achieve certain objectives. These are:

- Guidance & Signal
- Rules & Standards
- Transparency & Accountability
- Means of Implementation
- Knowledge & Learning

The governance functions have been applied to the GST by Obergassel et al (2019). Setting rules and providing means of implementation is usually addressed by other elements of a regime. What review processes may do is to contribute to the guidance, transparency and learning functions. The paper will therefore discuss for each of the processes to what extent they fulfil these functions.

## Design options for the global Stocktake: lessons from other review processes

On this basis, the summary and conclusions section discusses what lessons may be learned for the design and implementation of the GST.



## 3 Review of Processes



### 3.1 The Global Stocktake

#### 3.1.1 Part A - Policy background and review objectives of the Global Stocktake

While the Paris Agreement establishes ambitious long-term objectives, it was clear from the start that Parties' current contributions are not sufficient to actually meet these objectives. The very decision adopting the Paris Agreement "notes with concern" that current NDCs are not in line with least-cost scenarios and much greater emission reduction efforts will be required.<sup>1</sup>

The Paris Agreement therefore has at its core the five-yearly cycle of Global Stocktakes and subsequent submission of new or updated NDCs. The question of whether there should be an international assessment of contributions had been strongly contested in the negotiations up to Paris. The like-minded developing countries (LMDCs), in particular, had rejected any international assessment of the intended contributions of developing countries, citing reasons of sovereignty. However, given the low level of ambition of most NDCs, having no process to reconsider them would have put the temperature limit out of reach once and for all. Other Parties therefore strongly supported the establishment of an "ambition mechanism" to review and strengthen contributions regularly every five years (Obergassel et al. 2016).

Agreement was made possible by extending the cycle of ambition to include not only mitigation, but also adaptation and the provision of support. After three years of further negotiations, COP24 in Katowice adopted more detailed modalities for the implementation of the GST. In essence, while the Katowice decision establishes some pillars of the process, it also leaves much scope for the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies to organise the GST "in a flexible and appropriate manner" (Para 16).<sup>2</sup>

#### 3.1.2 Part B - Basic Design of the Process<sup>3</sup>

The GST relates to all long-term goals of the PA. It was not possible to establish an assessment of individual Parties' contribution. Instead, the CMA will regularly take stock of the implementation of the PA to assess collective progress. This "global stocktaking" is to take place in 2023 and every five years thereafter. The result of the stocktake will be to "inform" the Parties in order to update and enhance their actions and support (Obergassel et al. 2016).

The GST will consist of the following components (Para 3):

- Information collection and preparation for the technical assessment;
- Technical assessment of the collective progress;

<sup>1</sup> Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para 17.

<sup>2</sup> Decision 19/CMA.1, Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99–101 of decision 1/CP.21, FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2, para 16.

<sup>3</sup> Decision 19/CMA.1. All references in Part B also refer to paragraphs in Decision 19/CMA.1.

- Consideration of outputs of the technical assessment for informing Parties.

The Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice will establish a joint contact group to assist implementation of the GST (Para 4). The Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies are to develop guiding questions for all components of the global stocktake (Para 7). In addition, Parties will engage in a “technical dialogue” to support the work of the joint contact group (Paras 5f). Results of the GST will be provided in summary and synthesis reports.

There are no additional reporting obligations for the GST. Instead, the GST will draw on the reports and communications submitted by Parties through the normal reporting process of the PA and the UNFCCC. Parties may supplement this information through voluntary submissions to the GST. In addition, the GST will draw on the latest reports from the IPCC and other sources. The UNFCCC Secretariat is requested to prepare synthesis reports on the state of GHG emissions and mitigation efforts, the state of adaptation efforts, the overall effect of NDCs, and the state of finance flows and means of implementation and support, under the guidance of the co-facilitators. These synthesis reports can be expected to be the main point of reference as Parties will hardly be able to by themselves process all the information sources the Katowice decision lists as inputs for the GST (Christiansen and Olhoff 2020).

### 3.1.3 Part C - Interface between political and technical process

Technical expert input is organised through existing bodies and institutions such as the IPCC, the already existing SBSTA-IPCC special events and Joint Working Group, subsidiary bodies, constituted bodies and arrangements under the UNFCCC. Other procedures for expert and non-party stakeholder involvement have not yet been clarified.

Outputs of the GST are to be considered at high-level events where the findings of the technical assessment will be presented and their implications discussed and considered by Parties. The outputs of the components of the GST should summarize opportunities and challenges for enhancing action and support in the light of equity and the best available science, as well as lessons learned and good practice. The outputs are to be referenced in a decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA and/or a declaration.

### 3.1.4 Part D – Analysis

The modalities adopted in Katowice for the GST are relatively generic and leave much flexibility to the Chairs and facilitators on how to implement them. Task 1.2 of this project has elaborated a detailed analysis of how the design of the GST may help maximise delivery of the governance functions (Obergassel et al. 2019). In summary:

The GST can provide guidance and signal by further specifying the objectives set out in the Paris Agreement. In the area of mitigation, the long-term emissions target could be broken down to the sector level and the GST could discuss roadmaps for sectoral decarbonisation. As regards adaptation, the GST could highlight that significant climate impacts are already occurring, that they are going to further increase, and that the current adaptation response is insufficient. Such a signal could also help to underline the need for increased mitigation. On the financial side, the GST could develop guidelines on what it could mean to bring all financial flows into line with the Paris targets and how to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation. If agreement on guidelines is not politically feasible, the GST could at least promote a convergence of views by advancing the discussion on this issue.



The GST could help to ensure transparency and accountability. This function could best be fulfilled if the GST was able to assess the performance of the individual Parties. However, the mandate of the GST is only to assess collective progress. This limitation may be overcome to a certain extent by assessing groups of countries. For example, the Parties could be grouped into tier according to indicators of responsibility and capabilities, such as current and historical per capita emissions or GDP. In addition, the whole GST process can serve as an "echo chamber" for broader discussions on the efforts of individual Parties.

The GST can promote knowledge and learning about how to effectively achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This requires a facilitating format in which best practices can be exchanged, highlighted and translated into relevant recommendations. Ideally, this would take the form of structured expert dialogues focusing on concrete adaptation, mitigation and financing challenges and how to address them. The "technical dialogue", which is to be part of the GST, would be an appropriate framework for such a facilitative format, but the details of the technical dialogue still need to be developed.

The outcome of the GST should include high-level political messages on the need to step up efforts and a detailed technical summary of available options, best practices and recommendations. The final result should be a decision by the CMA fully endorsing the results of the GST and urging the Parties to take them fully into account when revising their NDCs.

Finally, the GST must include a high-level political event to reinforce its messages to influence national political agendas and to signal a renewed political commitment that the Parties continue to respect the PA and its objectives. This event should be held at the highest possible political level, ideally at the level of Heads of State and Government.

## 3.2 The Talanoa Dialogue

### 3.2.1 Part A - Policy background and review objectives of the Talanoa Dialogue

As noted above, the GST is at the core of the Paris Agreement. However, the PA became effective only in 2020 and the first GST is scheduled for 2023. To facilitate an earlier strengthening of efforts, the decision adopting the PA therefore included a mandate to "convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement"<sup>4</sup>. The facilitative dialogue was thereby essentially constituted as a test run for the GST parallel to the formal diplomatic negotiations.

The design of the facilitative dialogue was jointly prepared by the Moroccan presidency of COP 22 and the Fijian presidency of COP 23. The facilitative dialogue was launched at COP23 under the Fiji COP presidency and renamed Talanoa Dialogue (TD) to highlight the inclusive discussion element. The finally adopted approach was welcomed by COP23 and included in Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23 – Fiji Momentum for Implementation.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, para 20.

### 3.2.2 Part B – Basic Design of the Process

As the GST, the TD reviewed collective effort, not efforts by individual countries. The TD was intended to be inclusive and participatory including an online submissions platform, in-person dialogues (governments and civil society), and more than 50 regional events worldwide (SEI 2018). The discussion process consisted of a preparatory and political phase and was limited to one year and one review cycle respectively. The timing was based on the dates of the climate negotiations.

The aim of the TD was to take stock of climate mitigation action of Parties, and inform the preparation of the next round of “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs) due in 2020. It was based on voluntary Party and non-party stakeholder submissions and submissions by the COP23 and COP24 presidencies providing analytical and policy-relevant input. There were no specific reporting obligations but the voluntary inputs should cover three sets of overarching questions on status quo, targets and process / steps:

- Where are we?
- Where do we want to go?
- How do we get there?

Inputs were processed as summary and synthesis reports and were mainly descriptive with general statistical data and overall qualitative conclusions.

The TD was ultimately concluded after one year at COP 24 in Poland in 2018 with the ‘Talanoa Call for Action’, which calls upon all countries and stakeholders to act with urgency.<sup>5</sup> A synthesis report covered inputs received and discussions held over the course of the year.

### 3.2.3 Part C - Interface between political and technical process

Technical Expert input was organised via submission to the Talanoa Platform. The Platform received 473 inputs throughout the year. One key input that had been specifically requested by the Paris COP was the special report on „Global Warming of 1.5 °C” published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2018 .

The synthesis report was discussed in the political phase at COP24 by high-level representatives and Ministers in 21 roundtables focusing on the third question “how to get there” and concluding key messages that were the basis for the appellative Talanoa Call for Action. This Call for action is of non-committal nature and the COP took only note of it. As further discussed below, the COP did not translate the outcomes of the TD into specific recommendations or guidance for Parties.

### 3.2.4 Part D – Analysis

In effect, the three governance functions described in section 2 were essentially captured by the three questions that were at the core of the Talanoa Dialogue:

- “Where are we now” relates to the status quo, which can be captured by the transparency provisions of the regime.

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<sup>5</sup> Talanoa Dialogue for Global Ambition: Call for Action. [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cuk0273o\\_417799.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cuk0273o_417799.pdf)



- “Where do we need to go” relates to the guidance and signal function.
- “How do we get there” is a question of knowledge and learning about how to achieve the desired end.

The Talanoa Dialogue has to a differing extent fulfilled the three governance functions:

The long-term goal of the Paris Agreement is the major guidance for ambitious climate policies at all governance levels. The TD contributed to further developing this guidance by developing visions and guiding principles for a transformation of energy, land, infrastructure and industrial systems, as well as through behavioural shifts, e.g. visions towards a zero (net) emissions world or towards climate resilience. Submissions on how to achieve these visions highlighted, for example, “... coherent sectoral policies and instruments that reduce GHG emissions and address climate vulnerability, whilst identifying the means to enforce, measure and monitor progress.” However, the question is how to ensure that Parties fully engage with this information and incorporate lessons learned into their national policies. It might be helpful if the GST was designed in a way to engage all relevant national ministries. Usually, Parties are represented at the climate negotiations by their environment ministries, but most of the policies and actions that need to be taken to combat climate change are the province of other ministries.

Moreover, the TD served only little to reinforce a sense of urgency. As the Talanoa Dialogue ran in parallel to the diplomatic negotiations, the question was how its outcome would be reflected in the formal conference decisions. In the end, instead of a strong call to increase ambition, the COP decided to merely “take note” of the dialogue’s outcome, input and outputs, and to invite Parties “to consider the outcome, inputs and outputs of the Talanoa Dialogue in preparing their nationally determined contributions and in their efforts to enhance pre-2020 implementation and ambition”.<sup>6</sup> The GST will similarly run in parallel to the negotiations. To maximise its impact, the final result of the GST should be a decision by the CMA fully endorsing the results of the GST and urging the Parties to take them fully into account when revising their NDCs.

Nonetheless, the process was more successful if seen more broadly. The IPCC’s special report on the 1.5°C warming limit, which COP21 had requested as part of the preparation for the facilitative dialogue, urges swift and immediate action and generated high levels of public attention. This attention was further heightened at COP24 because there was an ardent controversy on whether or not the COP should officially “welcome” the report. In terms of public messaging, the “media tsunami” created by this controversy may have compensated for the lack of strong language on ambition raising in the COP decision.<sup>7</sup> These events highlight that, as suggested in the preceding section, the GST may indeed serve as “echo chamber” for broader discussions on the need to raise ambition. Progressive Parties and non-Party stakeholders should therefore develop strategies to maximally leverage the public attention that may be generated by the GST process.

On the transparency and accountability function, the TD had the same problem as the GST of being limited to assessing collective progress, which resulted in an overall synthesis report even where individual country submissions highlighted what countries were actually implementing. With numerous events and the majority of submissions from Non-Party

<sup>6</sup> Decision 1/CP.24, Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, paras 35-37.

<sup>7</sup> Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12 No. 747, Summary of the Katowice Climate Change Conference: 2-15 December 2018, Tuesday, 18 December 2018, <http://enb.iisd.org/climate/cop24/enb/>.

Actors the TD succeeded to take stock of existing activities, initiatives and solution-oriented approaches worldwide and to showcase exemplary action on the ground. However, as all information was provided voluntarily and the process was not linked to binding obligations or an analysis of the effectiveness of the approaches and policies, accountability was limited. Finally, the process deliberately produced only qualitative, non-confrontational conclusions. For the GST, it would be helpful to develop strategies for how to alleviate the problem caused by its mandate to assess only collective progress.

On knowledge and learning, submissions to the Talanoa Platform addressed all three questions of the TD, providing an extensive overview on the status of and approaches towards climate policies. Submissions included information on challenges and obstacles as well as best practices. Nonetheless, knowledge and learning could have been supported by more in-depth analysis of the individual submissions' content. However, as noted in the preceding section on the GST, the capacity of Parties to process all these submissions is limited. This raises the question how to better harness the wealth of information that will be put on the table during the GST process. One avenue for doing so could be to strongly involve independent experts, as is being done in some of the other processes that will be discussed in the following sections.

### 3.3 The Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum (HLPF)

#### 3.3.1 Part A - Policy background and review objectives of the HLPF

In 2015, UN member states consensually adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).<sup>8</sup> Within this broad frame, the UN member states themselves have to decide on approaches and concrete measure to implement the SDGs. Sub-goals and indicators are presented but it is not specified how the goals are to be achieved. During the negotiations on the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs there had been conflicts over the definition of follow-up and review procedures on implementation efforts (Beisheim 2016 and 2018). There was strong opposition by countries against a binding framework for monitoring and national progress reports. There was a preference for more sovereign national decisions on which indicators to use instead of applying uniform global indicators. Countries preferred to decide themselves on the indicators used nationally. Proposals for critical evaluation of the national reports and the discussion of necessary changes based on additional information from parliaments and local authorities, civil society and other local stakeholders were rejected.

As a solution, the United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF)<sup>9</sup> was established in 2013 replacing the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) which had been meeting annually since 1993. It was mandated in 2012 subsequent to the negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), "The Future We Want". The HLPF now is the central platform of the United Nations for the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs at the global level<sup>10</sup>.

The objective of the HLPF is to support member states in taking on political leadership and responsibility for implementing Agenda 2030. Its role is defined as overseeing a network of

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1) (New York: UN, October 2015).

<sup>9</sup> <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf> (accessed 22.08.2019).

<sup>10</sup> General Assembly resolution 70/299 provides further guidance on the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs



voluntary follow-up and review processes. In February 2013, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution providing guidance on mandate and procedures including reviews:<sup>11</sup>

- The HLPF encourages member states to “conduct regular and inclusive reviews of progress at the national and sub-national levels, which are country-led and country-driven” (para 79).
- National reviews are expected to serve as a basis for the regular reviews by the HLPF.
- Regular reviews by the HLPF are to be voluntary, state-led and undertaken by both developed and developing countries (para 84 of the 2030 Agenda),
- and shall provide a platform for partnerships, including through the participation of major groups and other relevant stakeholders (ibid).
- The HLPF adopts intergovernmentally negotiated political declarations.

The Forum’s first meeting was held on 24 September 2013.

Governments are mandated to review the functioning of the HLPF processes itself every four years. Objectives are to take stock of the HLPF cycle and to reflect on how to strengthen the HLPF. The first review takes place during the UN General Assembly’s 74th session (July 2020)<sup>12</sup>. In order to prepare this review, UN DESA invited HLPF participants to a survey in July 2019. The results of the 234 responses were published at the SDG Knowledge Platform<sup>13</sup>.

### 3.3.2 Part B - Basic Design of the Process

The HLPF reviews actions to implement 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the global level. Reporting obligations for stock taking comprise the so-called **thematic and SDG reviews**. Outlined as a four-year review cycle, the HLPF meets annually to discuss one overarching theme (Thematic Review) and selected SDGs in more detail (SDG Reviews). By the end of a four-year cycle, all 17 SDGs should have been reviewed.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations prepares the thematic and SDG Reviews, which are annual progress reports providing a global overview of the current situation of the SDGs based on the latest available SDG indicator data.

- Reviews should build on existing platforms and review procedures (including their reports, data, and analyses) and avoid duplication.
- Thematic Reviews are to be supported by reviews by the functional commissions of the ECOSOC and other intergovernmental bodies and forums
- Working groups of the extended Executive Committee for Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA Plus,) evaluate the material from the UN system on the SDGs being reviewed.

<sup>11</sup> The format and organizational aspects of the Forum are outlined in General Assembly resolution 67/290. UNGA, *Format and Organizational Aspects of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development* (A/RES/67/290) (New York: UN, August 2013).

<sup>12</sup> General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/299

<sup>13</sup> SDG Knowledge Platform: Comprehensive HLPF Survey. Results. Evaluation of the HLPF after 4 years. [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/24802Comprehensive\\_HLPF\\_Survey\\_Results\\_FINAL.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/24802Comprehensive_HLPF_Survey_Results_FINAL.pdf) (accessed 24.1.2020)

They present the results in short reports (background notes), which are consolidated before the HLPF in an Expert Group Meeting.

The quadrennial **Global Sustainable Development Reports** (GSDR) provide guidance on the state of global sustainable development from a scientific perspective, which should help address the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, provide lessons learned, while focusing on challenges, address new and emerging issues and highlight emerging trends and actions. It should inform the HLPF, shall strengthen the science-policy interface and provide a strong evidence-based instrument to support policymakers in promoting poverty eradication and sustainable development.

**Voluntary National Reports** (VNR) aim to facilitate the sharing of individual country experiences, including successes, challenges and lessons learned, with a view to accelerating the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The VNRs also seek to strengthen policies and institutions of governments and to mobilize multi-stakeholder support and partnerships for the implementation of the SDGs

### 3.3.3 Part C - Interface between political and technical process

Reviews are discussed at the regular annual HLPF meetings. Participants are all States Members of the United Nations and States members of specialized agencies, UN Organisations and representatives from major groups. The HLPF meets under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council for eight days, including a three-day ministerial segment and every four years two further days at the level of Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the General Assembly<sup>14</sup>. Results are the adoption of negotiated Ministerial declarations which are negotiated before the HLPF meets and the publication of the GSDR.

Technical expert input is organised via voluntary inputs to the HLPF online Platform. The GSDR is the means for putting a science-policy interface in place. An independent group of 15 scientists drafts the quadrennial GSDR. It is evidence-based to support policymakers in promoting poverty eradication and sustainable development. It is made available for a wide range of stakeholders, including business and civil society as well as the wider public. Each year, in order to strengthen the science-policy interface at the annual HLPF convened under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council, scientists who work on the GSDR could be invited to provide scientific input into the discussion, including on the theme of the HLPF.

Participation rights for non-state actors at all official meetings are mandated by General Assembly resolution A/67/290 §14 and §15 and is primarily organised through The Major Groups and other Stakeholders (MGoS).

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<sup>14</sup> In 2019 the SDG SUMMIT was held on 24 - 25 September in New York. The UN General Assembly adopted a Political Resolution on 15 October 2019. A/RES/74/4. <https://undocs.org/A/RES/74/4> (accessed 9.3.2020)



### 3.3.4 Part D – Analysis

The first HLPF Cycle will be under review in July 2020. The survey on the HLPF performance conducted among HLPF participants indicates the following overall satisfaction with HLPF processes:

HLPF Function	%*
Thematic Reviews of SDGs	51
Identification of Trends and Emerging Issues	50
Voluntary National Reviews	49
Platform for Partnerships	44
Promotion of UN System-wide Coherence and Policy Coordination	44
Provision of High-Level Political Leadership and Guidance	38
Improved Science-Policy Interface	30
*Percentage of respondents indicating function fulfillment (Source: SDG Knowledge Platform)	

Beisheim (2018) concludes that the procedures for preparing the follow up and reviews of the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs have to be further improved for an effective stock taking and for applying the results for enhanced action of the Member States. Especially important recommendations with a view to the design of the GST are

- to mandate and develop good practice guidelines for the reviews that are sufficiently flexible and establish / further develop minimum standards,
- the timing of reviews and preparation of reports must be available early and well in advance of meetings,
- experiences with the HLPF thematic reviews show that a presentation of data on agreed indicators is not sufficient for a meaningful review, a synthesis should be complemented by an analysis. Integrated assessments could identify entry points for appropriate and coherent measures in all relevant policy areas in order to enable and force discussion and recommendations for appropriate action.

Comparable to the Talanoa Dialogue, the HLPF processes have to a differing extent fulfilled the three governance functions:

The HLPF processes are limited regarding the guidance and signal functions. The basic vehicle would be the Ministerial Declaration. However, it is negotiated already before the HLPF sessions. Hence it does not reflect on the analysis from the thematic, national, or regional learning processes and it is not action-oriented. Political leadership and guidance for further implementation has been limited in the Declarations adopted so far. The survey preparing the review of the HLPF processes supports this view with a lower rating of 38 %. It also indicates this as a major point for improvement: 86 % of the respondents agree that declarations should better reflect the discussions at the HLPF and 83 explicitly call for including more political guidance and follow up.

The HLPF experience therefore shows that the timing and coordination of the various processes is significant. The analytical work needs to be completed before the high-level phase, otherwise the results of the analytical work cannot be taken up by decision-makers.

The quadrennial session at the level of Heads of State and Government bears the potential to maximize the guidance and signal provided by the process. However, so far the results are prepared before the meeting and cannot cover discussions and direct results of the session. For the GST, it could equally be very useful if it included such a session. Ideally, Heads of State and Government could highlight key outcomes of the GST process and commit to fully taken the outcomes into account in the subsequent NDC development process.

As for transparency and accountability, the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) are considered as a success in terms of process (Beisheim 2018). To date, more than half of the UN's member states have reported to the HLPF on how they implement the SDGs. However, the quality of the reports and underlying review processes must be improved. An early review of 43 VNR showed their great diversity.<sup>15</sup> Reports vary according to length, structure, and thematic coverage. This reflects both the diversity in national contexts and the diversity of the approaches applied for compiling the information and preparing the reports. Moreover, the consequences of the reporting are also unclear. In 2018, many of the participants were disappointed by the lack of results. Criticism also points to the representation of VNRs at the HLPF meetings. As only three days are available to present 40-50 VNRs, there is only very limited time to present and discuss the individual reports (De Burca, 2019).

Thematic and SDG Reviews focus on data on the agreed indicators. An integrated assessment of the data that identifies entry points for measures in all relevant policy areas might enable and enforce member states to further discuss recommendations for appropriate action. The participation processes and science-policy interface are criticized as being too low level by several CSOs and HLPF participants (see survey results above, de Burca, 2019). Increasing civil society participation is one of the major suggestions to improve the HLPF in the future. Strong participation by experts and civil society would be equally important for the GST in order to fully mobilise all available knowledge and account for differing perspectives in the stocktaking process.

Despite this criticism on participation in the HLPF, the knowledge transfer and learning functions are partially being delivered. The annual UNSDG progress report, the quadrennial GSDR and particularly the VNR are already a source of good examples of SDG implementation, showcase solutions, sharing implementation challenges and, hence, for learning and adapting experiences of other countries to the circumstances of the own country. The opportunities for knowledge exchange and learning at the HLPF meeting are nevertheless limited as for each VNR only about 15 minutes of presentation are available. There is only little time for discussion following the presentation. It is recommended to provide more time for interactive discussion.<sup>16</sup> In order to strengthen the learning character, it has been suggested that written questions could be collected, and followed by written replies. A Group of Friends of VNRs, launched by the 2019 President of ECOSOC, aim to foster dialogue and peer learning around the reviews not only at HLPF meetings but generally between regions and countries at different levels of development.

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<sup>15</sup> Partners for Review (2018) Comparative analysis of 43 VNRs submitted to the HLPF 2017. Non-paper for Discussion. <http://sdghelpdesk.unescap.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/P4R-Comparative-analysis-of-2017-VNRs.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> Background Note to the HLPF reflecting results of an Expert Group Meeting on Lessons learned from the first cycle of the HLPF. See [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/24045HLPF\\_BN\\_1.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/24045HLPF_BN_1.pdf)



The national VNR preparation processes have been assessed to foster knowledge, learning and capacity building: The preparatory process for a VNR presentation has the potential to drive the setting up of coordination institutions and mechanisms at the national level, the identification of synergies and the convening of all actors connected to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.<sup>17</sup> However, as the GST mandate is to review collective action, a comparable element is not realistic under the GST.

### 3.4 Review processes in the UN human rights system

#### 3.4.1 Part A - Policy background and review objectives in the UN human rights system

After World War II, the United Nations (UN) was established. Its purposes include “to achieve international co-operation (...) in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”<sup>18</sup>

In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN’s General Assembly proclaiming civil, political and economic rights for all. On its basis, two legally binding treaties were adopted in 1966: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Over the years, these treaties were complemented by several other core international human rights treaties, inter alia, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Optional protocols supplement some of the treaties, leading to a total of 18 international treaties.<sup>19</sup>

Each treaty has its own review provisions. Every two to five years, depending on the treaty, member states are to submit reports on how the respective treaty is implemented in their national legislation. These reports may be supplemented by information from, inter alia, other UN bodies, NGOs, research institutions, and the media. Based on this information, separate committees of experts monitor implementation of each treaty and issue recommendations for the state to comply with.

Committees of independent experts – the human rights treaty bodies – monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties<sup>20</sup>. The treaty bodies publish

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 1, available at: <http://www.unwebsite.com/charter>. In detail, the purposes are:

1. “To , (...) and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples (...);
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx>

<sup>20</sup> The official website states that “There are ten human rights treaty bodies composed of independent experts of recognized competence in human rights, who are nominated and elected for four years by State parties.” <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/Overview.aspx> (accessed 9.3.2020). At the current term,, committees have between 10 and 23 members. Every 2 years half of the committees’ members are elected. This

their interpretation of the provisions of their respective human rights treaties as “general recommendations” or “general comments”. Frequently, general comments aim at clarifying State parties’ reporting duties regarding specific provisions and make recommendations on how to implement treaty provision. They can, however, also cover cross-cutting issues such as the rights of minorities and the role of national human rights institutions.

As human rights is a cross-cutting theme in all UN policies and programmes, nearly all UN bodies and specialized agencies are in some way involved in the protection of human rights. The UN has six principal organs. One of them, the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) “may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”<sup>21</sup>.

In 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) as the inter-governmental body responsible “for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner”<sup>22</sup>. It shall

- “(a) Promote human rights education and learning as well as advisory services, technical assistance and capacity-building, to be provided in consultation with and with the consent of Member States concerned;
- (b) Serve as a forum for dialogue on thematic issues on all human rights;
- (c) Make recommendations to the General Assembly for the further development of international law in the field of human rights;
- (d) Promote the full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by States and follow-up to the goals and commitments related to the promotion and protection of human rights emanating from United Nations conferences and summits;
- (e) Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs; such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies (...);
- (f) Contribute, through dialogue and cooperation, towards the prevention of human rights violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies;
- (g) Assume the role and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights relating to the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (...);

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ensures a balance between continuity and change in committee composition. All elected members serve in their personal capacity. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/ElectionsofTreatyBodiesMembers.aspx> (accessed 9.3.2020)

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Art. 62, available at: <http://www.unwebsite.com/charter>

<sup>22</sup> United Nations, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 15 March 2006, 3 April 2006, A/RES/60/251



- (h) Work in close cooperation in the field of human rights with Governments, regional organizations, national human rights institutions and civil society;
- Make recommendations with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights;
- (j) Submit an annual report to the General Assembly<sup>23</sup>.

While most UN-level reports on human rights review the current human rights situation at country level, there are not only country-specific but also thematic mandates for independent human rights experts to report and advise on human rights in the system of special procedures of the Human Rights Council. There are 44 thematic and 12 country mandates with 80 mandate holders within this system.

Supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), special procedures have various tasks: They

- undertakes country visits,
- bring alleged violations or abuses in individual cases and concerns of a broader, structural nature to the attention of States and others,
- conduct thematic studies and convene expert consultations,
- contribute to the development of international human rights standards,
- engage in advocacy, raises public awareness, and provides advice for technical cooperation.<sup>24</sup>

While special procedures annually report to the Human Rights Council, most mandates also report to the General Assembly. These reports contain a description of all activities undertaken during the year in question and discuss working methods, theoretical analysis, general trends and developments with regard to their respective mandates. Furthermore, they may contain general recommendations.<sup>25</sup> They do, however, not take stock of the current global situation regarding thematic issues.

### 3.4.2 Part B - Basic Design of the Process of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)

Within four-and-half years, the UPR assesses the extent to which all UN Member States respect their human rights obligations set out in

- the UN Charter,
- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- human rights instruments to which the State is party (human rights treaties ratified by the State concerned),
- voluntary pledges and commitments made by the State, and
- applicable international humanitarian law.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 15 March 2006, 3 April 2006, A/RES/60/251

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/sp/pages/welcomepage.aspx>

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/AnnualreportsHRC.aspx>

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- the UN Charter,
- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- human rights instruments to which the State is party (human rights treaties ratified by the State concerned),
- voluntary pledges and commitments made by the State, and
- applicable international humanitarian law.<sup>26</sup>

The UPR has various objectives:

- “(a) The improvement of the human rights situation on the ground;
- (b) The fulfilment of the State’s human rights obligations and commitments and assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the State;
- (c) The enhancement of the State’s capacity and of technical assistance, in consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned;
- (d) The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders;
- (e) Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights;
- (f) The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the Council, other human rights bodies and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.”<sup>27</sup>

It considers information provided by the State under review, recommendations from the UN human rights system as well as a summary of information and recommendations provided by civil society organizations.<sup>28</sup> Following the national reports, there is a dialogue between the State under review and all UN Member States.

### 3.4.3 Part C - Interface between political and technical process

The reviews take place during three UPR sessions per year and are conducted by the UPR Working Group. A group of three States, known as “troika”, serves as rapporteur, and the President of the Human Rights Council chairs the proceedings.<sup>29</sup> The reviews take the form of interactive discussions between the State under review and other UN Member States. In these discussions, all UN Member States can ask question, and make comments and recommendations while other stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), indigenous organizations, and UN agencies may not speak during the sessions.

The UPR results in an outcome report which contains a summary of the dialogue including recommendations and observations made by other States to the State under review. The

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>27</sup> Human Rights Council (2007): Resolution 5/1. Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council.

<sup>28</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>29</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)



reviewed State has to respond to the recommendations in written form. Subsequently, the outcome report is adopted. During the adoption of the outcome of the State's review, NHRIs, NGOs and other stakeholders may make general comments.<sup>30</sup>

While the Human Rights Council encourages the State under review to implement all recommendations, the UPR holds all countries accountable for progress or failure in implementing the recommendations during the subsequent review.<sup>31</sup>

#### 3.4.4 Part D – Analysis

Overall, the review processes in the UN human rights system mostly focus on the performance of individual states and individual human rights violations. There is little consideration of collective progress, which limits the applicability of lessons learned to the GST. However, the strong role of independent experts could be adopted for the GST.

##### Guidance and Signal

The main output of the HRC are resolutions. As in the Talanoa Dialogue and the HLPF, the guidance and signal impact is limited because of their very general nature.

In addition, guidance and signal are provided by the human rights treaty bodies. The treaty bodies publish their interpretation of the provisions of their respective human rights treaties as “general recommendations” or “general comments”. Frequently, general comments aim at clarifying State parties’ reporting duties regarding specific provisions and make recommendations on how to implement treaty provision. They can, however, also cover cross-cutting issues such as the rights of minorities and the role of national human rights institutions. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council has mandated several dozen independent experts, the so-called “special procedures”, to, inter alia, conduct thematic studies, contribute to the development of international human rights standards and raise public awareness.

The GST could similarly profit from including independent experts in such a strong role. Strong involvement of experts could help Parties to process the vast wealth of information that will be made available as part of the GST process. In the human rights system, independent experts develop detailed recommendations for the implementation of each individual human right. The GST could for example take a sectoral approach, with dedicated work streams on each sector and strong involvement of independent experts and stakeholders to develop recommendations on how to enhance ambition.

##### Transparency and Accountability

In the UN Human Rights Council, the Universal Periodic Review regularly assesses the extent to which all States respect their human rights obligations and provides recommendations on how States can improve their human rights situation. As of 2014, one in two of the UPR's recommendations were either fully or partially implemented three years after the UPR.<sup>32</sup> With this process, the UPR significantly enhances transparency as well as accountability. In addition, the treaty bodies of the various human rights treaties also assess States' compliance with their respective treaty obligations. In addition, the Special Procedures also have the mandate to bring cases of human rights violations to the attention of States and others.

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>32</sup> UPR Info (2014): Beyond promises. The impact of the UPR on the ground.

However, the GST is not able to assess the performance of individual countries and hence has not at all a mandate to bring compliance failure of Parties to the attention of the COP; its mandate is limited to assessing collective progress. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the human rights system assigns such a strong role to independent experts in monitoring States' compliance with their treaty obligations. As noted above, involvement of independent experts would also be of benefit in the GST.

### Knowledge and Learning

The UPR also aims to provide technical assistance to States and enhance their capacity to deal effectively with human rights challenges and to share best practices in the field of human rights among States and other stakeholders. For that purpose, in 2007, the HRC established the Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assistance (resolution 6/17), to provide, a source of financial and technical assistance to help countries with the follow up and implementation of UPR recommendations.<sup>33</sup> This state-centered approach, however, is not appropriate for the GST as it covers only collective ambition and is not connected to provision of means of implementation.

Regarding knowledge and learning Parra (2016) points to a potential catalyst role of the UPR for generating public debates on the situation of human rights in the national context by stakeholders. Through interactive participation procedures, a regulatory mechanism could evolve, which "draws attention both to the goals (the UPR) seeks to realize and to the specific devices it deploys in order to achieve these goals" (Parra 2016). However, again, as the GST reviews collective progress, such a kind of mechanism might be difficult to establish.

## 3.5 The review processes of the Montreal Protocol

### 3.5.1 Part A - Policy background and review objectives of the Montreal Protocol

The depletion of the ozone layer by chemical substances was discovered in the mid-1970s. In 1985, the Vienna Convention was agreed upon. The Vienna Convention was a non-binding agreement that provided the legal framework necessary to negotiate regulatory measures. Already 16 months later in 1987, the Montreal Protocol was signed by 24 nations and the European Community. It is a global agreement to protect the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). It is the first treaty that was ratified by all countries of the world. The 197 Parties are committed to control ozone depleting chemicals and to replace them by alternative substances. Starting with the reduction and phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the Montreal Protocol was amended six times. In the most recent Kigali Amendment in 2016, the group of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which in addition to being ozone-depleting also has high global warming potentials, was added to the list of substances regulated under the Montreal Protocol (UBA 2017).

"...The Montreal Protocol has been widely regarded as the most successful environmental protection agreement ever reached to date." (EU Commission 2007). It is often considered a prototype of international environmental regimes, as "... the worldwide phase-out of ozone depleting substances shows that effective environment protection measures are possible based on global-level treaties and lead to results which rise to the challenges" (UBA 2017).

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<sup>33</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRTrustFunds.aspx>



The Montreal Protocol is assessment driven. Science provided the information that stimulated concern (Le Prestre et. al. 1998). The core concept behind is to implement the precautionary principle and claiming to act without total scientific certainty (Canan and Reichman 2002). Hence the Protocol and its amendments are based on expert advice from advisory bodies.

Article 6 of the Montreal Protocol broadly mandates an assessment and review process on the basis of available scientific, environmental, technical and economic information<sup>34</sup>. Under Art. 7 of the Montreal Protocol, Parties are required to report various types of information on ODS to the Ozone Secretariat at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).<sup>35</sup> The data is used to determine the calculated levels of production and consumption, upon which the control measures are based.

Several advisory boards have been established under the mandate of Art. 6. They report their conclusions to the Parties in advance of their annual meetings, the meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP) or its intersessional preparatory meetings of the Open Ended Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (OEWG). The terms of reference for these major assessments are decided at the MOPs.<sup>36</sup> The institutional structure of the Ozone Regime is presented in Annex 4.

The expert advisory bodies are three review panels, the Panel for Scientific Assessment, the Panel for Environmental Assessment and the Technical and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP)<sup>37</sup>. The TEAP has five Technical Options Committees (TOCs) covering industrial sectors associated with ozone-depleting substances (ibid, p. 56).

The Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP) consists of hundreds of scientists. It assesses the status of the depletion of the ozone layer and relevant atmospheric science issues. SAP prepares a status report every three or four years.

The objectives of the TEAP are to analyse technical information and to present technical and economic information relevant to policy. There is no mandate for the evaluation of policy issues, to give policy recommendations, or to assess the merit or success of national plans, strategies, or regulations. The analysis of technical issues includes a regular evaluation whether exemptions from phase out for some substances are necessary (CFCs, halons, and methyl bromide). That means regulated substances might be still used for some important purposes where no alternative substances are available (safety issues, etc). The TEAP terms of reference<sup>38</sup> specify the tasks (see 3.5.2).

### 3.5.2 Part B - Basic Design of the assessment processes and role of advisory bodies

The reviews under the Montreal Protocol are mandatory and include annual and quadrennial reporting. They comprise the phase-out and phase down of ozone-depleting substances of Parties, technical progress in all sectors reviewed and technically and economically feasible choices for the use of alternative substances as well as technical progress on the recovery,

<sup>34</sup> Montreal Protocol at [https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1989/01/19890101%2003-25%20AM/Ch\\_XXVII\\_02\\_ap.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1989/01/19890101%2003-25%20AM/Ch_XXVII_02_ap.pdf)

<sup>35</sup> <https://ozone.unep.org/countries/data-reporting-tools>

<sup>36</sup> WMO (World Meteorological Organization), Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion: 2018, Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project – Report No. 58, 588 pp., Geneva, Switzerland, 2018.

<sup>37</sup> In 1990, two separate panels on Technology and Economy were merged to the TEAP (Carvalho, 1998).

<sup>38</sup> [https://ozone.unep.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MP\\_Handbook\\_2019.pdf](https://ozone.unep.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/MP_Handbook_2019.pdf)

reuse and destruction of ozone-depleting substances. In addition, the reviews have to account for all forms of ozone-depleting substances (production, use, inventory, contained in products) and for emissions from different use patterns. Data have to be coordinated among different Expert Panels in order to reconcile estimated emissions and atmospheric concentrations.

Basically two Expert Panels carry out the reviews: A Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP) reports real data on ozone concentrations and a Technical and Environmental Assessment Panel (TEAP) reports policy relevant technical information that drives the evolution of the Montreal Protocol.

There are several reporting obligations. TEAP delivers an Annual Progress Reports on topics as requested by Parties and special in-depth reports on time sensitive issues. TEAP and SAP both deliver Quadrennial Assessment Reports, with the 9th QAR in 2018.

The scope of these reports is clearly defined as “scientific/technical” as any matter that might be seen as “political” is carefully excluded from reports and there is no interpretation or recommendations regarding political implications of the technical assessments.

The reviews measure both progress of individual activities and collective action of Parties. The analysis of reported data and comparison with observed data on ozone concentrations from the SAP report and comparison with emission figures reported by Parties to the Ozone Secretariat enables to identify gaps between reported data and observed. The gaps give hints on releases from banks, unexpected emissions non-compliance, illegal trade, etc.

### 3.5.3 Part C - Interface between political and technical process

The reports are regularly discussed at the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) and in the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG). At the MOP, government delegates participate and a High Level Segment of the MOP takes decisions.

The interaction is as follows: The terms of reference of the reports are decided by MOP. The reviews are carried out by technical experts. The Assessment Panels provide policy relevant technical inputs on the MOP agenda. Inputs have to be agreed by consensus. Parties rely on the Assessment Panels’ (esp. TEAP and TOC) ability to provide objective and balanced information. Members are individuals with the responsibility and integrity to act independently. The member composition is essential for balanced results. The Assessment Panels report directly to the MOP as periodic reviews are submitted to MOP/OEWG.<sup>39</sup> The MOP has frequently based their decisions upon the reports. In particular, six amendments to the Montreal Protocol were adopted on the basis of the results of the review processes.

The technical experts in the Assessment Panels operate with substantial independence under their respective chairs. Industry expertise was included from the beginning. In particular the inclusion of industry stakeholders in TEAP has been assessed as a precondition for success and as a stimulus for innovations of alternative substances. There are no other procedures for Non-State Actor Participation than the nomination of experts for the assessment panels.

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<sup>39</sup> van Slooten, 1998:151.



### 3.5.4 Part D – Analysis

The basic measure of success regarding the objectives of the Montreal Protocol is the observed development of the “ozone hole”. Quadrennial Assessment reports do not only focus on emission figures but also report on the observed changes. The 2018 assessment report states that “The Antarctic ozone hole is recovering, while continuing to occur every year. As a result of the Montreal Protocol much more severe ozone depletion in the polar regions has been avoided.” And “The Antarctic ozone hole is expected to gradually close, with (...) ozone returning to 1980 values in the 2060s.” (WMO, 2019, p.ES 3). Although the climate change challenge is in many regards different from the ozone challenge, a lesson from the Montreal Protocol could be to link the GST with latest IPCC scientific knowledge on observed climate change impacts in order to make a visible link between the review of policy progress and state of climate impacts. This would improve the signal and guidance function of the GST considerably. In particular, the GST could highlight that substantial climate impacts are already occurring and that they are going to get far worse. Such a signal could help to underscore the need to step up on mitigation as well as on adaptation.

Regarding the MP reporting on the status quo of phasing out and down and discussion to end exceptions, the guidance and signal function towards the overall objective is fulfilled. The development and further inclusion of substances is assessment driven. Periodic reviews are the basis of decision making at the MOP. MOP specifies the general ToR as regards the next quadrennial reviews. TEAP and SAP present their assessments to the Open Ended Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (OEWG) and MOP and respond to their questions.<sup>40</sup> OEWG discusses issues with TEAP and SAP and prepares decisions for the MOP. MOP mandates the Assessment Panels to continue analysis, to conduct additional research, decides on issues, etc. For example, in case of the Kigali Amendment in 2016, TEAPs periodic reviews have been contributed to the decisions in OEWG and at the MOP.<sup>41</sup> A comparable institutional body and process for regular but still flexible reviews is not yet in sight under the UNFCCC. However, the GST could adopt the sectoral approach which is being applied under the MP. Similar to how the MP review bodies have been developing recommendations for phase-outs of specific substances, the GST could break the long-term emission target of the Paris Agreement down to the sector level and develop recommendations and roadmaps for how such sectoral decarbonisation targets could be achieved.

The transparency and accountability of the review processes under the MP is high as there is an explicit review procedure and the processes and terms of reference are clear. The MOP receives reviews with technical assessments and observations by its advisory bodies on substances and country/country group activities. In addition MOP receives reporting data (on ODS) by the Ozone Secretariat. In cases of deviations of data observed by SAP from reported data, the gap is not always easy to explain or to account to specific Parties. MOP might request further analysis from TEAP. An example for this is the case of unexpected increases of the emission of CFC-11 banned since 2010<sup>42</sup>. Global monitoring and observations detected that approximately 50% of the unexpected emissions have come from China. The issue was intensively discussed at COP31 in 2019 and China explained the

<sup>40</sup> ENB MOP 31 analysis report. <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb19152e.pdf>

<sup>41</sup> OEWG 37: <http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb19116e.pdf>

OEWG 38 and MOP28: <http://enb.iisd.org/ozone/resumed-oewg38-mop28/>

<sup>42</sup> <http://enb.iisd.org/ozone/mop31/>

steps taken to address illegal CFC-11 use. However, given its collective nature, such an approach is not possible under the GST.

To a large extent the review processes are organised to stimulate knowledge exchange and learning: Inclusion of industry stakeholders in TEAP has been assessed as precondition for success and to speed up innovations of alternative substances. While the challenges are very different, the general approach of strongly involving experts could easily be adopted for the GST. As part of the “technical dialogue”, the GST could organise structured expert dialogues for each sector so that best practices can be exchanged, highlighted and translated into relevant recommendations. However, the GST would need to go beyond purely technical considerations. Different from ODS, the challenge with GHGs is to change the engine of the economic system while running it. The implementation of technical mitigation options therefore requires careful consideration of social, economic, political and institutional implications.



## 4 Summary and conclusions



In order to achieve the PA objectives, increasing ambition and implementing the NDCs in the coming years are central. The CMA will regularly take stock of the implementation of the PA as regards mitigation, adaptation and the provision of support. Individual country progress is not reviewed. The mandate of the GST is to collect information and prepare it for a technical assessment, to carry out a technical assessment of **collective** progress as well as to consider outputs of the technical assessment for informing Parties. That means the GST has a potentially decisive role helping to fulfill the objectives of the PA. This role is analysed by the contribution of the GST to the three governance functions guidance and signal, transparency and accountability and knowledge and learning. Depending on the design of the GST, the GST may perform differently on these functions.

The objective of this report is to review existing international regimes as regards their review and stocktaking processes, the contribution of the review process to the three governance functions and, finally, to derive lessons for the GST. The processes reviewed are the design of the upcoming Global Stocktake itself, the Talanoa Dialogue which is the direct precursor of the GST, the Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum because of its regular stocktaking process regarding progress of the SDGs, the review processes of the UN human rights system and the review processes and assessment panels of the Montreal Protocol because of the long experience with mandatory review processes.

### General observations

All these review and stocktaking processes relate to a long-term goal and review activities to achieve them. The review processes are on collective action with individual components, such as submissions showcasing good practices (TD), on collective action regarding thematic foci supplemented by country reviews (HLPF), with obligations to report national and atmospheric data (Montreal Protocol) or focus on individual progress (UN Human Rights System). They have been based on voluntary submissions organised via an online platform in the cases of the TD and HLPF. The Montreal Protocol and the human rights system have mandatory reporting obligations.

Whereas the TD was a one-year process bridging a time gap and was a test case for the global stocktake, the HLPF, the Human Rights System and the Montreal Protocol have regular meetings and carry out reviews according to fixed cycles.

The HLPF and the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP) are in addition regularly informed by mandated Assessment Reports written by a group of nominated scientists. This is similar to the role of the IPCC for the UNFCCC. However, whereas the uptake of the scientific advice by the HLPF and TD is rather muted, the MOP of the Montreal Protocol took decisions on substances and phase-out schedules based on Scientist Panel recommendations

Though developed for the purpose of quite different objectives under the respective regimes, experiences with these stocktaking processes provide valuable insights for the fulfilment of the governance functions of the GST.

### **Lessons for the Global Stocktake on “Guidance and Signal”:**

In all processes, results are discussed in high-level fora, the Conferences of the Parties and the HLPF meeting under the auspices of the ECOSOC or under the auspices of the UN General Assembly or the MOP.

The TD political phase ran in parallel to the COP negotiations. As to the results, the TD’s main output was the non-committal Talanoa Call for Action adopted at COP 24. The Talanoa Dialogue reiterated the objectives of the Paris Agreement but did not provide further guidance on ways how to achieve the objective. The GST will similarly run in parallel to the negotiations. To maximise its impact, the final result of the GST should be a decision by the CMA fully endorsing the results of the GST and urging the Parties to take them fully into account when revising their NDCs.

Another question for the GST is how to ensure that Parties fully engage with the information of the stocktaking process and incorporate lessons learned into their national policies. It might be helpful if the GST was designed in a way to engage all relevant national ministries, not only the environment ministries represented at the climate negotiations.

The experiences with events around the TD highlight that the process surrounding the GST may be at least as important as the official outcome. The GST may serve as “echo chamber” for broader discussions on the need to raise ambition. Progressive Parties and non-Party stakeholders should therefore develop strategies to maximally leverage the public attention that may be generated by the GST process.

The main results of the HLPF review processes are Ministerial Declarations. However, already by the design of the time schedules, the ministerial declaration cannot reflect on any of the HLPF results as it is already negotiated before the HLPF sessions. Hence it does not include analysis from the thematic, national, or regional learning processes and it is not action-oriented. Although being a ministerial declaration, political leadership and hence a guidance and signal function for further implementation is rather limited as there is no link between high-level declaration and results of the review process. It has therefore been criticised<sup>43</sup> that the HLPF has only partially fulfilled its mandate to provide political leadership, recommendations and guidance as these elements are missing in the Ministerial Declarations. This experience shows that the timing and coordination of the various processes is significant. The analytical work needs to be completed before the high-level phase, otherwise the results of the analytical work cannot be taken up by decision-makers. The HLPF experience also shows that GST could have a high-level session at COPs. Ideally, Heads of State and Government could highlight key outcomes of the GST process and commit to fully taken the outcomes into account in the subsequent NDC development process.

Guidance and signal is provided and strengthened by the review processes under the Montreal Protocol linking the real observations of a publicly visible indicator for achieving the objectives (which is the impact of the depleting activity, the “ozone hole”) with mandated reviews on substances and sectors and regularly reported ODS figures. Similarly, the GST could highlight that substantial climate impacts are already occurring and that they are going to get far worse. Such a signal could help to underscore the need to step up on mitigation as well as on adaptation.



Regarding the Montreal Protocol, the review process and consultation with the Assessment Panels are a central part of the decision making. Periodic reviews and their annual updates are regularly on the MOP and OEWG agendas. A comparably complex institutional body and process for regular but still flexible reviews is not yet in sight under the UNFCCC. However, the GST could adopt the sectoral approach which is being applied under the MP. Similar to how the MP review bodies have been developing recommendations for phase-outs of specific substances, the GST could break the long-term emission target of the Paris Agreement down to the sector level and develop recommendations and roadmaps for how such sectoral decarbonisation targets could be achieved.

In the UN human rights system, committees of independent experts – the human rights treaty bodies – are mandated to develop authoritative interpretations of the provisions of their respective human rights treaties as “general recommendations” or “general comments”. Frequently, these general comments aim at clarifying State parties’ reporting duties and make recommendations on how to implement treaty provision. In addition, the Human Rights Council has mandated several dozen independent experts, the so-called “special procedures”, to, inter alia, conduct thematic studies, contribute to the development of international human rights standards and raise public awareness. The GST could similarly profit from including independent experts in such a strong role to help Parties to process the vast wealth of information that will be made available as part of the GST process. In the human rights system, independent experts develop detailed recommendations for the implementation of each individual human right. The GST could for example take a sectoral approach, with dedicated work streams on each sector and strong involvement of independent experts and stakeholders, e.g from the IPCC, to develop recommendations on how to enhance ambition.

### **Lessons for the Global Stocktake on “Transparency and Accountability”**

Both the Talanoa Dialogue and the Agenda 2030 HLPF do not assess the performance of individual Parties. Despite individual submissions, (TD) and Voluntary National Reports (HLPF), analysis is limited to collective progress. In particular in the one-year TD, the review was dependent on voluntary, exemplary submissions that were synthesised to avoid individual review of progress or ambition. For the GST, it would be helpful to develop strategies for how to alleviate the problem caused by its mandate to assess only collective progress.

In case of the HLPF, thematic and SDG Reviews only present data on the agreed indicators. Integrated assessments should identify entry points for advanced appropriate and coherent measures in all relevant policy areas in order to enable and enforce member states to discuss recommendations for appropriate action. The individual VNR are widely agreed as being helpful. The quality of the VNR and underlying review processes could be improved. As the GST is only on collective progress, similar reports are not applicable under the GST. But may be re-discussed in the future.

Stakeholder involvement is stated a central goal in both the TD and HLPF. The HLPF has a procedure for the involvement of major groups. Civil Society Organisations (CSO), however, criticise that these participation rights are rather rhetoric and the HLPF remains a state-centered and state-driven process with marginal involvement of CSOs<sup>44</sup>. For example CSO

<sup>44</sup> de Burca, 2019, [http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/where-to-for-hlpf-review-process/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=SDG%20Update%20-%208%20October%202019%20AE&utm\\_content=SDG%20Update%20-](http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/where-to-for-hlpf-review-process/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=SDG%20Update%20-%208%20October%202019%20AE&utm_content=SDG%20Update%20-)

alternative reports have no official status. Also, the participation processes and science-policy interface are criticized as being too low level by several CSOs and HLPF participants. Strong participation by experts and civil society would be equally important for the GST in order to fully mobilise all available knowledge and account for differing perspectives in the stocktaking process.

Stakeholder involvement is not part of the processes under the Montreal Protocol, where in particular industry representatives are represented in Assessment Panels. These structured expert dialogues have had a decisive role in the assessment based decision making procedures of the Meeting of the Parties of the Montreal protocol.

The TD encouraged and promoted broad Non-Party stakeholder involvement and prepared an overview and a synthesis report to feed their inputs together with inputs by Parties or groups of Parties into the negotiations.

In the UN Human Rights Council, the Universal Periodic Review regularly assesses the extent to which all States respect their human rights obligations. The UPR provides recommendations on how States can improve their human rights situation. As of 2014, one in two of the UPR's recommendations were either fully or partially implemented three years after the UPR. In addition, the treaty bodies of the various human rights treaties also assess States' compliance with their respective treaty obligations. In addition, the Special Procedures also have the mandate to bring cases of human rights violations to the attention of States and others.

### **Lessons for the Global Stocktake on “Knowledge and Learning”**

Knowledge and learning have been institutionalised by the Assessment Panels, in particular the TEAP, under the Montreal Protocol. TEAP reports assess options and approaches to substances, sectors, countries and groups of countries. The MOP can request additional reporting content if needed. The advisory bodies integrate expertise of industry individuals. It has been assessed that this set-up has stimulated the invention of innovative alternative substances in industry and recommendations of and decisions on feasible phase out/phase down schedules by the MOP.

The TD has mobilised Parties to report activities and exchange with other Parties and stakeholders at different governance levels. However, there was no clear guidance and the complete process and follow-up was voluntary. Submissions were manifold and included information on challenges and obstacles as well as best practices. However, the capacity of Parties to process all these submissions is limited, though summary and synthesis reports had been prepared. This raises the question how to better harness the wealth of information that will be put on the table during the GST process. One avenue for doing so could be to strongly involve independent experts as in other review processes.

Knowledge exchange under the HLPF is organised via thematic discussion on SDGs and the VNR. However, this has proven to be of limited relevance as the time for presentation and discussion is very limited and follow-up processes are unclear. These processes are

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currently under review. For the GST, a lesson is to assign enough time to the discussion of GST reports.

Knowledge exchange and learning is being stimulated under the MP. The inclusion of industry stakeholders in the TEAP has been assessed as precondition for success and to speed up innovations of alternative substances. While the challenges are very different, the general approach of strongly involving experts could easily be adopted for the GST. As part of the 'technical dialogue', the GST could organise structured expert dialogues for each sector so that best practices can be exchanged, highlighted and translated into relevant recommendations. However, the GST would need to go beyond purely technical considerations. Different from ODS, the challenge with GHGs is to change the engine of the economic system while running it. The implementation of technical mitigation options therefore requires careful consideration of social, economic, political and institutional implications.

### **Conclusions...**

The following conclusions take the lessons from the review of the other processes and consider what they suggest for a GST process that helps deliver on promises of the Paris Agreement. These recommendations do not necessarily consider all the political or practical realities that constrain the GST process, but rather seek to sketch potential components of an idealized GST.

#### **...on the GST design and institutional setting**

- As recommended for the HLPF, the timing and coordination of various processes is significant for having a robust stocktaking process that delivers on all three functions. The experience of the HLPF highlights that the analytical work needs to be completed before the high-level phase, otherwise the results of the analytical work cannot be taken up by decision-makers.
- Experience from the TD shows that the question for the GST is how to ensure that Parties fully engage with the information of the stocktaking process and incorporate lessons learned into their national policies. It might be helpful if the GST was designed in a way to engage all relevant national ministries, not only the environment ministries represented at the climate negotiations.
- The HLPF experience shows that the GST could have a high-level session at COPs. Ideally, Heads of State and Government could highlight key outcomes of the GST process and commit to fully taken the outcomes into account in the subsequent NDC development process.
- The GST could adopt the sectoral approach which is being applied under the MP. Similar to how the MP review bodies have been developing recommendations for phase-outs of specific substances, the GST could break the long-term emission target of the Paris Agreement down to the sector level and develop recommendations and roadmaps for how such sectoral decarbonisation targets could be achieved.
- Within this sectoral approach, the GST could have dedicated work streams on each sector with strong involvement of independent experts, e.g. from the IPCC, and stakeholders to develop recommendations on how to enhance ambition.

- A common criticism of both the TD and the HLPF is that the high-level phase should engage in detail with the outcomes of the analytical work and aim for concluding not only with high-level political messages on the need to step up efforts, but also with detailed recommendations on how to do so. The outcome of the GST should therefore include a detailed technical summary of available options, best practices and recommendations, and the final CMA decision should engage with and endorse these results.

#### **...on the science policy interface**

- A lesson from the Montreal Protocol could be to link the GST with latest IPCC scientific knowledge on observed climate change impacts in order to make a visible link between the review of policy progress and state of climate impacts. In particular, the GST could highlight that substantial climate impacts are already occurring and that they are going to get far worse. Such a signal could help to underscore the need to step up on mitigation as well as on adaptation.
- Especially the example of the Montreal Protocol demonstrates that periodic review and stocktaking can indeed enable a further development of commitments. The involvement of industry experts in the assessment panels is widely credited as having been a key success factor in this regard.
- As demonstrated by the TEAP with its Technical Options Committees (TOCs), a sectoral approach to stocktaking has the potential to highlight additional mitigation potentials and to promote knowledge and learning on how to tap into these potentials. In a structured expert dialogue, best practices can be exchanged, highlighted and translated into relevant recommendations. However, the GST would need to go beyond purely technical considerations. The challenge with GHGs is to change the engine of the economic system while running it. The implementation of technical mitigation options therefore requires careful consideration of social, economic, political and institutional implications.
- Parties will hardly be able to digest all the information that is supposed to be drawn on in the GST. The UNFCCC Secretariat is therefore mandated to provide synthesis reports. In addition, direct involvement of independent experts as in the human rights system and the Montreal Protocol could also help Parties process the information. The technical dialogue, which is to be part of the GST, would be an appropriate framework for integrating participation of independent experts.

#### **...on participation**

- Several of the processes have been criticised for a lack of meaningful stakeholder participation. Strong participation by civil society would be similarly important for the GST in order to fully mobilise all available knowledge and account for differing perspectives in the stocktaking process.



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## 6 Annex



### 6.1 Annex 1: Review framework and tables

The policy processes reviewed in this paper were selected from the following longlist of processes :

- the Talanoa Dialogue
- the Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum
- the UNFCCC structured expert dialogue 2013 to 2015
- the UNFCCC Technical Expert Meetings,
- Review processes in the ozone regime
- Review processes in the UN human rights system
- Review processes in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
- Review processes in the World Trade Organisation (WTO)

The review framework has been developed from analysing literature on the objectives, design and issues still to be settled of the Global stocktake (Hermwille and Siemons 2018, Huang 2018, Friedrich 2017). It takes into account literature on the effectiveness of practices and working methods within the UN HLPF (Beisheim 2018). These practices and working methods comprise formal guidelines and rules but also informal practices including mandates, negotiation formats, coordination and decision-making processes, cooperation with non-state actors, knowledge transfer as well as other systematic collective practices and work routines.<sup>45</sup>

The analysis of policy processes focuses on the following issues:

- the policy background and objectives of the respective process,
- the basic design of the process,
- the organisation of the interface between political and technical process, and finally
- the extent to which the process contributes to achieving the objectives the underlying regime is meant to achieve.

Part A describes the process itself and the context in which it was established in order to understand the overall setting and objectives.

Part B describes the technical and organisational details of the processes. What is the subject of the review and how is progress measured?

Part C looks at the interface between the political and technical processes. How is it organised in order to enable consideration/implementation? What are the factors that have allowed recommendations from technical processes to be taken up in political processes and translated into political decisions?

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<sup>45</sup> Beisheim (2018) also discusses resource management and financing regulations which is beyond scope in this study.



Finally, Part D analyses for each of the review mechanisms to what extent they contribute to achieving the objectives the underlying regime is meant to achieve. This discussion is based on the concept of governance functions.

Oberthür et al. (2017) identify five functions international governance institutions may perform in general to help achieve certain objectives. These are:

- **Guidance & Signal:** The objectives laid down in Art.2 of the Paris Agreement have been found to entail strong guidance as they signal the resolve of governments across the world to take far-reaching action on climate change (Obergassel et al 2019). They provide orientation to Parties to the agreement and other relevant actors as to the course of action that is desired and necessary. Thus, they entail a call for more ambition if progress towards these objectives proves to be slow. In general, stocktaking processes have a guidance and signal function related to the success in achieving the objectives of a regime. The institutional design and implementation of the stocktaking process impacts on the delivery of this function.
- **Transparency & Accountability:** Collecting and analysing relevant data in a stocktaking processes of international regimes may enhance the transparency of the actions taken by their Parties. It helps to identify and address problems in implementation of agreed rules and standards.
- **Knowledge & Learning:** International institutions may create knowledge as well as platforms for individual and social learning. The aim is the creation and diffusion of scientific, economic, technical and policy-related knowledge on the understanding of and/or possible solutions to the problem at hand.
- **Rules & Standards**
- **Means of Implementation**

The governance functions have been applied to the GST by Obergassel et al (2019). Setting rules and providing means of implementation is usually addressed by other elements of a regime. What review processes may do is to contribute to the guidance, transparency and learning functions. Part D will therefore discuss for each of the processes to what extent they fulfil these functions.

Parts B and C in the main text are based on tables of this annex. These analysis tables are organised as follows:

<b>B Basic Design of the Process</b>
2. Is there a long-term goal?
3. What is being reviewed?
4. Content of reporting
5. How is progress measured? Of individual activities / Of collective action towards a long-term goal?
6. How is the timing and review cycle defined?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General set-up</li> <li>• Voluntary/mandatory/</li> <li>• What are the reporting obligations</li> <li>• regular/inclusive / frequency</li> </ul>
<b>C Interface between political and technical process</b>
7. Where are reports discussed/considered
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stand alone Event/regular meeting/</li> <li>• Who is participating /High rank/delegates/admin</li> </ul>
8. What is the outcome of the review process?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of political consultation and results                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ e.g. intergovernmentally negotiated joint ministerial declaration featuring a list of priorities.</li> <li>○ e.g. part of high-level events (options include a dedicated political ministerial segment, high-level ministerial dialogues or roundtables), a presidential statement or final report, a summary of key messages, a decision by the participants high level event, a formal declaration.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How are results dealt with                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ e.g. releases at high level, largely narrative report with some statistics outlining progress</li> <li>○ e.g. summaries how countries are improving their data management, monitoring and accountability systems and methodology</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
10. How is Technical Expert Input organised?
11. Are there / What are the procedures for Non-State Actor Participation?



## GST analysis tables Part B and C

<b>Part B: Basic Design of the Process</b>	
2. Is there a long-term goal?	<p>The GST relates to all long-term goals of the PA as established in Article 2:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,</li> <li>- Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;</li> <li>- Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.</li> </ul>
3. What is being reviewed?	The collective effort of Parties towards the PA's long-term goals, not efforts by individual Parties.
4. Content of reporting	The GST will cover the thematic areas mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support. In addition, the GST may take into account efforts to address social and economic consequences and impacts of response measures and efforts to avert minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change (Para 6(b)).
5. How is progress measured? Of individual activities / Of collective action towards a long term goal	The collective effort of Parties towards the PA's long-term goals, not efforts by individual Parties.
6. How is the timing and review cycle defined?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General set-up</li> </ul>	<p>The GST will consist of the following components (Para 3):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Information collection and preparation for the technical assessment;</li> <li>(b) Technical assessment of the collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Agreement, as well as opportunities for enhanced action and support;</li> <li>(c) Consideration of outputs, discussing the implications of the findings of the technical assessment for informing Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support as well as enhancing international cooperation.</li> </ul> <p>The Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice will establish a joint contact group to assist implementation of the GST (Para 4). The Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies are to develop guiding questions for all components of the global stocktake (Para 7).</p> <p>In addition, Parties will engage in a technical dialogue to support the work of the joint contact group. The technical dialogue will have two co-facilitators and undertake its work through in-session round tables, workshops or other activities (Paras 5f).</p> <p>The co-facilitators of the technical dialogue are to summarize its outputs in summary reports for each thematic area and an overarching factual synthesis report (Para 31).</p> <p>The UNFCCC Secretariat is to prepare synthesis reports on the state of GHG emissions and mitigation efforts, the state of</p>

## Design options for the global Stocktake: lessons from other review processes

	adaptation efforts, the overall effect of NDCs, and the state of finance flows and means of implementation and support, under the guidance of the co-facilitators (Para 23). In addition, the constituted bodies and institutional arrangements under the UNFCCC are to prepare synthesis reports on these matters in their respective areas of expertise (Para 24).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voluntary/mandatory/</li> </ul>	Voluntary events, contributions / submissions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the reporting obligations</li> </ul>	There are no reporting obligations specifically for the GST. The GST will draw on the reports and communications submitted by Parties through the normal reporting process of the PA and the UNFCCC. Parties may supplement this information through voluntary submissions to the GST. In addition, the GST will draw on the latest reports from the IPCC and other sources (Para 37) (see also below).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regular/inclusive / frequency</li> </ul>	<p>The information collection and preparation component is to start one session before the start of the technical assessment, which will take place during the two (or depending on the timing of the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, three) successive sessions of the subsidiary bodies preceding the sixth session of the CMA in November 2023, during which the consideration of outputs will take place. That is, the consideration of outputs will take place at CMA 6, the technical assessment will start one year earlier at CMA 5, and the information collection and preparation component will start at CMA 4.</p> <p>This cycle will repeat every five years (Para 8).</p>

### **PART C:** Interface between political and technical process

7. Where are reports discussed/considered	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stand alone Event/regular meeting/</li> </ul>	The consideration of outputs is to consist of high-level events where the findings of the technical assessment will be presented and their implications discussed and considered by Parties. The events are to be chaired by a high-level committee consisting of the Presidencies of the CMA and the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (Para 33).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who is participating /High rank/delegates/admin</li> </ul>	High-level representatives to be determined.
8. What is the outcome of the review process?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of political consultation</li> </ul>	The outputs of the components of the GST should summarize opportunities and challenges for enhancing action and support in the light of equity and the best available science, as well as lessons learned and good practice. The outputs are to be referenced in a decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA and/or a declaration (Para 34).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How are results dealt with</li> </ul>	The outputs should focus on taking stock of collective progress, have no individual Party focus, and include non-policy prescriptive consideration of collective progress that Parties can use to inform the updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, of their actions and support (Para 14).



	<p>Parties are invited to present their nationally determined contributions, informed by the outcome of the global stocktake, at a special event held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Para 17).</p>
10. How is Technical Expert Input organised?	<p>The GST will draw on the latest reports of the IPCC (Para 37). The already existing SBSTA-IPCC special events and Joint Working Group are to be used for communication and coordination in the context of the GST (Para 29).</p> <p>In addition, the GST will draw on reports of the subsidiary bodies, constituted bodies and arrangements under the UNFCCC, the synthesis reports by the Secretariat mentioned above, relevant reports from UN agencies and other international organisations, regional groups and institutions, and submissions from stakeholders and UNFCCC observer organisations. The SBSTA may add further sources of input to this list (Para 37).</p> <p>Experts may also participate in the technical dialogue, but the Katowice decision provides no clarity on this.</p>
11. Are there / What are the procedures for Non-State Actor Participation?	<p>To be clarified. The Katowice decision stipulates that the GST will be conducted “with the participation of non-Party stakeholders, and that, to support such effective and equitable participation, all inputs will be fully accessible by Parties” (Para 10)</p>

## Talanoa Dialogue analysis tables Part B and C

<b>B Basic Design of the Process</b>	
2. Is there a long-term goal?	The TD relates to the 1.5°C and well-below 2°C targets of Art. 2 of the Paris Agreement.
3. What is being reviewed?	<p>The collective effort, not efforts by individual countries</p> <p>The aim of the TD was to take stock of climate mitigation action of Parties, and inform the preparation of the next round of “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs) due in 2020.</p> <p>The stocktaking is based on voluntary Party, Non-party stakeholder submissions and submissions by the COP23 and COP24 presidencies providing analytical and policy relevant input.</p>
4. Content of reporting	<p>It was suggested that, ideally, the contributions should cover three sets of overarching questions on status quo, targets and process / steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where are we?</li> <li>• Where do we want to go?</li> <li>• How do we get there?</li> </ul> <p>Subsequent to requests of the Parties to be more precise on the reporting subjects, the Fiji and Polish presidencies of COP23/24 have prepared a note with 23 more generic questions (Annex 1).</p> <p>Of the 473 inputs received, 354 address the first Talanoa Dialogue question, 348 address the second and 383 address the third. The majority of inputs (60%) addressed all three questions.</p> <p>An overview of Contents regarding the three questions is provided in Annex 2</p>
5. How is progress measured? Of individual activities / Of collective action towards a long term goal	<p>An overview report on collective action was delivered by the presidencies before the Bonn Climate Talks taking place April 30<sup>th</sup> to May 10<sup>th</sup> 2018 and updated at the end of the preparatory phase.<sup>4647</sup> These provided a mapping of the inputs submitted by different stakeholders and a high- level overview of their content.</p> <p>A synthesis report<sup>48</sup> on collective action was prepared at the end of the preparatory phase in the form of key messages. It was structured according to the three overarching questions. Statements of a confrontational nature and the singling out of individual Parties or groups of Parties was to be avoided in order to be constructive, facilitative and, above all, solutions oriented. The section on “how to get there” at a very general level identified actions that national governments, industries and civil society could undertake.</p> <p>These reports were mainly descriptive with general statistical data and overall qualitative conclusions.</p>

<sup>46</sup>

<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Overview%20of%20inputs%20to%20the%20Talanoa%20Dialogue.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1ct8fja1t\\_768448.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1ct8fja1t_768448.pdf)

<sup>48</sup> [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1csm8ieqa\\_676144.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1csm8ieqa_676144.pdf) (accessed 23.08.2019)



6. How is the timing and review cycle defined?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General set-up</li> </ul>	<p>The approach was decided at COP23 in 2017.<sup>49</sup></p> <p>The TD was a discussion process and was limited to one year and one review cycle respectively. The timing was based on the dates of the climate negotiations.</p> <p>There were two phases:</p> <p>The preparatory phase January to December 2018<sup>50</sup>: Information on the three overarching questions was compiled during multiple events until the end of 2018:</p> <p>January to April:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Parties and non-Party stakeholders were encouraged to cooperate in convening local, national, regional or global events. Discussions were to focus around the three overarching questions. Presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat were to be informed on these events to make information available on the Talanoa Dialogue Online Platform.</li> <li>Parties and Non-Party stakeholders were encouraged to submit inputs. Such inputs could include relevant studies or point of views in the form of documents, presentations or videos.</li> </ul> <p>April/May Bonn meeting</p> <p>May to COP24: Throughout the year, Parties and non-Party stakeholders cooperated in the organization of regional and national events.</p> <p>The political phase<sup>51</sup>: parties were to draw conclusions at ministerial level at COP 24 in Poland on December 11/12 2018. There, high-level representatives and ministers were to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties, and engage in roundtables and bi-lateral discussions. The presidencies provided a summary of key messages at the closing meeting of the political phase on 12 December.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Voluntary/mandatory/</li> </ul>	Voluntary events, contributions / submissions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the reporting obligations</li> </ul>	There were no specific binding reporting obligations but submitters were to consider the relevance regarding the three overarching questions, the objective of the input in the context of a multilateral dialogue and whether to join efforts to submit input.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>regular/inclusive / frequency</li> </ul>	Submissions could be fed into the process until April 2 <sup>nd</sup> 2018. Input received later to that deadline still appeared on the Talanoa Dialogue Online Platform, but they were not considered for the April/May session. An overview paper <sup>52</sup> on submissions summarised the inputs according to the objectives of submitting an input, expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue, the substance contained in the inputs. The summary was

<sup>49</sup> Decision 1/CP.23 Annex II. Suggested approach to organizing the Talanoa Dialogue in the first half of 2018. Information provided at the Talanoa Dialogue Online Platform: [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1c6ng599a\\_875385.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1c6ng599a_875385.pdf)

<sup>50</sup> <https://talanoadialogue.com/preparatory-phase-2>

<sup>51</sup> <https://talanoadialogue.com/political-phase-3>

<sup>52</sup> Overview of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Overview%20of%20inputs%20to%20the%20Talanoa%20Dialogue.pdf>

	<p>structured by the three questions of the TD, by stakeholder groups as well as by topic and recurrent themes, for example including general information on sectoral distribution of proposed and planned ways forward. An updated overview paper on 473 inputs was released before the political phase started. However, these documents summarised the inputs only at a very generic level. E.g. for the energy sector, the summary notes that inputs include solutions for increased energy efficiency and financing for a scale up of energy technologies, but does not go into the details of the proposed solutions.</p> <p>One review with synthesis report at the end of the preparatory phase.</p>
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<b>C Interface between political and technical process</b>	
7. Where are reports discussed/considered	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stand alone Event/regular meeting/</li> </ul>	<p>At Bonn Climate Change meeting April / May 2018</p> <p>At COP 24 event parallel to Climate negotiations on December 11/12 2018</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Who is participating /High rank/delegates/admin</li> </ul>	High-level representatives and Ministers
8. What is the outcome of the review process?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Level of political consultation</li> </ul>	<p>The political phase brought high-level representatives of Parties together to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties. Political discussions included 21 roundtables each comprised of 11 to 13 ministers to ensure focused and interactive discussions among ministers.<sup>53</sup> The Ministerial roundtables were to address specifically the question of “how do we get there”, with a view to commonly discussing the action required to meet the long-temperature goal.<sup>54</sup></p> <p>The presidencies provided a summary of key messages at the closing meeting of the political phase at COP24 on 12 December.<sup>55</sup> Stakeholders presented their views. COP23 president Frank Bainimarama and COP24 president Michal Kurtyka issued the Talanoa Call for Action. At the closing session the presidencies encouraged countries to factor the outcome of the Talanoa Dialogue into efforts to increase their ambitions and to update their NDCs, which detail nations’ climate actions, in 2020</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How are results dealt with</li> </ul>	<p>Synthesis publicly available,</p> <p>Appellative Call for Action</p> <p>COP took not of results of the TD (non-committal)</p> <p>Reference to UN Summit in 2019 to continue stock taking</p>
10. How is Technical Expert Input organised?	<p>Technical Expert input was organised as submission to the Talanoa Platform. So did e.g. the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) with its 2018 special report on „Global Warming of 1.5 °C“. The report concluded that “every bit of warming matters”. Whether global warming is kept below 1.5°C or only below 2°C would make a huge difference for humans and ecosystems. In addition, the report assessed emission</p>

<sup>53</sup> See Annex 2

<sup>54</sup> See

[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/information\\_note\\_high\\_level%20events\\_cop24\\_katowice\\_poland.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/information_note_high_level%20events_cop24_katowice_poland.pdf)

<sup>55</sup> Lehr, Don; 27.11. 2018: What’s at stake at COP24? <https://www.boell.de/en/2018/11/27/whats-stake-cop-24>



	pathways for achieving these temperature limits. To maintain a good chance of staying below 1,5°C, global emissions would essentially need to be halved by 2030 and be reduced to net zero by 2050.
11. Are there / What are the procedures for Non-State Actor Participation?	<p>The Talanoa Platform was launched on 10 January 2018 and received 473 inputs throughout the year. It was open to submissions of different actor categories<sup>56</sup>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inputs from the Presidencies</li> <li>• Inputs from Parties und Groups of Parties: 44 (24 by individual Parties, 20 by groups of Parties)</li> <li>• Inputs from Non-Party stakeholders: 429 thereof: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Civil Society: 121 (28%)</li> <li>○ Academy/Research: 94 (22%)</li> <li>○ Mixed partnerships and Coalitions: 64 (15%)</li> <li>○ Private Sector (15%)</li> <li>○ International Organisations: 37 (9%)</li> <li>○ Sub-national Governments: 32 (7%)</li> <li>○ United Nation Bodies: 12 (3%)</li> <li>○ UNFCCC constituted bodies 2 (0.5%)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<sup>56</sup> <https://unfccc.int/topics/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform/inputs-to-the-talanoa-dialogue-where-do-we-want-to-go#eq-2> (accessed 23.08.2018)

**Agenda 20130 High Level Political Forum analysis tables Part B and C**

<b>B Basic Design of the Process</b>	
2. Is there a long term goal?	2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and 17 Sustainable Development Goals
3. What is being reviewed?	Follow-up and review of the actions to implement 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the global level.
4. Content of reporting	<p><b>Thematic and SDG Reviews:</b> The follow up and review at the HLPF is informed by an annual progress report on the SDGs prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.<sup>57</sup> The report provides a global overview of the current situation of the Goals, on the basis of the latest available data for indicators in the global indicator framework. The HLPF is also informed by the Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR), which is issued every four years..</p> <p><b>Voluntary National Reviews:</b> Member states are encouraged to "conduct regular and inclusive reviews of progress at the national and sub-national levels, which are country-led and country-driven" (paragraph 79). These national reviews are expected to serve as a basis for the regular reviews by the high-level political forum (HLPF), meeting under the auspices of ECOSOC. They aim to facilitate the sharing of experiences, including successes, challenges and lessons learned, with a view to accelerating the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The VNRs also seek to strengthen policies and institutions of governments and to mobilize multi-stakeholder support and partnerships for the implementation of the SDGs</p> <p><b>Global Sustainable Development Report:</b> It provides guidance on the state of global sustainable development from a scientific perspective, which will help address the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, provide lessons learned, while focusing on challenges, address new and emerging issues and highlight emerging trends and actions. The Report should also focus on an integrated approach and examine policy options. The GSDR is one important component of the follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The GSDR should inform the high-level political forum, and shall strengthen the science-policy interface and provide a strong evidence-based instrument to support policymakers in promoting poverty eradication and sustainable development. It should incorporate scientific evidence in a multidisciplinary manner, considering all three dimensions of sustainable development.</p>
5. How is progress measured? Of individual activities / Of collective action towards a long term goal	Latest information on the SDG indicators is compiled collectively. It is an assessment of existing assessments, VNR report countries' individual activities.
6. How is the timing and review cycle defined?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General set-up</li> </ul>	Member states agreed in a resolution <sup>58</sup> to discuss each year at the HLPF an overarching theme (Thematic Reviews) and to discuss selected SDGs in more detail (SDG Reviews), see Annex 3. By the end of the first four-year cycle, all 17 SDGs

<sup>57</sup> UN ECOSOC E/2017/66 Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Report of the Secretary-General.

<sup>58</sup> UNGA, Follow-up and Review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the Global Level (A/RES/70/299), 29 July 2016, para. 2–5.



	<p>should have been reviewed.</p> <p>Procedures for the assessment of assessments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reviews should build on existing platforms and review procedures (including their reports, data, and analyses) and avoid duplication.</li> <li>• Thematic Reviews are to be supported by reviews by the functional commissions of the ECOSOC and other intergovernmental bodies and forums</li> <li>• working groups of the extended Executive Committee for Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA Plus, a coordination platform originally used to prepare for the Rio+20 Conference) evaluate the material from the UN system on the SDGs being reviewed. They present the results in short reports (background notes), which are consolidated before the HLPF in an Expert Group Meeting.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voluntary/mandatory/</li> </ul>	<p>Follow up and review of 2030 Agenda/SDGs: mandatory</p> <p>GSDR: mandatory</p> <p>VNR: voluntary, state-led</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the reporting obligations</li> </ul>	<p>VNR is guided by the UN Secretary-General's Voluntary Guidelines. These are voluntary and countries can apply them as fits their context. The use of the guidelines is recommended, however, to promote consistency and comparability between VNRs and from one year to the next.<sup>59</sup></p> <p>Set out in ministerial declarations such as for the GSDR in UN ECOSOC high level segment 29/07/2016 (E/HLS/2016/1)</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regular/inclusive / frequency</li> </ul>	<p>HLPF with follow up and review meets annually since September 2013</p> <p>Review cycle to be completed after 4 years</p> <p>A comprehensive, in-depth GSDR is produced every four years to inform the high-level political forum convened under the auspices of the General Assembly.</p>

### C Interface between political and technical process

7. Where are reports discussed/considered	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stand alone Event/regular meeting/</li> </ul>	At the regular HLPF meetings
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who is participating /High rank/delegates/admin</li> </ul>	<p>All States Members of the United Nations and States members of specialized agencies</p> <p>Organizations of the United Nations system, such as the World Trade Organization, can contribute within their respective mandates to the discussions of the Forum</p> <p>The Forum is open to the major groups, other relevant stakeholders and entities having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the General Assembly,</p>
8. What is the outcome of the review process?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of political consultation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• meets under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council for eight days,</li> <li>• including a three-day ministerial segment and</li> <li>• every four years two further days at the level of Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the General Assembly</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How are results dealt with</li> </ul>	Adoption of negotiated Ministerial declarations which are

<sup>59</sup> UNDP 2017

	negotiated before the HLPF meets Publication of GSDR
10. How is Technical Expert Input organised?	<p>HLPF online platform with currently 1261 inputs<sup>60</sup></p> <p>The aim is to compile voluntary inputs from countries participating in the national voluntary reviews of the HLPF, as well other voluntary governmental inputs, inputs from ECOSOC functional commissions and other intergovernmental bodies and forums, inputs from major groups and other stakeholders, as well contributions from multi-stakeholder partnerships and voluntary commitments.</p> <p>The GSDR is the means for putting a science-policy interface in place. It is a evidence-based instrument to support policymakers in promoting poverty eradication and sustainable development. It is made available for a wide range of stakeholders, including business and civil society as well as the wider public.</p> <p>Each year, in order to strengthen the science-policy interface at the annual HLPF convened under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council, scientists who work on the GSDR could be invited to provide scientific input into the discussion, including on the theme of the HLPF.</p> <p>An independent group of scientists drafts the quadrennial GSDR. The group comprises 15 experts representing a variety of backgrounds, scientific disciplines and institutions, ensuring geographical and gender balance. The group will be appointed for each GSDR by the Secretary-General in open, transparent and inclusive consultations with Member States, including the possibility of taking nominations from Member States. It will be supported by a task team, co-chaired by one representative each of the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Bank, with the logistical support of the United Nations Secretariat. The task team will coordinate inputs from a network of existing networks, representing the United Nations, the private sector, civil society and academia. Inputs can also be posted onto the HLPF online platform annually.<sup>61</sup></p>
11. Are there / What are the procedures for Non-State Actor Participation?	<p>Participation rights for non-state actors at all official meetings are mandated by General Assembly resolution A/67/290 §14 and §15: They shall be allowed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To attend all official meetings of the forum;</li> <li>• To have access to all official information and documents;</li> <li>• To intervene in official meetings;<sup>62</sup></li> <li>• To submit documents and present written and oral contributions;</li> <li>• To make recommendations;</li> <li>• To organize side events and round tables, in</li> </ul>

<sup>60</sup> <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/inputs/>

<sup>61</sup> UN ECOSOC 2016 E/HLS/2016/1

<sup>62</sup> In 2018, MGoS made about 25 % of all statements over the course of the HLPF session. HLPF presidents summary.

[https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/205432018\\_HLPF\\_Presidents\\_summary\\_FINAL.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/205432018_HLPF_Presidents_summary_FINAL.pdf)



	<p>cooperation with Member States and the Secretariat;</p> <p>The participation of societal groups in the HLPF is primarily organised through The Major Groups and other Stakeholders (MGoS). In 2017, a complex coordination mechanism for preparing the HLPF was created by them involving as many local groups as possible. The main focus of this work is on the written and oral comments, starting with the negotiations for the Ministerial Declaration, and during the HLPF the Thematic Reviews, SDG Reviews, and VNRs.</p> <p>Contributions to VNR</p> <p>Submissions to online platform</p>
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### UN Human Rights System analysis tables Part B and C

<b>B Basic Design of the Process</b>	
2. Is there a long-term goal?	<p>"The objectives of the review are:</p> <p>(a) The improvement of the human rights situation on the ground;</p> <p>(b) The fulfilment of the State's human rights obligations and commitments and assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the State;</p> <p>(c) The enhancement of the State's capacity and of technical assistance, in consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned;</p> <p>(d) The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders;</p> <p>(e) Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights;</p> <p>(f) The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the Council, other human rights bodies and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights."<sup>63</sup></p>
3. What is being reviewed?	<p>"The UPR will assess the extent to which States respect their human rights obligations set out in: (1) the UN Charter; (2) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (3) human rights instruments to which the State is party (human rights treaties ratified by the State concerned); (4) voluntary pledges and commitments made by the State (e.g. national human rights policies and/or programmes implemented); and, (5) applicable international humanitarian law."<sup>64</sup></p> <p>Furthermore, it addresses human rights violations whenever they occur</p>
4. Content of reporting	<p>"1. Information provided by the State under review, which can take the form of a "national report"<sup>65</sup></p> <p>"2. A compilation of recommendations from the UN human rights system.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- This includes input from UN Special Procedure Mandate Holders, which are independent experts who report to the UN Human Rights Council on thematic or country-specific human rights issues</li> <li>- This also includes input from UN Treaty Bodies, which are groups of independent experts that monitor States' compliance with international human rights treaties to which they are a</li> </ul>

<sup>63</sup> Human Rights Council (2007): Resolution 5/1. Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council.

<sup>64</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

	<p>party</p> <p>3. A summary of information and recommendations provided by civil society organizations. These reports are posted by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as they become available (generally four to six weeks before the review)."<sup>66</sup></p>
5. How is progress measured? Of individual activities / Of collective action towards a long term goal	Documentation by country
6. How is the timing and review cycle defined?	"A review cycle is a four-and-half year period within which all UN Member states' human rights records are reviewed. The working group convenes three two-weeks sessions per year, or 14 sessions over the course of an entire cycle." <sup>67</sup>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General set-up</li> </ul>	"Reviews take place through an interactive discussion between the State under review and other UN Member States. This takes place during a meeting of the UPR Working Group. During this discussion any UN Member State can pose questions, comments and/or make recommendations to the States under review. A group of three States, the troikas, may group issues or questions to be shared with the State under review to ensure that the interactive dialogue takes place in a smooth and orderly manner. The duration of the review was three hours for each country in the Working Group during the first cycle. From the second cycle onwards the time has been extended to three hours and thirty minutes." <sup>68</sup>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Voluntary/mandatory/</li> </ul>	Mandatory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the reporting obligations</li> </ul>	No reporting obligations but guidelines
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>regular/inclusive / frequency</li> </ul>	<p>"There are three Universal Periodic Review (UPR) sessions per year, with approximately 14 countries reviewed per session. This means that each UN Member States is reviewed every four or five years. The first cycle of UPR, which covered all UN member States, began in April 2008 and ended in October 2011.</p> <p>The second cycle of UPR ran from May 2012 to November 2016. The third cycle of UPR begins in April/May 2017."<sup>69</sup></p>

#### C Interface between political and technical process

7. Where are reports discussed/considered	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stand alone Event/regular meeting/</li> </ul>	There are three Universal Periodic Review (UPR) sessions per year, with approximately 14 countries reviewed per session.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Who is participating /High rank/delegates/admin</li> </ul>	<p>"dialogue between the State under review and all UN Member States. Proceedings are chaired by the President of the Human Rights Council."<sup>70</sup></p> <p>Other stakeholders can attend but may not speak during the session, such as:</p>

<sup>66</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>67</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CyclesUPR.aspx>

<sup>68</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>69</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>70</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)



	<p>non-governmental organizations (NGOs) National Human Rights Institutions Indigenous organizations UN agencies</p> <p>“National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) also play an important role in the UPR process. They can submit information for inclusion in the Summary of Stakeholders’ Information through the OHCHR’s online UPR submission registration system. NHRIs are also provided with an opportunity to speak during the adoption of the outcome of the State’s review.”<sup>71</sup></p>
8. What is the outcome of the review process?	While the outcome of the review, as a cooperative mechanism, should be implemented primarily by the State concerned, States are encouraged to conduct broad consultations with all relevant stakeholders in this regard.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Level of political consultation</li> </ul>	<p>“The reviews are conducted by the UPR Working Group which consists of the 47 members of the Council; however any UN Member State can take part in the discussion/dialogue with the reviewed States. Each State review is assisted by groups of three States, known as “troikas”, who serve as rapporteurs. The selection of the troikas for each State is done through a drawing of lots following elections for the Council membership in the General Assembly.”<sup>72</sup></p> <p>“Following the review by the Working Group, a report is prepared by the troika with the involvement of the State under review and assistance from the OHCHR. This report, referred to as the “outcome report”, provides a summary of the actual discussion. It therefore consists of the questions, comments and recommendations made by States to the country under review, as well as the responses by the reviewed State. (...) During the Working Group session half an hour is allocated to adopt each of the “outcome reports” for the States reviewed that session. These take place no sooner than 48 hours after the country review. The reviewed State has the opportunity to make preliminary comments on the recommendations choosing to either accept or note them. Both accepted and noted recommendations are included in the report. After the report has been adopted, editorial modifications can be made to the report by States on their own statements within the following two weeks. The report then has to be adopted at a plenary session of the Human Rights Council. During the plenary session, the State under review can reply to questions and issues that were not sufficiently addressed during the Working Group and respond to recommendations that were raised by States during the review. Time is also allotted to member and observer States who may wish to express their opinion on the outcome of the review and for NHRIs, NGOs and other stakeholders to make general comments.”<sup>73</sup></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How are results dealt with</li> </ul>	“Following a State’s review, a summary of the dialogue is prepared, including recommendations and observations made by other States to the State under review.

<sup>71</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>72</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>73</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

	<p>This summary is known as the UPR outcome report. The reviewed State will subsequently provide a written response to the recommendations, indicating which recommendations it accepts.</p> <p>The outcome report is then adopted at the following regular session of the Human Rights Council, and the State under review is encouraged by the Council to implement all recommendations.”<sup>74</sup></p> <p>“During the Working Group session half an hour is allocated to adopt each of the “outcome reports” for the States reviewed that session. These take place no sooner than 48 hours after the country review. The reviewed State has the opportunity to make preliminary comments on the recommendations choosing to either accept or note them. Both accepted and noted recommendations are included in the report. After the report has been adopted, editorial modifications can be made to the report by States on their own statements within the following two weeks. The report then has to be adopted at a plenary session of the Human Rights Council. During the plenary session, the State under review can reply to questions and issues that were not sufficiently addressed during the Working Group and respond to recommendations that were raised by States during the review. Time is also allotted to member and observer States who may wish to express their opinion on the outcome of the review and for NHRIs, NGOs and other stakeholders to make general comments.”<sup>75</sup></p> <p>“The State has the primary responsibility to implement the recommendations contained in the final outcome. The UPR ensures that all countries are accountable for progress or failure in implementing these recommendations. During the second review the State is expected to provide information on what they have been doing to implement the recommendations made during the first review as well as on any developments in the field of human rights. The international community will assist in implementing the recommendations and conclusions regarding capacity-building and technical assistance, in consultation with the country concerned. If necessary, the Council will address cases where States are not co-operating.”<sup>76</sup></p>
10. How is Technical Expert Input organised?	Information contained in the reports of independent human rights experts and groups, known as the Special Procedures, human rights treaty bodies, and other UN entities
11. Are there / What are the procedures for Non-State Actor Participation?	<p>“Civil society or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can contribute directly to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process.</p> <p>This is done by submitting input to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The OHCHR then gathers the material into a Summary of Stakeholders' Information.</p> <p>NGOs wishing to submit information for consideration and possible inclusion in the Summary can use the OHCHR's online UPR submission registration system.</p> <p>Questions regarding registration can be sent to the UPR Submission Helpdesk, at <a href="mailto:UPRsubmissions@ohchr.org">UPRsubmissions@ohchr.org</a>.</p>

<sup>74</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-epu/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>75</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

<sup>76</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>



	<p>When preparing National Reports, States are encouraged to undertake a consultation process with civil society. During this process, civil society organizations may provide information directly to the State under review. Civil society organizations can also play a valuable role in following up with the State under review on the implementation of the recommendations that the State has received.</p> <p>Civil society also has the opportunity to speak when the outcome report of the State under review is adopted by the Human Rights Council a few months after the review.<sup>77</sup></p> <p>„NGOs can submit information which can be added to the “other stakeholders” report which is considered during the review. Information they provide can be referred to by any of the States taking part in the interactive discussion during the review at the Working Group meeting. NGOs can attend the UPR Working Group sessions and can make statements at the regular session of the Human Rights Council when the outcome of the State reviews are considered.”<sup>78</sup></p>
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<sup>77</sup> [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_development-enjeux\\_developpement/human\\_rights-droits\\_homme/upr-eup/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/upr-eup/process-processus.aspx?lang=eng)

<sup>78</sup> <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/basicfacts.aspx>

## Montreal Protocol analysis tables Part B and C

<b>B Basic Design of the Process</b>	
2. Is there a long-term goal?	Protection of the ozone layer, phase-out and phase down schedules of ozone depleting substances determined by the meeting of the Parties and listed in Annexes of the Montreal Protocol and its Amendments
3. What is being reviewed?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• phase-out and phase down of ozone-depleting substances of Parties.</li> <li>• Technical progress in all sectors reviewed by Technical and Environmental Assessment Panel (TEAP) organised in Technical Options Committees (TOCs)</li> <li>• Technically and economically feasible choices for the elimination of ozone-depleting substances by the use of alternatives that have superior environmental performance with regard to climate change, human health and sustainability.</li> <li>• Technical progress on the recovery, reuse and destruction of ozone-depleting substances.</li> <li>• Accounting of the production and use of ozone-depleting substances and of ozone-depleting substances in inventory or contained in products.</li> <li>• Accounting of emissions of all relevant ozone-depleting substances with a view to updating continuously use patterns and coordinating such data with the Scientific Assessment Panel in order periodically to reconcile estimated emissions and atmospheric concentrations.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4. Content of reporting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP): Real data on ozone concentrations from a network of observations</li> <li>• TEAP: Policy relevant technical information that drives the evolution of the Montreal Protocol <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Careful exclusion of any matter that might be seen as “political”.</li> <li>- No interpretation or recommendations regarding political implications of technical assessments</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
5. How is progress measured? Of individual activities / Of collective action towards a long term goal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress of individual activities and collective action of Parties, as regards emission, production and usage figures of substances under the Montreal Protocol.</li> <li>• Statistical ODS data have to be reported to the Ozone Secretariat every year. The Ozone Secretariat uses the national data to calculate each Party’s official ODS consumption and production figures and, hence, each country’s compliance with the ODS phase-out schedules agreed under the Protocol, and for tracking overall progress in phasing-out ODS. In addition, several Meeting of the Parties (MOP) Decisions require Parties to submit other information which is incorporated in the official data reporting form. The annual data provides important information on national efforts and global efforts to protect the ozone layer, including new problems or issues at the national level or global level such as providing a basis for further policy development, for identifying appropriate</li> </ul>



	<p>activities and priorities at national level helping to identify illegal trade in ODS, etc.. There are two principal data requirements under the Montreal Protocol. The two reporting mechanisms ask for different types of information overall. However, the quantitative data on ODS imports, exports and production is normally the same in both.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Check of reported data with observed data on ozone concentrations (SAP report)</li> <li>• Gaps between reported data and observed data give hints on release from banks, unexpected emissions (2019: cfc 11) non-compliance, illegal trade, etc</li> </ul>
6. How is the timing and review cycle defined?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General set-up</li> </ul>	<p>Meeting of the Parties decides on the basis of reported data, quadrennial and other reports Intersessional OEWG meeting prepares MOP decisions</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voluntary/mandatory/</li> </ul>	Mandatory reports and assessments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the reporting obligations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TEAP: Annual Progress Reports, topics as requested by Parties</li> <li>• TEAP: Special in-depth reports on time sensitive issues</li> <li>• TEAP/SAP: Quadrennial Assessment Report (9th QAR in 2018)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• regular/inclusive / frequency</li> </ul>	<p>Major assessments of Panels every four years Annual ODS reporting</p>

### C Interface between political and technical process

7. Where are reports discussed/considered	Meeting of the Parties (MOP), Open Ended Working Group (OEWG)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stand alone Event/regular meeting/</li> </ul>	Regular meeting, latest: MOP31: 5-day meeting in 2019 on 4.-8.11.2019 in Rome OEWG 41 , 1.-5. July 2019
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who is participating /High rank/delegates/admin</li> </ul>	Government delegates, High Level Segment decides
8. What is the outcome of the review process?	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of political consultation</li> </ul>	<p>Terms of Reference decided by MOP. Assessment Panels report to MOP Assessment Panels provide policy relevant and technical inputs on MOP agenda. Inputs have to be agreed by consensus. Parties rely on the Assessment Panels (esp. TEAP and TOC) ability for objective and balanced information upon which they base their decisions. Members are individuals with the responsibility and integrity to act independently. Member composition essential for balanced results</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How are results dealt with</li> </ul>	Periodic reviews submitted to MOP/OEWG. Dealt with as inputs into decision-making. <sup>79</sup> Scientific/Technical basis for amendments.
10. How is Technical Expert Input organised?	See above: through Assessment Panels. They operate with substantial independence under their respective chairs. Industry expertise included from the beginning. <sup>80</sup> Inclusion of industry stakeholders in TEAP has been assessed as

<sup>79</sup> van Slooten, 1998:151.

<sup>80</sup> Parsons and Jäger, 2006: 232.

## Design options for the global Stocktake: lessons from other review processes

	precondition for success and as stimulus for innovations of alternative substances.
11. Are there / What are the procedures for Non-State Actor Participation?	None, except scientists and industry experts nominations for the advisory bodies.



## 6.2 Annex 2: Generic Questions of the Talanoa Dialogue

Talanoa Dialogue Guiding Paper 2018:

### **Where are we?**

1. What are the main sources of emissions and their current and future trends? What are the underlying drivers?
2. What are the current sectoral, national and international legal and policy frameworks for addressing climate change? Do they adequately address national and international climate change goals?
3. What are the current main initiatives and actions from government, leading private industries and other non-Party stakeholders to address climate change? Which ones have worked and what obstacles or barriers have been encountered?
4. What “best practice” examples and business models have successfully driven climate change action?
5. What available technologies can be game changers for addressing climate change today? Can they be easily implemented and what are the anticipated costs?
6. How has the financial sector responded to date on opportunities to address climate change within the different sectors? What models have worked and under which conditions?
7. What are examples of successful partnerships between governments and non-Party stakeholders? Which modalities have proven to be effective (e.g. contracts, blended financing, joint investments, etc.)?
8. What roles have women, local communities and indigenous people including youth played in the transition to low emission and carbon resilient society? What should be their future roles?

### **Where do we want to go?**

1. What is your short-term (e.g. by 2030) and long-term vision (e.g. by 2050 and beyond) for climate resilience and for achieving a balance between emissions and removals in the second half of this century?
2. What scientific evidence is required to engage leaders and other actors into such vision?
3. What is the near-term scope for increasing national ambition?
4. What is required for encouraging governments and non-Party stakeholders to do so?
5. Where should efforts be focused (sectors, regions, practices) in the short, medium and longer terms?
6. What are the modally-specific near, medium and long-term targets that can be identified and supported consistent with achieving a balance between emissions and removals in the second half of this century?
7. Are there fundamental technology barriers preventing a determined response to climate change in any sector? If so, what are the best ways to overcome them?

### **How do we get there?**

## Design options for the global Stocktake: lessons from other review processes

1. What fundamental changes are required for the vision described under “where do we want to go” to be realized? What factors would enable the realization of this vision?
2. What legal, policy and fiscal frameworks are required to achieve this vision?
3. What technological advancement / development (by sector) is needed to achieve this vision?
4. What level of investment and what should the sources be in order to meet the Paris

Agreement’s long-term goals?

5. What is the foreseen role of the financial sector, including to support technological innovation? What external and internal reforms and incentives would accelerate the flow of capital towards a more sustainable sector?
6. What new engagements and/or partnerships between Parties and non-Party stakeholders can be promoted for increasing ambition and achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement?
7. Which actions could be taken by leaders from national and local governments, regional development banks, private financial Institutions, companies and associations and others in order to contribute to the realization of this vision?
8. What would be the role of the UNFCCC and what actions can it take?



## 6.3 Annex 3: Talanoa Dialogue

### Overview on Content of Talanoa Dialogue Submissions

Taken from updated overview report<sup>81</sup>:

The inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question (Where are we) typically do one or more of the following:

- a. Present findings on GHGs at the global, national or sectoral scale;
- b. Set out climate impacts and vulnerability observed around the globe;
- c. Assess progress in initiatives, actions and the situation on the ground;
- d. Identify challenges and opportunities for policy action;
- e. Analyse existing institutional arrangements and policies.

The inputs to the second Talanoa Dialogue question (Where do we want to go) typically do one or more of the following:

- a. Identify aspirations in terms of global goals and principles for climate action;
- b. Describe a vision towards a zero (net) emissions world, which sometimes includes emissions scenarios and trajectories;
- c. Describe a vision towards climate resilience;
- d. Explain the vision and ambition that the stakeholder has for itself;
- e. Outline expectations about future institutional arrangements and policies.


The inputs to the third Talanoa Dialogue question (How do we get there) typically address this question by doing one or more of the following:

- a. Make a case for proposed and planned ways forward that are delivering or may in future deliver results through replication and/or scale-up;
- b. Share knowledge, analyses and opinions on high-potential solutions and technologies that may help to broaden the scope of, and accelerate, climate action;
- c. Identify actions for national governments to take to ensure progress towards realizing the global vision and ambition outlined in Talanoa Dialogue question 2;
- d. Identify actions for the UNFCCC bodies on issues to be addressed in the international climate negotiations;
- e. Identify actions for the private sector;
- f. Identify actions for the international community.

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<sup>81</sup> [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1ct8fja1t\\_768448.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4eec-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1ct8fja1t_768448.pdf)

**Structure of the political phase of the Talanoa Dialogue (Source: Decision decision 1/CP.23 Annex II)**




The political phase brought high-level representatives of Parties together to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties. Political discussions included roundtables to ensure focussed and interactive discussions among Ministers. At the closing meeting of the dialogue, the Presidencies of COP 23 and COP 24 provided a summary of key messages from the roundtables.



## 6.4 Annex 4: HLPF Cycle of Thematic and SDG Reviews

Year	Thematic Review	SDG Reviews
2013	Building the future we want: From Rio+20 to a post-2015 development agenda	
2014	Achieving the MDGs and charting the way for an ambitious post-2015 development agenda, including the SDGs	
2015	Strengthening integration, implementation and review – the HLPF after 2015	
2016	Ensuring that no one is left behind	
2017	Eradicating poverty and promoting prosperity in a changing world	SDG 1 No Poverty, SDG 2 No Hunger, SDG 3 Good Health, SDG 5 Gender Equality, SDG 9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, SDG 14 Life Below Water
2018	Transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies	SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation, SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy, SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities, SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production, SDG 15 Life on Land
2019	Empowering people and ensuring inclusiveness and equality	SDG 4 Quality Education, SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth, SDG 11 Reduced Inequalities, SDG 13 Climate Action, SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

## 6.5 Annex 5: Organisational chart of the Ozone Regime



Source: <http://42functions.net/en/institutions.php>

Additional resources are available online:

<https://www.climateworks.org/independent-global-stocktake/>

