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The production of commodities by energy-intensive industry is responsible for 1/3 of annual global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The climate goal of the Paris Agreement, to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C, requires global GHG emissions reach net-zero and probably negative by 2055-2080. Given the average economic lifetime of industrial facilities is 20 years or more, this indicates all new investment must be net-zero emitting by 2035-2060 or be compensated by negative emissions to guarantee GHG-neutrality. We argue, based on a sample portfolio of emerging and near-commercial technologies for each sector (largely based on zero carbon electricity & heat sources, biomass and carbon capture, and catalogued in an accompanying database), that reducing energy-intensive industrial GHG emissions to Paris Agreement compatible levels may not only be technically possible, but can be achieved with sufficient prioritization and policy effort. We then review policy options to drive innovation and investment in these technologies. From this we synthesize a preliminary integrated strategy for a managed transition with minimum stranded assets, unemployment, and social trauma that recognizes the competitive and globally traded nature of commodity production. The strategy includes: an initial policy commitment followed by a national and sectoral stakeholder driven pathway process to build commitment and identify opportunities based on local zero carbon resources; penetration of near-commercial technologies through increasing valuation of GHG material intensity through GHG pricing or flexible regulations with protection for competitiveness and against carbon leakage; research and demand support for the output of pilot plants, including some combination of guaranteed above-market prices that decline with output and an increasing requirement for low carbon inputs in government procurement; and finally, key supporting institutions.
The establishment of the Leveraging a Climate-neutral Society–strategic Research Network (LCS–RNet) (then named the International Research Network for Low Carbon Societies) was proposed at the Group of Eight (G8) Environment Ministers’ Meeting in 2008. Its 12th annual meeting in December 2021 focused on the discussion on how to transition into a just and sustainable society and how to reduce the risks associated with the transition. This requires comprehensive studies including on the concept of transition, pathways to net-zero societies and how to realise the pathways by collaborating with various stakeholders. This Special Feature provides new insights into sustainability science by linking the scientific knowledge with practical science for the transition through the exploration of studies presented at the annual meeting. Following the opening paper, "A challenge for sustainability science: can we halt climate change?", a wide range of topics were discussed, including practices for sustainable transformation in the Erasmus University, practices in industry, energy transition and international cooperation.
The Greens / European Free Alliance Group of the European Parliament contracted Wuppertal Institute in collaboration with Energiaklub to develop scientifically sound, comprehensive, alternative, and sustainable long term energy scenarios for Hungary, which cover potential development paths till 2030 and 2050. The scenarios developed deliver information about the costs and long-term effects of different energy choices for Hungary as well as credible information on potential benefits of greening the energy mix. As a result, the study aims to provide policy makers with better evidence for making informed, prudent and forward-thinking decisions in this field.
The target of zero emissions sets a new standard for industry and industrial policy. Industrial policy in the twenty-first century must aim to achieve zero emissions in the energy and emissions intensive industries. Sectors such as steel, cement, and chemicals have so far largely been sheltered from the effects of climate policy. A major shift is needed, from contemporary industrial policy that mainly protects industry to policy strategies that transform the industry. For this purpose, we draw on a wide range of literatures including engineering, economics, policy, governance, and innovation studies to propose a comprehensive industrial policy framework. The policy framework relies on six pillars: directionality, knowledge creation and innovation, creating and reshaping markets, building capacity for governance and change, international coherence, and sensitivity to socio-economic implications of phase-outs. Complementary solutions relying on technological, organizational, and behavioural change must be pursued in parallel and throughout whole value chains. Current policy is limited to supporting mainly some options, e.g. energy efficiency and recycling, with some regions also adopting carbon pricing, although most often exempting the energy and emissions intensive industries. An extended range of options, such as demand management, materials efficiency, and electrification, must also be pursued to reach zero emissions. New policy research and evaluation approaches are needed to support and assess progress as these industries have hitherto largely been overlooked in domestic climate policy as well as international negotiations.
The European Union (EU) has established that the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 as a key driver of innovation and growth for industry and the economy in the EU. In addition to offering great opportunities, this also poses considerable challenges for the European economy and, for the most part, for basic industries, which are particularly emission-intensive and face strong international competition.
An integrated climate and industry strategy is of central importance to protecting the climate, since the production of steel, cement, basic chemicals, glass, paper, and other materials in the EU and worldwide accounts for roughly one fifth of total greenhouse gas emissions. Even in a greenhouse gas-neutral future, we will not be able to fully eliminate our need for these materials. At the same time, it is particularly challenging to produce these materials without creating emissions given the state of technology and the necessary infrastructures. This applies above all to the question of how large amounts of green energy, including electricity and hydrogen, can be produced at competitive prices. Analyses show that despite the considerable costs involved in process changeover, the costs of transforming the raw materials industry are acceptable to society as a whole, given that the additional costs usually only increase the price of the end products by a few percentage points. However, in the case of crude steel or cement, the price would increase by between one third and 100 per cent. Since almost all raw materials manufacturers face strong global market competition, in most cases they are not able to bankroll the investments in climate-neutral production and the required energy infrastructure without outside support.
This paper outlines an integrated climate industrial policy package that allows the EU to utilise its existing technological leadership in many of these industries to build a greenhouse gas-neutral raw materials industry.
On 26 January 2019, the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment recommended that no more coal-fired power plants would be operated in Germany by 2038 at the latest. In this paper the Wuppertal Institute comments on the results of the Commission and makes recommendations for the current necessary steps for the climate and innovation policy in Europe, Germany and North Rhine-Westphalia.
Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the government put forward a law - passed in parliament by a large majority - that calls for a complete nuclear phase-out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs.
The immediate closure of 8 NPPs and the plans for a complete nuclear phase-out within little more than a decade, raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Some observers feared power supply shortages, increasing CO2-emissions and a need for Germany to become a net importer of electricity.
Now - a little more than a year after the phase-out law entered into force - this paper examines these concerns using (a) recent statistical data on electricity production and demand in the first 15 months after the German government's immediate reaction to the Fukushima accident and (b) reviews the most recent projections and scenarios by different stakeholders on how the German electricity system may develop until 2025, when NPPs will no longer be in operation.
The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, provided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011.
If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electricity importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.
The basic materials industries are a cornerstone of Europe's economic prosperity, increasing gross value added and providing around 2 million high-quality jobs. But they are also a major source of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite efficiency improvements, emissions from these industries were mostly constant for several years prior to the Covid-19 crisis and today account for 20 per cent of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions.
A central question is therefore: How can the basic material industries in the EU become climate-neutral by 2050 while maintaining a strong position in a highly competitive global market? And how can these industries help the EU reach the higher 2030 climate target - a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55 per cent relative to 1990 levels?
In the EU policy debate on the European Green Deal, many suppose that the basic materials industries can do little to achieve deep cuts in emissions by 2030. Beyond improvements to the efficiency of existing technologies, they assume that no further innovations will be feasible within that period. This study takes a different view. It shows that a more ambitious approach involving the early implementation of key low-carbon technologies and a Clean Industry Package is not just possible, but in fact necessary to safeguard global competitiveness.
The present brief analysis provides an overview about costs and benefits of the promotion of renewable energies in the framework of the EEG. We describe the development of the EEG apportionment in recent years, and its possible development in coming years. Furthermore, the analysis examines the merits of some of the most commonly expressed points of criticism against the EEG. Finally, we examine the extent to which the calculations regarding the costs of the expansion of photovoltaics, which are often raised in the media, are correct, and how they are to be interpreted.
Due to significant success in technology development and cost reductions, the electricity system is now widely perceived as the part of the energy system to be first in decarbonisation. This means a double challenge for the system: Firstly, it will undergo significant change due to rapidly increasing shares of fluctuating renewable generation; Secondly, there will be an expansion of electricity into other fields of the energy system such as heat generation and transport.
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major economies Japan, the UK, and Germany, all of whom were committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident are examined. In Japan and Germany, the accident precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate change policies. The status of the energy and climate change policies in each country prior to the accident is assessed, the responses to the accident are described, and the possible impacts on their positions in the international climate negotiations are analysed. Finally, the three countries' responses are compared and some differences between them observed. Some reasons for their different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, are identified. Policy relevance: The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low-cost electricity, low-carbon energy supply, and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident, which followed the Japanese tsunami of March 2011, has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. The responses to Fukushima are assessed for the UK, Germany, and Japan. Before the accident, all three countries considered nuclear as playing a significant part in climate mitigation strategies. Although the UK Government has continued to support nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements, Japan and Germany have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit according to different timescales. The factors that explain the different decisions are examined, including patterns of energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes to risk. The implications for the international climate negotiations are also assessed.
In recent decades, better data and methods have become available for understanding the complex functioning of cities and their impacts on sustainability. This review synthesizes the recent developments in concepts and methods being used to measure the impacts of cities on environmental sustainability. It differentiates between a dominant trend in research literature that concentrates on the accounting and allocation of greenhouse gas emissions and energy use to cities and a reemergence of studies that focus on the direct and indirect material and resource flows in cities. The methodological approaches reviewed may consider cities as either producers or consumers, and all recognize that urban environmental impacts can be local, regional, or global. As well as giving an overview of the methodological debates, we examine the implications of the different approaches for policy and the challenges these approaches face in their application on the field.
The German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) is home to important clusters of energy-intensive basic materials industries. 15% of the EU's primary steel as well as 15% of high-value base chemicals are produced here. Together with refinery fuels, cement, lime and paper production (also overrepresented in NRW) these are the most carbon-intensive production processes of the industrial metabolism. To achieve the ambitious regional and national climate goals without relocating these clusters, carbon-neutral production will have to become standard by mid-century. We develop and evaluate three conceptual long-term scenarios towards carbon-neutral industry systems for NRW for 2050 and beyond:
* a first scenario depending on carbon capture and storage or use for heavy industries (iCCS),
* a second scenario sketching the direct electrification of industrial processes (and transport) and
* a third scenario relying on the import of low carbon energies (e.g. biomass, and synthetic fuels (like methanol) for the use in industries and transport. All scenarios share the assumption that electricity generation will be CO2-neutral by 2050.
For all three scenarios energy efficiency, primary energy demand for energy services and feedstock as well as the carbon balance are quantified. We apply a spatial-explicit analysis of production sites to allow for discussion of infrastructure re-use and net investment needs. Possible symbiotic relations between sectors are also included. The robustness of the three conceptualised future carbon-neutral industry systems is then analysed using a multi-criteria approach, including e.g. energy security issues and lock-ins on the way to 2050.