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Additionality revisited : guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris agreement

  • The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of "hot air" generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independentThe Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of "hot air" generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC's ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain "hot air", or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Document Type:Peer-Reviewed Article
Author:Axel Michaelowa, Lukas HermwilleORCiDGND, Wolfgang Obergassel, Sonja Butzengeiger
URN (citable link):https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:wup4-opus-73284
Year of Publication:2019
Language:English
Source Title (English):Climate policy
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1628695
Volume:19
Issue:10
First Page:1211
Last Page:1224
Division:Energie-, Verkehrs- und Klimapolitik
Dewey Decimal Classification:320 Politik
OpenAIRE:OpenAIRE
Licence:License LogoCreative Commons - CC BY-NC-ND - Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International