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This policy paper reviews the concept of additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement. Additionality is a key criterion that helps to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, especially when units created under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting purposes whether that is by Parties in order to meet their NDCs or whether by other entities with legal mitigation obligations.
It does so by first reviewing key concepts such as offsetting, environmental integrity, and baseline. Subsequently, it explores the context of additionality under the Paris Agreement. More specifically it discusses what should be counted as the baseline for additionality demonstration. The subsequent chapter then highlights the challenges with establishing additionality, that is establishing a causal relationship between a policy intervention and a proposed activity. Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of international governance with respect to additionality.
Shaping the Paris mechanisms part III : an update on submissions on article 6 of the Paris Agreement
(2017)
At the 46th meeting of the UNFCCC's subsidiary bodies in Bonn, it was decided that Parties submit their input on selected aspects of the Art. 6 negotiations shortly before COP 23, taking place in Bonn in early November. This Policy Paper summarises the views submitted in October 2017 to identify points of controversy and convergence. It builds on previous papers summarising the views submitted in September 2016 and March 2017, respectively.
This paper analyses the results of the climate conference in Lima 2014 in the light of the coming climate summit in Paris by the end of this year (COP21). The authors from the Wuppertal Institute make recommendations for the improvement of the current cooperation in the context of the climate convention and they suggest to complement the existing UN regime with a club of forerunner countries in order to provide new breath for international climate policy.
The 2014 United Nations Climate Change Conference had been scheduled from 1 to 12 December in Lima/Peru. While in the run-up to the conference, China and the US in a surprise bilateral move had announced plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions that exceeded expectations, the conference was characterised once again by a deep division between key players from the former so-called "developed" and "developing" world. The negotiations thus took 32 hours longer than planned and ended on Sunday morning at 1.22 am. More importantly, the conference failed almost completely to resolve the tasks it was supposed to do in order to prepare the last round of negotiations before next year's conference in Paris 2015, which is supposed to deliver a comprehensive future climate agreement. A team of researchers from the Wuppertal Institute attended the conference and have compiled a first assessment of the results.
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, former debates about generating carbon credits on the basis of national policies have resurged. National policies have not been eligible as project activities under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms. The Paris Agreement opens the possibility for such policy crediting but also provides an entirely new context: Universal participation, ambitious long-term targets and nationally defined contributions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambitious over time. As this paper shows, these changes in the framework conditions add an additional layer of complexity to policy-based cooperation.
The paper explores the potential for policy-based cooperation by first briefly presenting the regulatory basis provided by the Paris Agreement before outlining a prototype for policy-based cooperation and its key challenges.
The new mechanism under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement is to be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). However, so far there is no clarity what role exactly the supervisory body (Body) is to play. Against this background, this JIKO Policy Paper analyses different governance options for Art. 6.4.
The paper first reflects the objectives of the new mechanism and on what the role of the mechanism as a whole should be. The paper then summarises what has already been agreed on the functioning of the mechanism and elaborates what steps will be needed to generate transferrable emission reductions under the Article 6.4 mechanism. On this basis, the paper develops criteria for how to decide what role the Body should have, and then discusses what role the Body and the other actors that are involved in the mechanism could have in each of the steps of the activity cycle.
The 2010 UN climate conference in Cancún emphasized that "Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights". However, so far there is no further guidance. This article discusses the relevant legal human rights norms and two case studies from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The first case (Bajo Aguán, Honduras) shows that the current absence of any international safeguards can lead to registration of highly problematic projects. The second case (Olkaria, Kenya) suggests that safeguards, introduced here as a side effect of World Bank involvement, can have a positive impact, but that it is necessary to have them based on human rights. It therefore seems recommendable that the UN climate regime develop mandatory human rights safeguards. In addition or alternatively, individual buyer countries or groups of countries, such as the European Union, could introduce their own additional requirements for CDM projects.
The inclusion of references to human rights in the Paris Agreement was celebrated as a milestone towards greater integration of human rights in environmental and climate governance. Beyond their symbolic value, the significance of these provisions however depends on the extent to which they inform the implementation of the Paris Agreement both at the national and international levels. This article takes stock of the integration of human rights in climate governance and identifies concrete opportunities to ensure that human rights considerations are included in the Paris Implementation Guidelines to be adopted at COP-24, promoting climate action that aligns with Parties' human rights obligations. We first consider the relevance of human rights to climate action and the incremental recognition of these linkages in the international climate regime - both in the lead up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and since. We then consider in specific terms how human rights could inform five key dimensions of the Paris Agreement's Implementation Guidelines: NDC guidance, adaptation communications, transparency framework, global stocktake, and the article 6 mechanisms. This article will reflect on past experience of how climate policy impacts human rights and on proposals put forward in the context of the negotiations of the implementation guidelines. It concludes with recommendations on a right-based approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
Much mitigation-related governance activity is evident in a range of sectoral systems, and regarding particular governance functions. However, there is a tendency for this activity to relate to the easiest functions to address, such as "learning and knowledge building", or to take place in somewhat limited "niches". Across all sectoral systems examined, the gap between identified governance needs and what is currently supplied is most serious in terms of the critical function of setting rules to facilitate collective action. A lack of "guidance and signal" is also evident, particularly in the finance, extractive industries, energy-intensive industries, and buildings sectoral systems.
Of the sectoral systems examined, the power sector appears the most advanced in covering the main international governance functions required of it. Nevertheless, it still falls short in achieving critical governance functions necessary for sufficient decarbonisation. Significantly, while the signal is strong and clear for the phase-in of renewable energy, it is either vague or absent when it comes to the phase-out of fossil fuel-generated electricity. The same lack of signal that certain high-carbon activities need actively to be phased out is also evident in financial, fossil-fuel extractive industry and transport-related sectors.
More effective mitigation action will need greater co-ordination or orchestration effort, sometimes led by the UNFCCC, but also from the bodies such as the G20, as well as existing (or potentially new) sector-level institutions. The EU needs to re-consider what it means to provide climate leadership in an increasingly "polycentric" governance landscape.
