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Research on environmental behaviour is often overlooked in literature on regime destabilization in energy transitions. This study addresses that gap by focusing on socio-political and demographic factors shaping support for carbon regime destabilization policies in one of the most carbon-intensive regions of Europe. Carbon-intensive industries, especially coal mining and coal-based power generation, are often concentrated in a few carbon-intensive regions. Therefore, decarbonization actions will affect those regions particularly strongly. Correspondingly, carbon-intensive regions often exert significant political influence on the two climate mitigation policies at the national level. Focusing on Poland, we investigate socio-political and demographic factors that correlate with the approval or rejection of the two climate mitigation policies: increasing taxes on fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal and using public money to subsidize renewable energy such as wind and solar power in Poland and its carbon-intensive Silesia region. Using logistic regression with individual-level data derived from the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), we find party-political ideology to be an important predictor at the national level but much less so at the regional level. Specifically, voting for right-wing party is not a divisive factor for individual support of the two climate mitigation policies either nationally or regionally. More interestingly, populism is a strong factor in support of increasing taxes on fossil fuel in the carbon-intensive Silesia region but is less important concerning in support of using public money to subsidize renewable energy in Poland overall. These results show the heterogeneity of right-wing party and populism within the support for the two climate mitigation policies. Socio-demographic factors, especially age, gender, education level, employment status, and employment sector, have even more complex and heterogeneous components in support of the two climate mitigation policies at the national and regional levels. Identifying the complex socio-political and demographic factors of climate mitigation policies across different national versus carbon-intensive regional contexts is an essential step for generating in situ decarbonization strategies.
European coal mining regions face massive transformational challenges. The necessity of climate protection only intensifies a trend, prevalent in all of Europe: coal mining has been losing its economic importance over the last decades. Fewer and fewer people are employed in the sector. Coal regions face the challenge of how to facilitate a just transition, and which perspectives to develop for a future beyond coal.
Against this background this study analyses the current situation in four key European coal mining regions, namely: Aragon in Spain, Lusatia in Germany, Silesia in Poland and Western Macedonia in Greece. The study provides a brief summary of the regions' socio-economic structure, including the respective role of coal mining. An assessment of how existing European structural instruments, specifically the European Structural and Investment Funds (the ESI Funds) are utilised in the region, forms the core of the study.
At the next United Nations (UN) climate conference in the United Arab Emirates at the end of 2023, the first Global Stocktake (GST) of the Paris Agreement is due to conclude. The main goal of this process is to feed into a new round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by Parties to the Agreement for 2035. In addition, the GST is aimed at identifying opportunities for strengthening international cooperation to achieve the Paris goals. The GST represents the first opportunity for Parties and other stakeholders to collectively highlight opportunities for international climate cooperation. Specifically, outcomes should plant the seeds for the development of concrete sectoral decarbonization roadmaps that could guide international cooperation in years to come.
Sustainable energy
(2017)
Dieses Wuppertal Paper dient dazu, a) die mögliche Klimaschutzwirkung eines CO2-Preises zu analysieren, allein und im Gesamtpaket von Instrumenten zum Klimaschutz, b) die Möglichkeiten der Mittelverwendung zu analysieren und zu bewerten, c) dadurch den Dschungel der Argumente und Motivationen in den bestehenden Vorschlägen zu lichten und d) aus der Analyse ein Modell zu skizzieren, das den Anforderungen von Klimaschutz und sozialer Gerechtigkeit sowie Erhalt der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit am besten gerecht wird und damit der Bundesregierung als Anregung bei der Entscheidung über Einführung und Ausgestaltung eines CO2-Preises dienen kann.
In dem Papier werden diese Fragen anhand von neun Thesen mit einem abschließenden Fazit ergründet. Daraus wird deutlich:
Ein CO2-Preis kann sektorale Ziele und Instrumente nicht ersetzen. Seine volle Wirkung kann er nur entfalten, wenn er komplementär zu sektorspezifischen Klimaschutzinstrumenten eingeführt wird. Nur wenn für diese Instrumente ein guter Teil der Einnahmen aus der CO2-Steuer eingesetzt wird, sind die Klimaziele erreichbar. Die Ziele werden dadurch mit weitaus geringerem CO2-Preis bei gleichzeitig höheren Kostenentlastungen für Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher, Unternehmen und sogar die öffentlichen Haushalte erreichbar, als wenn die Politik allein auf einen CO2-Preis setzen würde.
Apart from the much-debated question of what legal form the 2015 climate agreement is supposed to have, another core issue is the substantive content of countries' commitments. While the climate regime has so far mostly been based on emission targets, literature has identified a broad range of other possible types of mitigation commitments, such as technology targets, emission price commitments, or commitments to specific policies and measures (PAMs). The nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) submitted by developing countries under the Cancún Agreements also show a broad range of different forms of participation. This article surveys the possible commitment types that have so far been discussed in literature and in the UNFCCC negotiations and assesses their respective advantages and disadvantages against a set of criteria: environmental effectiveness, cost effectiveness, distributional aspects and institutional feasibility. The article finds that no commitment option provides a silver bullet. All options have several advantages but also disadvantages. The environmentally most effective way forward may lie in pursuing a multi-dimensional approach, combining emission targets with other commitment types to compensate for the drawbacks of the emission-based approach. However, such an approach would also increase complexity, both in terms of the negotiations and in terms of implementation and administration.
Global climate
(2014)
In what has become normal procedure at the international climate negotiations, the 2013 United Nations climate conference in Warsaw (the nineteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 19) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the ninth Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 9)) once again seemed on the brink of collapse and concluded more than one day behind schedule, in the evening of Saturday 23 November 2013. However, on most of the key issues it made only scant progress.
This report lays out the main developments in Warsaw and assesses the main outcomes. It starts with the discussions under the Durban Platform on developing a new comprehensive climate agreement by 2015 and increasing short-term ambition and subsequently covers the issues relating to near-term implementation of previous decisions in the areas of emission reductions and transparency, adaptation, loss and damage, finance and technology.
This report analyses the international climate negotiations at the UN climate conference in Warsaw in November 2013. The report covers the discussions under the Durban Platform on developing a new comprehensive climate agreement by 2015 and increasing short-term ambition as well as the issues relating to near-term implementation of previous decisions in the areas of emission reductions and transparency, adaptation, loss and damage, finance and technology. The report concludes that Warsaw once again starkly highlighted the sharp divisions and lack of trust among countries. Industrialised countries' collective lack of leadership strongly contributed to re-opening the traditional North-South divide. As a result, on many issues the outcomes hardly go beyond the lowest common denominator. The conference only agreed on the bare minimum to move the 2015 process forward and also made no headway in strengthening short-term ambition. Some progress was made with the establishment of the "Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts" and the completion of the rules for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. However, here as well further substance, in particular financial support from industrialised countries, is required to actually fill these mechanisms with meaning. If countries want to escape from groundhog day, they will have to start seeing and utilizing the UN climate process rather differently.
Much mitigation-related governance activity is evident in a range of sectoral systems, and regarding particular governance functions. However, there is a tendency for this activity to relate to the easiest functions to address, such as "learning and knowledge building", or to take place in somewhat limited "niches". Across all sectoral systems examined, the gap between identified governance needs and what is currently supplied is most serious in terms of the critical function of setting rules to facilitate collective action. A lack of "guidance and signal" is also evident, particularly in the finance, extractive industries, energy-intensive industries, and buildings sectoral systems.
Of the sectoral systems examined, the power sector appears the most advanced in covering the main international governance functions required of it. Nevertheless, it still falls short in achieving critical governance functions necessary for sufficient decarbonisation. Significantly, while the signal is strong and clear for the phase-in of renewable energy, it is either vague or absent when it comes to the phase-out of fossil fuel-generated electricity. The same lack of signal that certain high-carbon activities need actively to be phased out is also evident in financial, fossil-fuel extractive industry and transport-related sectors.
More effective mitigation action will need greater co-ordination or orchestration effort, sometimes led by the UNFCCC, but also from the bodies such as the G20, as well as existing (or potentially new) sector-level institutions. The EU needs to re-consider what it means to provide climate leadership in an increasingly "polycentric" governance landscape.
A sectoral perspective on international climate governance : key findings and research priorities
(2021)
This concluding article derives six major findings from the contributions to this special issue. First, the barriers and challenges to decarbonisation vary significantly across sectoral systems. Second, and similarly, the need and potential for the five functions of international governance institutions to contribute to effective climate protection also vary widely. Third, while the pattern is uneven, there is a general undersupply of international climate governance. Fourth, the sectoral analyses confirm that the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement play an important overarching role but remain limited in advancing effective sectoral governance. Fifth, while non-environmental institutions may present important barriers to decarbonisation, more synergistic effects are possible. Sixth, our sectoral approach provides a sound basis on which to identify sector-specific policy options. The paper then offers reflections on the merits and limitations of the sectoral approach, before identifying avenues for future research to further advance the agenda.
The 2015 Paris Agreement relies on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to outline each country's policies and plans for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To strengthen global climate action and achieve the Agreement's temperature goal, it is crucial to enhance the ambition level of NDCs every 5 years. While previous studies have explored the ambition of initial NDCs, limited research has delved into the factors driving the enhancement or lack thereof in NDCs' emission reduction plans. This study employs a mixed-method design to investigate the determinants of NDC enhancement. First, we analyse the updated or revised NDCs of 111 countries using quantitative methods. Second, we conduct qualitative case studies focusing on Brazil and South Africa. Our findings reveal that countries that engaged in stakeholder consultations with civil society, business, and labour groups prior to developing their updated or revised NDCs were more likely to enhance their greenhouse gas reduction targets. These results are further supported by the case studies. South Africa conducted comprehensive consultations and submitted an enhanced GHG target, while Brazil, which did not arrange open consultations, did not improve its target. This study underscores the significance of comprehensive and transparent stakeholder engagement processes, highlighting their potential to drive enhanced NDCs. By involving diverse stakeholders, including civil society, business, and labour groups, countries can foster greater ambition and effectiveness in their climate action, ultimately contributing to the global effort to combat climate change.
This paper analyses the results of the climate conference in Lima 2014 in the light of the coming climate summit in Paris by the end of this year (COP21). The authors from the Wuppertal Institute make recommendations for the improvement of the current cooperation in the context of the climate convention and they suggest to complement the existing UN regime with a club of forerunner countries in order to provide new breath for international climate policy.
US-Präsident Donald Trump verkündete am Nachmittag des 1. Juni 2017 im Rosengarten des Weißen Hauses, dass er das Pariser Klimaabkommen aus dem Jahr 2015 kündigen wolle. Was bedeutet dieser Schritt der USA für den globalen Klimaschutz? Dieser in brief zeigt, in welcher Weise die an Klimaschutz interessierten Staaten sich am besten organisieren, um das Pariser Klimaabkommen und die globale Klimapolitik erfolgreich weiterzuführen.
On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected to become the 45th President of the United States of America. In his campaign, he repeatedly expressed his intention to "cancel the Paris Agreement". How can the course set with the adoption of the Paris Agreement be continued independently of the developments in the US? Lukas Hermwille and Wolfgang Obergassel sketch possible consequences of the sea change of US climate policy for the international negotiation process and identify options for a "Trump-resilient" way forward.
The 2014 United Nations Climate Change Conference had been scheduled from 1 to 12 December in Lima/Peru. While in the run-up to the conference, China and the US in a surprise bilateral move had announced plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions that exceeded expectations, the conference was characterised once again by a deep division between key players from the former so-called "developed" and "developing" world. The negotiations thus took 32 hours longer than planned and ended on Sunday morning at 1.22 am. More importantly, the conference failed almost completely to resolve the tasks it was supposed to do in order to prepare the last round of negotiations before next year's conference in Paris 2015, which is supposed to deliver a comprehensive future climate agreement. A team of researchers from the Wuppertal Institute attended the conference and have compiled a first assessment of the results.
This article develops a sectoral approach to the analysis of global climate governance. This approach advances the assessment of global climate governance by focusing on complexes of intergovernmental and transnational institutions co-governing key socio-technical sectoral systems. The actual and potential contribution of these sectoral institutional complexes to advancing decarbonization can be assessed according to five key governance functions: (1) providing guidance and signal to actors, (2) setting rules to facilitate collective action, (3) enhancing transparency and accountability, (4) offering support (finance, technology, capacity-building), and (5) promoting knowledge and learning. On this basis, we can assess the potential of international cooperation to address the challenges specific sectoral systems face in the climate transition as well as the extent to which existing sectoral institutional complexes deliver on this potential. This provides a solid starting point for developing options for filling identified gaps and enhancing the effectiveness of global climate governance.
Combating climate change requires a fundamental simultaneous transformation of various sectoral systems that are key to the functioning of our economies and societies, such as energy, industry, transport, housing, and agriculture. This report by the COP21 RIPPLES project examines sector-specific challenges to decarbonisation and what contribution international governance could make to overcoming these challenges.
Taking a sectoral perspective, the report identifies the key governance challenges that exist internationally towards the deep transformations required, and specifies the resulting key governance functions to be fulfilled by means of international cooperation/international institutions.
To this end, the report first clarifies a number of key concepts, including international (climate) governance, international and transnational institutions, institutional complexes and poly-centricity. It then derives a number of functions that international institutions can fulfil from the relevant literature: providing guidance and signals, setting rules, providing transparency and accountability, providing capacity building, technology and finance, and facilitating knowledge and learning. This is the basis for an investigation into the key governance challenges and the potential of international governance in 14 key sectoral systems.
Much of the current literature on climate clubs sees mitigation costs creating free rider incentives as the main problem of climate policy. Climate clubs are supposed to solve this problem by creating additional incentives for mitigation. Looking more in detail, one sees that the situation differs from sector to sector. Some industry sectors indeed have substantial cost and competitiveness issues. In others such as electricity and transport, there are costs at micro level but balance for economy and society as a whole is rather positive. International climate policy in general and clubs in particular should therefore be tailored to sectoral specifics.
Am frühen Sonntagmorgen des 20. November 2022 ging die 27. Konferenz der Vertragsparteien des Rahmenübereinkommens der Vereinten Nationen über Klimaänderungen (27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), COP27) im ägyptischen Scharm El Sheikh zu Ende. Geplant war die Konferenz bis Freitag. Doch es gab viel zu diskutieren. Katastrophale Extremwetterereignisse wie die Überschwemmungen in Pakistan und historische Dürren in Europa unterstrichen auch dieses Jahr wieder die Bedeutung von ambitionierten klimapolitischen Entschlüssen. Auch der neueste Bericht des Weltklimarats (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC) hatte erneut hervorgehoben, dass diese Ereignisse weiter eskalieren werden, je mehr die globale Erwärmung zunimmt.
Global climate
(2016)
This article summarises the main outcomes of the Lima UN Climate Conference (COP20 / CMP10). It starts with the discussions under the Durban Platform on developing a new comprehensive climate agreement and increasing short-term ambition and subsequently covers the issues relating to near-term implementation of previous decisions in the areas of transparency, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, loss and damage, adaptation, finance, and carbon markets.
While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current level of action of the Parties to the Agreement falls far short of this ambition, as is recognised in the very COP decision adopting the Agreement. The Global Stocktake (GST) established in Art. 14 of the PA is a key element to address this problem. Its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the progress made towards the collectively agreed goals.
The aim of this report is to develop recommendations on how to maximise the potential impact of the GST. The report starts from a perspective of what the GST could ideally do, irrespective of decisions already taken under the UNFCCC and other political constraints. In the second step, the report takes these limitations into account and suggests ways for how to nonetheless work towards the desired outcome.
The impacts of the COVID-19 crisis and the global response to it will co-determine the future of climate policy. The recovery packages responding to the impacts of the pandemic may either help to chart a new sustainable course, or they will further cement existing high-emission pathways and thwart the achievement of the Paris Agreement objectives. This article discusses how international climate governance may help align the recovery packages with the climate agenda. For this purpose, the article investigates five key governance functions through which international institutions may contribute: send guidance and signals, establish rules and standards, provide transparency and accountability, organize the provision of means of implementation, and promote collective learning. Reflecting on these functions, the article finds that the process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), together with other international institutions, could promote sustainable recovery in several ways.
The gap between the internationally agreed climate objectives and tangible emissions reductions looms large. We explore how the supreme decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Conference of the Parties (COP), could develop to promote more effective climate policy. We argue that promoting implementation of climate action could benefit from focusing more on individual sectoral systems, particularly for mitigation. We consider five key governance functions of international institutions to discuss how the COP and the sessions it convenes could advance implementation of the Paris Agreement: guidance and signal, rules and standards, transparency and accountability, means of implementation, and knowledge and learning. In addition, we consider the role of the COP and its sessions as mega-events of global climate policy. We identify opportunities for promoting sectoral climate action across all five governance functions and for both the COP as a formal body and the COP sessions as conducive events. Harnessing these opportunities would require stronger involvement of national ministries in addition to the ministries of foreign affairs and environment that traditionally run the COP process, as well as stronger involvement of non-Party stakeholders within formal COP processes.
Global climate
(2020)
The annual Climate Change Conference took place on 2-15 December in Katowice, Poland. It included the twenty-fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-24) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the fourteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (MOP-14), the resumed first Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (MOP-1), and their subsidiary bodies. The conference had two main objectives: operationalizing the Paris Agreement by adopting detailed rules for its implementation and starting the process of strengthening the parties' climate protection contributions.
Last year's conference of the global climate change regime took place from 2 until 15 December 2018 in Katowice, Poland. The conference had two main objectives: operationalising the Paris Agreement by adopting detailed rules for its implementation, and starting the process of strengthening Parties' climate protection contributions. This article covers the negotiations on these two sets of issues and also includes a discussion of other recent climate activities by Parties and non-Party actors. Success of the negotiations in Katowice was far from assured, but in the end COP24 concluded with the adoption of the "Katowice Climate Package" setting out detailed guidelines on how to implement its various elements. However, the conference fell short on the first objective, none of the major emitting countries was ready to step up its climate ambition. The most important aspect of the Katowice outcome is therefore that it has brought the wrangling about implementation procedures to a close, making way for the true task at hand: the strengthening of national and international activities to protect the climate and the implementation of the existing pledges. Arguably, a key factor that has been slowing down climate policy is the power of entrenched interests. The article therefore concludes with a reflection on how such barriers to climate action may be overcome and what role future COPs may play in this regard.
Global climate
(2017)
On 7-18 November, the twenty-second Conference of the Parties (COP-22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the twelfth Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP-12) took place in Marrakech. Due to the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement, Marrakech also hosted the first Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA-1). Nobody had expected this one year before in Paris - the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, by comparison, had taken eight years. Many hailed the rapid entry into force as further proof of the commitment of the world community to finally tackle the climate problem.
From 7 to 18 November 2016, the twenty-second Conference of the Parties (COP22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in Marrakech. Due to the early entry into force of the Paris Agreement, Marrakech also hosted the first Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1). Researchers from the Wuppertal Institute observed the conference and elaborated a detailed analysis of the results. The report starts by discussing developments regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreement, in particular the detailed "rulebook" and cooperative mechanisms. Next, the article discusses developments in the various avenues for raising climate ambition that have been put in place by the Paris conference: the 2018 facilitative dialogue, the engagement of non-state and sub-national actors, and the elaboration of mid-century climate strategies. In addition, the article discusses other Marrakech developments, in particular on issues of climate finance and adaptation, as well as recent developments in the wider world that have an impact on the UNFCCC, in particular developing alliances, developments in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and under the Montreal Protocol, and possible repercussions of the US presidential election.
Global climate
(2017)
On 12 December, the twenty-first Conference of Parties (COP-21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Paris Agreement. This marked the conclusion of the long process of crafting a new international climate regime that began with the adoption of the Bali Roadmap in 2007, failed spectacularly in Copenhagen in 2009, and resumed with a new approach in Durban 2011. This article summarizes and analyzes the main contents of the Paris Agreement.
On 12 December 2015, the Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the "Paris Agreement". With this step, the world community has agreed on a collective and cooperative path to fight human-induced climate change: After 25 years of UN climate diplomacy, the world's governments have for the first time in history negotiated a treaty which envisages climate action by all nations. The Agreement sets the world on a path that might lead to a decarbonised economy in the second half of the century. Researchers from the Wuppertal Institute have observed COP 21 and elaborated a detailed analysis of the results. The assessment provides an overview of the most important negotiation outcomes, assesses their results as well as shortfalls and provides an outlook of the next steps needed to implement the Paris Agreement's goals and to set the world firmly on a non-fossil based development path.
On 12 December 2015, the Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the "Paris Agreement". With this step, the world community has agreed on a collective and cooperative path to fight human-induced climate change: After 25 years of UN climate diplomacy, the world's governments have for the first time in history negotiated a treaty which envisages climate action by all nations. The Agreement sets the world on a path that might lead to a decarbonised economy in the second half of the century. Researchers from the Wuppertal Institute have observed COP 21 and elaborated a detailed analysis of the results. The assessment provides an overview of the most important negotiation outcomes, assesses their results as well as shortfalls and provides an outlook of the next steps needed to implement the Paris Agreement's goals and to set the world firmly on a non-fossil based development path.
Global climate
(2019)
The twenty-third Conference of the Parties (COP-23) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Bonn on 6-17 November 2017, under the presidency of Fiji. COP-23 focused, in particular, on developing rules to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement and on raising ambition for climate protection. Since this was the first "Oceanic" COP, special attention was given to supporting the countries of the Global South in their efforts to reduce emissions, adapt to climate change, and deal with the unavoidable impacts of climate change. This article summarizes the main developments and results of COP-23.
The calm before the storm : an assessment of the 23rd Climate Change Conference (COP 23) in Bonn
(2018)
From 6 to 17 November, the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP23) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Bonn under the presidency of Fiji. Researchers of the Wuppertal Institute, who attended the conference, have now published an in-depth analysis of the key results of the conference.
The report starts by discussing developments regarding the implementation of the Paris Agreement, in particular the negotiations on the detailed "rulebook" for implementing the Agreement. Other key issues addressed at the conference were the support for countries of the Global South in dealing with the effects of climate change (adaptation and climate finance) and preparation of the first global review of climate action that will take place in December this year. In addition, the report discusses recent developments in the wider world that have an impact on the UNFCCC, in particular the rise of pioneer alliances at the intergovernmental and civil society level.
Although some progress was achieved regarding the rulebook for implementation of the Paris Agreement, no real breakthrough was made. Therefore, quite some diplomatic work and political leadership will be needed this year to make the adoption of the rulebook at COP24 in Katowice (Poland) possible. This will require quite some tailwind from civil society and the media.
Last year's conference of the global climate change regime took place from 2 until 15 December 2019 in Madrid, Spain. Despite marking a new record for overtime in the history of the UNFCCC, the conference did not only fail to meet the increasing public demand for swift and strong climate action, it also failed on its formal mandate to finalise the Paris rulebook. A record number of issues were left unresolved and shelved for the next session. COP25 thereby highlighted how much work still lies ahead both domestically and internationally if 2020 is to see a step-up in climate action that is consistent with the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement.
The twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Sharm el-Sheikh made history by for the first time ever discussing and ultimately even agreeing to establish a fund to address loss and damage caused by climate change. However, the conference did little to limit the occurrence of loss and damage in the first place by containing the extent of climate change. This article discusses the conference's outcomes in the areas of mitigation and adaptation, loss and damage, the Global Stocktake, cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, climate finance, and gender-responsiveness. While modest progress can be observed, it is too slow to actually achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This pace is leading many, not least the most vulnerable countries, to search for parallel arenas of cooperation.
2020 was meant to be the year of climate ambition. Then the COVID-19 pandemic struck, the Glasgow conference was postponed to November 2021, and climate policy generally appeared to have been put on the backburner. But towards the end of the year prospects seemed to brighten with a series of zero-emission pledges and the election of Joe Biden as US President. This article analyses what the year of the pandemic achieved in terms of combating climate change. This article first summarizes the virtual events that were organised to substitute for the physical UNFCCC conferences and what progress was or was not made on the outstanding items of the "Paris rulebook", implementation of the Gender Action Plan, and other items. Subsequently, the article surveys the status of NDC updates and to what extent recovery programmes have been used to advance climate action. Finally, the article takes a closer look at the current dynamics among non-Party actors. In summary, while formal negotiations essentially stopped in the year of the pandemic, the conservation did not. However, implementation is still lagging far behind the ambitious targets that have been set. While implementation is mostly the domain of national policy, the international process has a number of options at its disposal to foster climate action.
The Glasgow climate conference marked a symbolic juncture, lying half-way between the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 and the year 2050 in which according to the IPCC special report on the 1.5°C limit net zero CO2 emissions need to be reached, globally, in order to maintain a good chance of achieving the 1.5°C limit. This article undertakes an assessment of what the UNFCCC and in particular the Paris Agreement and its implementation process have actually achieved so far up to and including the results of the Glasgow conference. The article discusses efforts at ambition raising both within and outside the formal diplomatic process, the finalization of the implementation rules of the Paris Agreement, as well as progress on gender responsiveness, climate finance, adaptation and loss and damage. In summary, the Paris Agreement and its implementation can be considered a success as it is having a discernible impact on the behavior of parties as well as on non-party actors. However, significant further efforts will be required to actually achieve the objectives of the Agreement.
This paper discusses options to increase mitigation ambition in crediting mechanisms that serve the Paris Agreement (PA), such as the Article 6.4 mechanism. Under the Clean Development Mechanism and other crediting mechanisms, baselines have been specified in the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity factors and linked to business-as-usual developments. This means that with increasing production of goods and services through carbon market activities, absolute emissions may increase or fall only slowly. At a global level, such an approach widens the "emissions gap". To enable continued use of emissions intensity baselines in crediting mechanisms while being in line with the PA’s goal to pursue efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5˚C, we propose to apply an "ambition coefficient" to emissions intensities of technologies when establishing the baseline. This coefficient would decrease to reflect increasing ambition over time, and reach zero when a country needs to reach net zero emissions. Due to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the coefficient would fall more quickly for developed than for developing countries. The latter would be able to generate emission reduction credits well beyond 2050, while for the former, crediting would stop around 2035 or before. An ambition coefficient approach would generate certainty for carbon market investors and preserve trust in international carbon markets that operate in line with the agreed, long-term ambition of the international climate regime.
Additionality revisited : guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris agreement
(2019)
The Paris Agreement requires mitigation contributions from all Parties. Therefore, the determination of additionality of activities under the market mechanisms of its Article 6 will need to be revisited. This paper provides recommendations on how to operationalize additionality under Article 6. We first review generic definitions of additionality and current approaches for testing of additionality before discussing under which conditions additionality testing of specific activities or policies is still necessary under the new context of the Paris Agreement, that is, in order to prevent increases of global emissions. We argue that the possibility of "hot air" generation under nationally-determined contributions (NDCs) requires an independent check of the NDC's ambition. If the NDC of the transferring country does contain "hot air", or if the transferred emission reductions are not covered by the NDC, a dedicated additionality test should be required. While additionality tests of projects and programmes could continue to be done through investment analysis, for policy instruments new approaches are required. They should be differentiated according to type of policy instrument. For regulation, we suggest calculating the resulting pay-back period for technology users. If the regulation generates investments exceeding a payback period threshold, it could be deemed additional. Similarly, carbon pricing policies that generate a carbon price exceeding a threshold could qualify; for trading schemes an absence of over-allocation needs to be shown. The threshold should be differentiated according to country categories and rise over time.