Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (25)
- Peer-Reviewed Article (19)
- Report (19)
- Contribution to Periodical (13)
- Part of a Book (10)
- Conference Object (1)
Division
This policy paper reviews the concept of additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement. Additionality is a key criterion that helps to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, especially when units created under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting purposes whether that is by Parties in order to meet their NDCs or whether by other entities with legal mitigation obligations.
It does so by first reviewing key concepts such as offsetting, environmental integrity, and baseline. Subsequently, it explores the context of additionality under the Paris Agreement. More specifically it discusses what should be counted as the baseline for additionality demonstration. The subsequent chapter then highlights the challenges with establishing additionality, that is establishing a causal relationship between a policy intervention and a proposed activity. Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of international governance with respect to additionality.
This policy brief discusses the opportunities and obligations of host country DNAs within the Standardized Baselines framework and identifies options for strategic intervention. Host countries can, for example, intervene by selecting the right sectors for which they develop an SB in the first place. DNAs can also tailor their SBs to some extent to support certain technologies, fuels or feed- stocks over others by choosing the right level of aggregation of the sector to be covered. Last but not least, the paper discusses the DNAs' role in managing the data for the development and maintenance of the SB. Host countries should take full advantage of potential synergies between data collection for SBs and other data intensive processes such as national greenhouse gas inventories or national statistics. SBs and the data gathered in the process of developing them can also be a basis for the development of other mitigation instruments such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) or New Market Mechanisms (NMM).
Technology cooperation : update on the technology mechanism and options for using carbon markets
(2014)
This policy brief provides a general overview on the setup of the UNFCCC's Technology Mechanism, exploring potential synergies between the mechanism and carbon market instruments such as the CDM.
There are two branches of the Technology Mechanism: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), which is tasked to give political advice, and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), providing support and fostering the operationalization of technology transfer. Both institutions strongly focus on capacity building.
The CDM, instead, has contributed to technology transfer in practice. However, the transfer has largely focused on equipment and basic operational knowledge. The transfer of knowledge to adapt, advance and innovate has been limited so far.
Therefore, the two mechanisms could well complement each other. In theory, Programmes of Activities and Standardized Baselines under the CDM could be a means for developing country governments to strategically address financial barriers to technology transfer.
This paper analyses the results of the climate conference in Lima 2014 in the light of the coming climate summit in Paris by the end of this year (COP21). The authors from the Wuppertal Institute make recommendations for the improvement of the current cooperation in the context of the climate convention and they suggest to complement the existing UN regime with a club of forerunner countries in order to provide new breath for international climate policy.
The 2014 United Nations Climate Change Conference had been scheduled from 1 to 12 December in Lima/Peru. While in the run-up to the conference, China and the US in a surprise bilateral move had announced plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions that exceeded expectations, the conference was characterised once again by a deep division between key players from the former so-called "developed" and "developing" world. The negotiations thus took 32 hours longer than planned and ended on Sunday morning at 1.22 am. More importantly, the conference failed almost completely to resolve the tasks it was supposed to do in order to prepare the last round of negotiations before next year's conference in Paris 2015, which is supposed to deliver a comprehensive future climate agreement. A team of researchers from the Wuppertal Institute attended the conference and have compiled a first assessment of the results.
Although it is not part of what has been called the "ambition mechanism" or "ratchet mechanism", Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also has an explicit requirement to promote ambition. Article 6 specifically highlights that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions. Despite the common purpose, the two elements have to date been discussed mostly in isolation, both in the negotiations as well as in the wider literature. This JIKO Policy Paper sets out to change this by exploring the relationship between Article 6 and the Global Stocktake.
Many hope that the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement can become a catalyst for increased mitigation ambition over time. Based on different theories of change, this paper outlines four governance functions for the Global Stocktake. It can contribute to the Paris Agreement as a pacemaker (stimulating and synchronizing policy processes across governance levels), by ensuring accountability of Parties, by enhancing ambition through benchmarks for action and transformative learning, and by reiterating and refining the guidance and signal provided from the Paris Agreement. The paper further outlines process- and information-related preconditions that would enable an ideal Global Stocktake.
