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Offset approaches in existing compliance mechanisms : adding value and upholding environmental integrity?

  • The objective of this report is to use historical analysis to identify conditions that determine when offsets add value to compliance schemes while upholding environmental integrity. The indicators of success include: increased acceptance of introducing compliance schemes; raising ambition in subsequent compliance periods; the possibility to drive emission reductions outside the compliance sectors; promoting investments in sustainable development; and avoiding perverse incentives that undermine the stringency of the compliance scheme or compliance actors’ efforts in reducing their own emissions. Through undertaking in-depth case study analyzes on the effects of offsets in the European Union, Alberta, Australia, Colombia and Japan, theThe objective of this report is to use historical analysis to identify conditions that determine when offsets add value to compliance schemes while upholding environmental integrity. The indicators of success include: increased acceptance of introducing compliance schemes; raising ambition in subsequent compliance periods; the possibility to drive emission reductions outside the compliance sectors; promoting investments in sustainable development; and avoiding perverse incentives that undermine the stringency of the compliance scheme or compliance actors’ efforts in reducing their own emissions. Through undertaking in-depth case study analyzes on the effects of offsets in the European Union, Alberta, Australia, Colombia and Japan, the report identifies common conditions that explain why offsets were successful (or not) in achieving individual indicators. The report further identifies two common conditions that can help explain when offsets achieve all five indicators of success. The first is that policymakers need to be willing to design the compliance scheme to set and maintain a strong compliance price signal that justifies the need for incorporating cost containment measures, such as offsets, to avert negative political and economic ramifications. Relatedly, the second condition requires institutions, processes and infrastructure that govern both the compliance scheme and offsets to be well developed so that they can ensure offsets uphold the principles of environmental integrity, achieve sustainable development benefits, and act as a reliable cost containment measure to high compliance prices. The findings also highlight how difficult it is to achieve both conditions, as both domestic and international political economy factors determine whether policymakers and voters are willing to introduce and maintain compliance schemes that deliver effective action on climate.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Document Type:Report
Author:Maria Carvalho, Mireille Meneses, Aryanie Amellina, Carmen Álvarez Campo, Nicolas Kreibich
URN (citable link):https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:wup4-opus-80153
Publisher:Umweltbundesamt
Place of publication:Dessau-Roßlau
Year of Publication:2022
Number of page:104
Series Title (English):Climate change
Volume:2021,58
Language:English
Divisions:Energie-, Verkehrs- und Klimapolitik
Dewey Decimal Classification:320 Politik
Licence:License LogoIn Copyright - Urheberrechtlich geschützt