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Much of the current literature on climate clubs sees mitigation costs creating free rider incentives as the main problem of climate policy. Climate clubs are supposed to solve this problem by creating additional incentives for mitigation. Looking more in detail, one sees that the situation differs from sector to sector. Some industry sectors indeed have substantial cost and competitiveness issues. In others such as electricity and transport, there are costs at micro level but balance for economy and society as a whole is rather positive. International climate policy in general and clubs in particular should therefore be tailored to sectoral specifics.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement explicitly acknowledges the need to incentivize and facilitate the participation of private entities in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), private sector actors had already the opportunity to participate in a new and fast-growing market. However, they faced numerous challenging investment barriers. The study provides an overview on key factors and barriers determining private sector participation in Article 6 mechanisms. It distinguishes between the three topics demand side factors, rules and standards for market mechanisms, and supply side factors and provides for each of them options to mitigate or overcome barriers.
In a short analysis, it further explores three of the identified options:
- Improving the design and support of national systems and capacities is an important pre-requisite for the private sector to be able to generate and sell ITMOs
- The up-scaling of mitigation activities e. g. through (sub-) sector level crediting, and policy crediting helps private sector actors to benefit from economies of scale
- Exploring the potential of digitization of measuring, reporting and verification (MRV), e. g. the use of sensors, internet of things, artificial intelligence and blockchain to make the project cycle more efficient and reduce transaction costs.
Overall, the report stresses the importance of host country readiness to provide the private sector with a robust and trusted environment that allows for the adoption of Article 6 mechanisms.
The new mechanism defined under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement is supposed to allow for international cooperation with regard to climate change mitigation and thereby enable an increase in overall mitigation. Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism under Article 6.4 should also make sure that it is not be in conflict with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions but even better foster national pathways leading to this objective. Building this into the mechanism requires to shift the focus from short- and mid-term considerations to the long-term perspective in one way or another.
This discussion paper explores three different approaches that may help to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalization of Article 6.4, namely positive and negative lists, additionality with regard to a baseline consistent with both, NDCs and long-term targets, as well as adaptation of existing instruments and criteria from climate finance. The detailed discussion of the ap-proaches shows that the approaches should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as comple-mentary to each other. From the analyses, two storylines emerge how to combine aspects of the differ-ent approaches in a reasonable way to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions under Article 6.4.
How can existing national climate policy instruments contribute to ETS development? : Final report
(2019)
Before introducing an emissions trading system, jurisdictions have to consider the ex-isting energy and climate policy framework. This report seeks to analyse and evaluate non-ETS climate policy instruments, such as carbon taxes or green certificate trading schemes, regarding their suitability to serve as a basis for establishing emission trading systems. There is a general assessment of prototypical policy instruments. Besides, the report contains insights from case studies in India and Mexico. The report is meant to inform ETS development by showing how existing policy instruments could contribute to this process and by illustrating how non-ETS policy instruments could coexist with an emissions trading system, allowing for an effective policy mix.
While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current level of action of the Parties to the Agreement falls far short of this ambition, as is recognised in the very COP decision adopting the Agreement. The Global Stocktake (GST) established in Art. 14 of the PA is a key element to address this problem. Its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the progress made towards the collectively agreed goals.
The aim of this report is to develop recommendations on how to maximise the potential impact of the GST. The report starts from a perspective of what the GST could ideally do, irrespective of decisions already taken under the UNFCCC and other political constraints. In the second step, the report takes these limitations into account and suggests ways for how to nonetheless work towards the desired outcome.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a new mechanism for Parties to cooperate in achieving their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). One key innovation of the Article 6.4 mechanism is its objective to "deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions" (Art. 6.4(d)). This report develops recommendations on how to implement this objective. A key difficulty lies in the fact that even basics of how the mechanism is supposed to function have so far not been clarified by the Parties. The report therefore first sketches out what has so far been agreed and discussed on the mechanism’s activity cycle. Second, as the concept of overall mitigation has so far also not been clearly defined by Parties, the report derives a working definition from the language that was agreed in the Paris Agreement. In the next step, the report provides a survey of the options to achieve overall mitigation that have so far been discussed in the relevant literature and in the Article 6 negotiations. Many of these options were developed in the context of the Kyoto mechanisms. The report therefore discusses to what extent the options are also applicable under the Paris Agreement or whether adjustments need to be made. In the following, the options that are applicable under the Agreement are assessed on the basis of a number of criteria. The report concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes mechanisms for Parties to "pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions [...]" (Article 6.1). I. e. the mechanisms are explicitly designed to foster higher ambition. However, without additional guidance and rules, the economic incentives of carbon markets may work against increasing host country ambition. For example, setting ambitious NDC targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country can transfer abroad. The report presents four options on how the risks can be ad-dressed and ambition can be increased: (1) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability; (2) Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries; (3) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism; (4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism. These options are assessed and recommendations are provided on how they could be implemented.
This report explores the future role of the voluntary carbon market and its potential to contribute to raising the ambition of climate policy. For this purpose, desk research was complemented by interviews with voluntary carbon market representatives. The report finds that the current roles of the voluntary market are set to change fundamentally due to the Paris Agreement. For the future of the voluntary market as an investor, three roles were identified, each of which is associated with specific challenges: The market may maintain its current role of buyer of carbon neutrality credits, it may become a supporter of NDC implementation, or it may become a driver of ambition. With regard to the future role of private certification standards, the Paris Agreement may hold the possibility of using such standards in the context of compliance activities. Overall, the findings indicate that the voluntary market has some potential to contribute to ambition raising. Whether this potential will actually be unlocked depends on how the concept of ambition raising will be operationalized under the Paris Agreement and to what degree it can be integrated into the voluntary market's activities and business models.