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Additionality revisited : guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris agreement
(2019)
The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of "hot air" generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC's ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain "hot air", or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are commonly used by decision makers in order to derive climate policies. IAMs are currently based on climate-economics interactions, whereas the role of social system has been highlighted to be of prime importance on the implementation of climate policies. Beyond existing IAMs, we argue that it is therefore urgent to increase efforts in the integration of social processes within IAMs. For achieving such a challenge, we present some promising avenues of research based on the social branches of economics. We finally present the potential implications yielded by such social IAMs.
Klimaneutralität wird im Zuge des Pariser Klimaabkommens zur politischen Zielgröße. Die Nationalstaaten, die das Abkommen unterzeichnet haben, müssen regeln, wie sie das Ziel erreichen möchten. Das deutsche Klimaschutzgesetz unterscheidet dabei zwischen "klimaneutral" und "treibhausgasneutral". Das kann zu Missverständnissen führen, kann aber auch sinnvoll sein.
Das Klimaabkommen von Paris ist ein Abkommen der Vereinten Nationen. Mit Artikel 4.1 wurde die Treibhausgasneutralität zum Ziel aller globalen Klimapolitik gemacht. Die Begriffe Klimaneutralität und Treibhausgasneutralität werden vom Klimasekretariat der Vereinten Nationen in der öffentlichen Kommunikation synonym verwendet. Die Europäische Kommission hat sich bisher im Zuge der Umsetzung ebenfalls für die synonyme Verwendung entschieden. In Deutschland ist es anders - da herrscht begriffliches Chaos.
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 provides the basis for future international cooperation on the field of climate change mitigation. While truly global in reach, the agreement will however result in an increasingly complex new climate regime: Instead of using a uniform formula, Parties are allowed to autonomously define their NDCs (nationally determined contributions), resulting in a large diversity of contributions. This poses significant challenges for emissions accounting and the transfer of emission units.
This Policy Paper explores how these challenges can be addressed by analysing different types of NDCs and assessing their compatibility with the export and use of emission units. On that basis, the authors develop opt-in provisions for Parties willing to participate in unit transfers under the new climate regime and illustrate how potential risks to environmental integrity can be addressed.
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, former debates about generating carbon credits on the basis of national policies have resurged. National policies have not been eligible as project activities under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms. The Paris Agreement opens the possibility for such policy crediting but also provides an entirely new context: Universal participation, ambitious long-term targets and nationally defined contributions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambitious over time. As this paper shows, these changes in the framework conditions add an additional layer of complexity to policy-based cooperation.
The paper explores the potential for policy-based cooperation by first briefly presenting the regulatory basis provided by the Paris Agreement before outlining a prototype for policy-based cooperation and its key challenges.
This report explores the future role of the voluntary carbon market and its potential to contribute to raising the ambition of climate policy. For this purpose, desk research was complemented by interviews with voluntary carbon market representatives. The report finds that the current roles of the voluntary market are set to change fundamentally due to the Paris Agreement. For the future of the voluntary market as an investor, three roles were identified, each of which is associated with specific challenges: The market may maintain its current role of buyer of carbon neutrality credits, it may become a supporter of NDC implementation, or it may become a driver of ambition. With regard to the future role of private certification standards, the Paris Agreement may hold the possibility of using such standards in the context of compliance activities. Overall, the findings indicate that the voluntary market has some potential to contribute to ambition raising. Whether this potential will actually be unlocked depends on how the concept of ambition raising will be operationalized under the Paris Agreement and to what degree it can be integrated into the voluntary market's activities and business models.