Purpose - Iran as an energy-rich country faces many challenges in the optimal utilization of its vast resources. High rates of population and economic growth, a generous subsidies program, and poor resource management have contributed to rapidly growing energy consumption and high energy intensity over the past decades. The continuing trend of rising energy consumption will bring about new challenges as it will shrink oil export revenues, restraining economic activities. This calls for a study to explore alternative scenarios for the utilization of energy resources in Iran. The purpose of this paper is to model demand for energy in Iran and develop two business-as-usual and efficiency scenarios for the period 2005-2030.
Design/methodology/approach - The authors use a techno-economic or end-use approach to model energy demand in Iran for different types of energy uses and energy carriers in all sectors of the economy and forecast it under two scenarios: business as usual (BAU) and efficiency.
Findings - Iran has a huge potential for energy savings. Specifically, under the efficiency scenario, Iran will be able to reduce its energy consumption 40 percent by 2030. The energy intensity can also be reduced by about 60 percent to a level lower than the world average today.
Originality/value - The paper presents a comprehensive study that models the Iranian energy demand in different sectors of the economy, using data at different aggregation levels and a techno-economic end-use approach to illuminate the future of energy demand under alternative scenarios.
Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the government put forward a law - passed in parliament by a large majority - that calls for a complete nuclear phase-out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs.
The immediate closure of 8 NPPs and the plans for a complete nuclear phase-out within little more than a decade, raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Some observers feared power supply shortages, increasing CO2-emissions and a need for Germany to become a net importer of electricity.
Now - a little more than a year after the phase-out law entered into force - this paper examines these concerns using (a) recent statistical data on electricity production and demand in the first 15 months after the German government's immediate reaction to the Fukushima accident and (b) reviews the most recent projections and scenarios by different stakeholders on how the German electricity system may develop until 2025, when NPPs will no longer be in operation.
The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, provided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011.
If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electricity importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.
Germany's current efforts to decarbonize its electricity system are analysed. As nuclear power and fossil power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage were ruled out in 2011, renewable electricity generation (RES) together with electricity savings are the primary focus for achieving decarbonization. Germany aims to have RES account for at least 80% of its electricity by 2050. Achieving renewable generation needs strong political support and regulatory provisions for its market integration. Four main technical and regulatory challenges are the maintenance of a steady and efficient expansion of RES, the provision of balancing capacities, the realization of the targeted electricity savings, and the smart adaptation of the transport and distribution grid. An overview of the existing and planned regulatory provisions for decarbonization are described, and some gaps identified, particularly with regard to the overall management of the process, the inclusion of electricity savings and the interference of Germany's decarbonization strategies with neighbouring countries. Policies that both accelerate grid expansion and direct RES expansion should immediately be put in place and can be supported by a targeted mobilization of balancing capacities. Electricity savings are a significant and cost-efficient strategy for low-carbon electricity. Policy relevance: Germany is actively converting its national electricity system towards a fully renewable one. As renewable electricity has reached about a quarter of total consumption, a number of technical and regulatory challenges arise. Current discussions and plans are described for the four main challenges: maintaining and optimizing high investment rates into RES generation technologies, providing balancing capacities, reducing demand, and adapting the grid to the changing needs. Policy recommendations for these four tasks highlight the need to intensify electricity demand reduction and also consider the potential interactions between the German electricity system and its neighbouring countries.
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major economies Japan, the UK, and Germany, all of whom were committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident are examined. In Japan and Germany, the accident precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate change policies. The status of the energy and climate change policies in each country prior to the accident is assessed, the responses to the accident are described, and the possible impacts on their positions in the international climate negotiations are analysed. Finally, the three countries' responses are compared and some differences between them observed. Some reasons for their different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, are identified. Policy relevance: The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low-cost electricity, low-carbon energy supply, and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident, which followed the Japanese tsunami of March 2011, has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. The responses to Fukushima are assessed for the UK, Germany, and Japan. Before the accident, all three countries considered nuclear as playing a significant part in climate mitigation strategies. Although the UK Government has continued to support nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements, Japan and Germany have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit according to different timescales. The factors that explain the different decisions are examined, including patterns of energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes to risk. The implications for the international climate negotiations are also assessed.
In recent decades, better data and methods have become available for understanding the complex functioning of cities and their impacts on sustainability. This review synthesizes the recent developments in concepts and methods being used to measure the impacts of cities on environmental sustainability. It differentiates between a dominant trend in research literature that concentrates on the accounting and allocation of greenhouse gas emissions and energy use to cities and a reemergence of studies that focus on the direct and indirect material and resource flows in cities. The methodological approaches reviewed may consider cities as either producers or consumers, and all recognize that urban environmental impacts can be local, regional, or global. As well as giving an overview of the methodological debates, we examine the implications of the different approaches for policy and the challenges these approaches face in their application on the field.
Nach einer langen Phase der Stabilität ist die Stromwirtschaft in den vergangenen 15 Jahren stark in Bewegung geraten. Mit der Liberalisierung stand zunächst der Wechsel von Gebietsmonopolen hin zu wettbewerblich organisierten Erzeuger- und Verbrauchermärkten an. Derzeit findet ein ganz ähnlicher Umbruch statt, der vom Übergang von konventioneller hin zu erneuerbarer Stromerzeugung gekennzeichnet ist. Aber sind die Paradigmen der einzelnen Phasen miteinander vereinbar und hat jede für sich noch immer ihre Daseinsberechtigung, oder ist hier eine Modifizierung notwendig? Das Strommarktdesign der Zukunft kann nicht auf einem leeren Blatt entworfen, sondern es müssen bestehende Strukturen berücksichtigt werden. Gleichzeitig ist die Frage zu beantworten, ob die Wahl zwischen regulatorischen oder marktbasierten Ansätzen sich auch anhand der mit ihnen möglichen Präzision der Steuerung unterscheidet.
Die Landesregierung in NRW hat am 14.4.2015 den in einem aufwändigen Stakeholderprozess erstellten Klimaschutzplan vorgestellt. Eines der Ziele war, die Klimaschutzpolitik als langfristige Strukturpolitik zu implementieren und entsprechende Prozesse in die Breite der Gesellschaft zu tragen. Weitere Bundesländer und der Bund selbst haben inzwischen ähnliche Prozesse eingeleitet. In zahlreichen anderen Ländern gibt es Beschlüsse, die in diese Richtung gehen. Eine Übersicht über den Prozess der Planerstellung in NRW und über den Stand der Diskussion in Deutschland verdeutlicht, wie Klimaschutzpläne durch partizipatorische Elemente in der Erstellungsphase mehr Akzeptanz erfahren können.
The German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) is home to one of the most important industrial regions in Europe, and is the first German state to have adopted its own Climate Protection Law (CPL). This paper describes the long-term (up to 2050) mitigation scenarios for NRW’s main energy-intensive industrial sub-sectors which served to support the implementation of the CPL. It also describes the process of scenario development, as these scenarios were developed through stakeholder participation. The scenarios considered three different pathways (best-available technologies, break-through technologies, and CO2 capture and storage). All pathways had optimistic assumptions on the rate of industrial growth and availability of low-carbon electricity. We find that a policy of "re-industrialisation" for NRW based on the current industrial structures (assumed here to represent an average growth of NRWs industrial gross value added (GVA) of 1.6% per year until 2030 and 0.6% per year from 2030 to 2050), would pose a significant challenge for the achievement of overall energy demand and German greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets, in particular as remaining efficiency potentials in NRW are limited. In the best-available technology (BAT) scenario CO2 emission reductions of only 16% are achieved, whereas the low carbon (LC) and the carbon capture and storage (CCS) scenario achieve 50% and 79% reduction respectively. Our results indicate the importance of successful development and implementation of a decarbonised electricity supply and breakthrough technologies in industry - such as electrification, hydrogen-based processes for steel, alternative cements or CCS - if significant growth is to be achieved in combination with climate mitigation. They, however, also show that technological solutions alone, together with unmitigated growth in consumption of material goods, could be insufficient to meet GHG reduction targets in industry.
The need for deep decarbonisation in the energy intensive basic materials industry is increasingly recognised. In light of the vast future potential for renewable electricity the implications of electrifying the production of basic materials in the European Union is explored in a what-if thought-experiment. Production of steel, cement, glass, lime, petrochemicals, chlorine and ammonia required 125 TW-hours of electricity and 851 TW-hours of fossil fuels for energetic purposes and 671 TW-hours of fossil fuels as feedstock in 2010. The resulting carbon dioxide emissions were equivalent to 9% of total greenhouse gas emissions in EU28. A complete shift of the energy demand as well as the resource base of feedstocks to electricity would result in an electricity demand of 1713 TW-hours about 1200 TW-hours of which would be for producing hydrogen and hydrocarbons for feedstock and energy purposes. With increased material efficiency and some share of bio-based materials and biofuels the electricity demand can be much lower. Our analysis suggest that electrification of basic materials production is technically possible but could have major implications on how the industry and the electric systems interact. It also entails substantial changes in relative prices for electricity and hydrocarbon fuels.
In October 2014, the European Council agreed on a target of improving overall energy efficiency by at least 27 per cent by 2030. According to the European Council's conclusions, this target should not be translated into nationally binding targets. Nevertheless individual Member States are free to set higher national objectives if desired. However, it is difficult to assess the degree of ambition of a national target because so far not much light has been shed upon the exact size of the untapped efficiency potentials.
This paper provides an in-depth analysis and comparison of existing studies on energy efficiency potentials in the European Union's (EU) Member States by 2030. It includes a structured overview of the results, information on the quality of the available data and suggestions for improvement.
The review shows that comprehensive studies on national energy efficiency potentials are rare and hardly comparable. The existing studies agree on the existence of significant potentials for energy efficiency. Their outcomes, however, vary significantly in terms of national levels. Assuming low policy intensity, energy savings between 10 and 28 per cent could be realised by 2030 compared to a baseline development, in the case of high policy intensity 7-44 per cent. Technical energy efficiency potentials in the different EU Member States are estimated at 14-52 per cent. On average, energy savings of 27 per cent by 2030 appear to be feasible with significant policy effort. We conclude that the deviation in Member States' energy efficiency potentials resulting from different studies represents an indication of the so far poor quality of underlying data. In order to allow for a concretisation of efficiency potential estimates, the comparability and detail of information sources should be improved.