Mit dem Kernenergieunfall im japanischen Fukushima im März 2011 ist die Diskussion über das Für und Wider der Nutzung der Kernenergie für die Stromerzeugung in Deutschland neu entbrannt. Die Frage nach den Auswirkungen eines beschleunigten Ausstiegs aus der Kernenergienutzung auf die Entwicklung der Strompreise in Deutschland bildete in den vergangenen Monaten einen Schwerpunkt der öffentlichen Diskussion. Allerdings halten nicht alle Aussagen, die hierzu veröffentlicht wurden, einer kritischen Analyse stand, was zum Teil auch an zugrunde liegenden politischen Motiven gelegen haben mag. Eine Untersuchung fundierter Studien und ausgewählter Stellungnahmen zeigt, dass sich die befürchteten kurzfristigen Preiseffekte in ü̈berschaubaren Grenzen halten werden.
In October 2014, the European Council agreed on a target of improving overall energy efficiency by at least 27 per cent by 2030. According to the European Council's conclusions, this target should not be translated into nationally binding targets. Nevertheless individual Member States are free to set higher national objectives if desired. However, it is difficult to assess the degree of ambition of a national target because so far not much light has been shed upon the exact size of the untapped efficiency potentials.
This paper provides an in-depth analysis and comparison of existing studies on energy efficiency potentials in the European Union's (EU) Member States by 2030. It includes a structured overview of the results, information on the quality of the available data and suggestions for improvement.
The review shows that comprehensive studies on national energy efficiency potentials are rare and hardly comparable. The existing studies agree on the existence of significant potentials for energy efficiency. Their outcomes, however, vary significantly in terms of national levels. Assuming low policy intensity, energy savings between 10 and 28 per cent could be realised by 2030 compared to a baseline development, in the case of high policy intensity 7-44 per cent. Technical energy efficiency potentials in the different EU Member States are estimated at 14-52 per cent. On average, energy savings of 27 per cent by 2030 appear to be feasible with significant policy effort. We conclude that the deviation in Member States' energy efficiency potentials resulting from different studies represents an indication of the so far poor quality of underlying data. In order to allow for a concretisation of efficiency potential estimates, the comparability and detail of information sources should be improved.
The Paris Agreement calls on all nations to pursue efforts to contribute to limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. However, due to limited global, regional and country-specific analysis of highly ambitious GHG mitigation pathways, there is currently a lack of knowledge about the transformational changes needed in the coming decades to reach this target. Through a meta-analysis of mitigation scenarios for Germany, this article aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the changes needed in the energy system of an industrialized country. Differentiation among six key long-term energy system decarbonization strategies is suggested, and an analysis is presented of how these strategies will be pursued until 2050 in selected technologically detailed energy scenarios for Germany. The findings show, that certain strategies, including the widespread use of electricity-derived synthetic fuels in end-use sectors as well as behavioral changes, are typically applied to a greater extent in mitigation scenarios aiming at high GHG emission reductions compared to more moderate mitigation scenarios. The analysis also highlights that the pace of historical changes observed in Germany between 2000 and 2015 is clearly insufficient to adequately contribute to not only the 1.5 °C target, but also the 2 °C long-term global target.
Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the government put forward a law - passed in parliament by a large majority - that calls for a complete nuclear phase-out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs.
The immediate closure of 8 NPPs and the plans for a complete nuclear phase-out within little more than a decade, raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Some observers feared power supply shortages, increasing CO2-emissions and a need for Germany to become a net importer of electricity.
Now - a little more than a year after the phase-out law entered into force - this paper examines these concerns using (a) recent statistical data on electricity production and demand in the first 15 months after the German government's immediate reaction to the Fukushima accident and (b) reviews the most recent projections and scenarios by different stakeholders on how the German electricity system may develop until 2025, when NPPs will no longer be in operation.
The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, provided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011.
If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electricity importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.
Germany's current efforts to decarbonize its electricity system are analysed. As nuclear power and fossil power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage were ruled out in 2011, renewable electricity generation (RES) together with electricity savings are the primary focus for achieving decarbonization. Germany aims to have RES account for at least 80% of its electricity by 2050. Achieving renewable generation needs strong political support and regulatory provisions for its market integration. Four main technical and regulatory challenges are the maintenance of a steady and efficient expansion of RES, the provision of balancing capacities, the realization of the targeted electricity savings, and the smart adaptation of the transport and distribution grid. An overview of the existing and planned regulatory provisions for decarbonization are described, and some gaps identified, particularly with regard to the overall management of the process, the inclusion of electricity savings and the interference of Germany's decarbonization strategies with neighbouring countries. Policies that both accelerate grid expansion and direct RES expansion should immediately be put in place and can be supported by a targeted mobilization of balancing capacities. Electricity savings are a significant and cost-efficient strategy for low-carbon electricity. Policy relevance: Germany is actively converting its national electricity system towards a fully renewable one. As renewable electricity has reached about a quarter of total consumption, a number of technical and regulatory challenges arise. Current discussions and plans are described for the four main challenges: maintaining and optimizing high investment rates into RES generation technologies, providing balancing capacities, reducing demand, and adapting the grid to the changing needs. Policy recommendations for these four tasks highlight the need to intensify electricity demand reduction and also consider the potential interactions between the German electricity system and its neighbouring countries.
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major economies Japan, the UK, and Germany, all of whom were committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident are examined. In Japan and Germany, the accident precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate change policies. The status of the energy and climate change policies in each country prior to the accident is assessed, the responses to the accident are described, and the possible impacts on their positions in the international climate negotiations are analysed. Finally, the three countries' responses are compared and some differences between them observed. Some reasons for their different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, are identified. Policy relevance: The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low-cost electricity, low-carbon energy supply, and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident, which followed the Japanese tsunami of March 2011, has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. The responses to Fukushima are assessed for the UK, Germany, and Japan. Before the accident, all three countries considered nuclear as playing a significant part in climate mitigation strategies. Although the UK Government has continued to support nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements, Japan and Germany have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit according to different timescales. The factors that explain the different decisions are examined, including patterns of energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes to risk. The implications for the international climate negotiations are also assessed.
Die sog. Klimapfadestudie und ihre Szenarien haben in der Öffentlichkeit ein breites Echo gefunden, nicht zuletzt weil der BDI damit erstmals eine eigene detaillierte Untersuchung der Machbarkeit der deutschen Klimaschutzziele vorlegt und offensiv in die Diskussionen um die langfristige Transformation des Energiesystems einsteigt. Während der BDI in der Mai-Ausgabe der "et" bereits wesentliche Ergebnisse vorgestellt hat, werden die Szenarien der Studie in diesem Artikel mit anderen vorliegenden Klimaschutzszenarien verglichen.
The production of commodities by energy-intensive industry is responsible for 1/3 of annual global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The climate goal of the Paris Agreement, to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C, requires global GHG emissions reach net-zero and probably negative by 2055-2080. Given the average economic lifetime of industrial facilities is 20 years or more, this indicates all new investment must be net-zero emitting by 2035-2060 or be compensated by negative emissions to guarantee GHG-neutrality. We argue, based on a sample portfolio of emerging and near-commercial technologies for each sector (largely based on zero carbon electricity & heat sources, biomass and carbon capture, and catalogued in an accompanying database), that reducing energy-intensive industrial GHG emissions to Paris Agreement compatible levels may not only be technically possible, but can be achieved with sufficient prioritization and policy effort. We then review policy options to drive innovation and investment in these technologies. From this we synthesize a preliminary integrated strategy for a managed transition with minimum stranded assets, unemployment, and social trauma that recognizes the competitive and globally traded nature of commodity production. The strategy includes: an initial policy commitment followed by a national and sectoral stakeholder driven pathway process to build commitment and identify opportunities based on local zero carbon resources; penetration of near-commercial technologies through increasing valuation of GHG material intensity through GHG pricing or flexible regulations with protection for competitiveness and against carbon leakage; research and demand support for the output of pilot plants, including some combination of guaranteed above-market prices that decline with output and an increasing requirement for low carbon inputs in government procurement; and finally, key supporting institutions.
Energy-intensive processing industries (EPIs) produce iron and steel, aluminum, chemicals, cement, glass, and paper and pulp and are responsible for a large share of global greenhouse gas emissions. To meet 2050 emission targets, an accelerated transition towards deep decarbonization is required in these industries. Insights from sociotechnical and innovation systems perspectives are needed to better understand how to steer and facilitate this transition process. The transitions literature has so far, however, not featured EPIs. This paper positions EPIs within the transitions literature by characterizing their sociotechnical and innovation systems in terms of industry structure, innovation strategies, networks, markets and governmental interventions. We subsequently explore how these characteristics may influence the transition to deep decarbonization and identify gaps in the literature from which we formulate an agenda for further transitions research on EPIs and consider policy implications. Furthering this research field would not only enrich discussions on policy for achieving deep decarbonization, but would also develop transitions theory since the distinctive EPI characteristics are likely to yield new patterns in transition dynamics.
The need for deep decarbonisation in the energy intensive basic materials industry is increasingly recognised. In light of the vast future potential for renewable electricity the implications of electrifying the production of basic materials in the European Union is explored in a what-if thought-experiment. Production of steel, cement, glass, lime, petrochemicals, chlorine and ammonia required 125 TW-hours of electricity and 851 TW-hours of fossil fuels for energetic purposes and 671 TW-hours of fossil fuels as feedstock in 2010. The resulting carbon dioxide emissions were equivalent to 9% of total greenhouse gas emissions in EU28. A complete shift of the energy demand as well as the resource base of feedstocks to electricity would result in an electricity demand of 1713 TW-hours about 1200 TW-hours of which would be for producing hydrogen and hydrocarbons for feedstock and energy purposes. With increased material efficiency and some share of bio-based materials and biofuels the electricity demand can be much lower. Our analysis suggest that electrification of basic materials production is technically possible but could have major implications on how the industry and the electric systems interact. It also entails substantial changes in relative prices for electricity and hydrocarbon fuels.