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The 2014 United Nations Climate Change Conference had been scheduled from 1 to 12 December in Lima/Peru. While in the run-up to the conference, China and the US in a surprise bilateral move had announced plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions that exceeded expectations, the conference was characterised once again by a deep division between key players from the former so-called "developed" and "developing" world. The negotiations thus took 32 hours longer than planned and ended on Sunday morning at 1.22 am. More importantly, the conference failed almost completely to resolve the tasks it was supposed to do in order to prepare the last round of negotiations before next year's conference in Paris 2015, which is supposed to deliver a comprehensive future climate agreement. A team of researchers from the Wuppertal Institute attended the conference and have compiled a first assessment of the results.
Much of the current literature on climate clubs sees mitigation costs creating free rider incentives as the main problem of climate policy. Climate clubs are supposed to solve this problem by creating additional incentives for mitigation. Looking more in detail, one sees that the situation differs from sector to sector. Some industry sectors indeed have substantial cost and competitiveness issues. In others such as electricity and transport, there are costs at micro level but balance for economy and society as a whole is rather positive. International climate policy in general and clubs in particular should therefore be tailored to sectoral specifics.
This article develops a sectoral approach to the analysis of global climate governance. This approach advances the assessment of global climate governance by focusing on complexes of intergovernmental and transnational institutions co-governing key socio-technical sectoral systems. The actual and potential contribution of these sectoral institutional complexes to advancing decarbonization can be assessed according to five key governance functions: (1) providing guidance and signal to actors, (2) setting rules to facilitate collective action, (3) enhancing transparency and accountability, (4) offering support (finance, technology, capacity-building), and (5) promoting knowledge and learning. On this basis, we can assess the potential of international cooperation to address the challenges specific sectoral systems face in the climate transition as well as the extent to which existing sectoral institutional complexes deliver on this potential. This provides a solid starting point for developing options for filling identified gaps and enhancing the effectiveness of global climate governance.
A sectoral perspective on international climate governance : key findings and research priorities
(2021)
This concluding article derives six major findings from the contributions to this special issue. First, the barriers and challenges to decarbonisation vary significantly across sectoral systems. Second, and similarly, the need and potential for the five functions of international governance institutions to contribute to effective climate protection also vary widely. Third, while the pattern is uneven, there is a general undersupply of international climate governance. Fourth, the sectoral analyses confirm that the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement play an important overarching role but remain limited in advancing effective sectoral governance. Fifth, while non-environmental institutions may present important barriers to decarbonisation, more synergistic effects are possible. Sixth, our sectoral approach provides a sound basis on which to identify sector-specific policy options. The paper then offers reflections on the merits and limitations of the sectoral approach, before identifying avenues for future research to further advance the agenda.
This policy paper reviews the concept of additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement. Additionality is a key criterion that helps to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, especially when units created under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting purposes whether that is by Parties in order to meet their NDCs or whether by other entities with legal mitigation obligations.
It does so by first reviewing key concepts such as offsetting, environmental integrity, and baseline. Subsequently, it explores the context of additionality under the Paris Agreement. More specifically it discusses what should be counted as the baseline for additionality demonstration. The subsequent chapter then highlights the challenges with establishing additionality, that is establishing a causal relationship between a policy intervention and a proposed activity. Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of international governance with respect to additionality.
Additionality revisited : guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris agreement
(2019)
The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of "hot air" generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC's ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain "hot air", or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.
Africa and in particular African Least Developed Countries have to a large extent been neglected by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This article reviews the mechanism's performance in the region and highlights current developments. The analysis is based on a quantitative breakdown of data provided by the United Nations Environment Programme and Technical University of Denmark (UNEP/DTU) CDM Pipeline and was complemented by interviews with selected investors. The findings indicate that despite the various support measures for underrepresented regions, the overall share of African CDM activities continues to be low. The significant rise in the share of Programmes of Activities of recent years cannot make up for the continuing low numbers of African stand-alone projects. Further, the collapse of the compliance market has proved fatal in terms of timing: ongoing efforts to support the development of a genuine African carbon market were suffocated by the lack of demand for Certified Emission Reductions at a moment when capacity building had started to bear fruit. Consequently, instead of being a mitigation tool with significant scale, the future role of the CDM in Africa might be limited to the voluntary market, while at the same time serving as a tool to foster sustainable development, with mitigation benefits.
Although it is not part of what has been called the "ambition mechanism" or "ratchet mechanism", Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also has an explicit requirement to promote ambition. Article 6 specifically highlights that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions. Despite the common purpose, the two elements have to date been discussed mostly in isolation, both in the negotiations as well as in the wider literature. This JIKO Policy Paper sets out to change this by exploring the relationship between Article 6 and the Global Stocktake.
Wie viel Gestaltungsmacht haben das Pariser Klimaabkommen und die in der Agenda 2030 für nachhaltige Entwicklung formulierten Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) als internationaler Bezugsrahmen für die globale Energietransformation? In der vorliegeneden Studie analysiert Lukas Hermwille die beiden Agenden und stellt deren Komplementaritäten heraus.
Die Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein Fokus allein auf innovative Ansätze und den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien nicht ausreicht. Nimmt man die Ambition des Zwei-Grad-Limits oder gar des 1,5-Grad-Ziels ernst, reicht es nicht aus, darauf zu warten, bis Kohle, Öl und Gas von alleine obsolet werden, sondern es wird nötig werden, den Ausstieg aus fossilen Energieträgern aktiv politisch zu gestalten. In diesem Sinne empfiehlt die Studie mit Hilfe von "Exnovationsstrategien" auch die potenziellen Verlierer der Energietransformation in den Blick zu nehmen, so Widerstände abzubauen, um den Ausstieg aus der Nutzung fossiler Energieträger rechtzeitig und gleichzeitig sozial gerecht zu erreichen.