There is general agreement that preventing dangerous climate change requires a fundamental transformation of the global economy. Regarding carbon markets, the EU, for example, has called for the new market-based mechanism (NMM) to be established under the UNFCCC to "facilitate transition towards low carbon economy and attract further international investment". This JIKO Policy Paper discusses the transformative potential of the NMM and how it should be structured to maximize transformative impact.
The analysis shows that details in the arrangements of the scheme, such as allocation of allowances can significantly influence the incentive structure of the instrument and hence its potential to contribute to transformational change. The authors conclude that carbon pricing is necessary but is by itself not sufficient to redeem the various types of market failures that have led to the unsustainable global socio-economic system we are deemed to change. An NMM should therefore be tailored to complement other national policies.
Market mechanisms - the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Art. 17 emission trading - have been a central feature of the Kyoto Protocol. The shape of the new climate change agreement to adopted at this year's UN climate change conference in Paris is emerging only slowly, including the role market mechanisms will play. In order to assess the potential scope of market mechanisms in the Paris agreement, this JIKO Policy Brief surveys the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to the new agreement which countries have so far submitted. The paper is now available for download.
The Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) intend to adopt a new comprehensive climate agreement at this year's Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris. The shape of the new agreement is emerging only slowly, including the role market mechanisms will play. A new JIKO Policy Brief assesses the potential scope of market mechanisms in the Paris agreement by surveying the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) so far.
At COP 17 Durban, parties decided to establish a centralised new market-based mechanism (NMM) and to consider establishing a "framework for various approaches" to govern decentralised initiatives. Parties have also discussed possible use and up-scaling of non market based approaches (NMA) in this context. This Policy Brief summarises the state-of-play regarding the submissions by parties and observers as of Jan 2015. It is an update on previous JIKO policy papers and therefore focuses on comparable aspects of the discussion.
Market mechanisms - the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and Art. 17 emission trading - have been a central feature of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) intend to adopt a new comprehensive climate agreement at this year's Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris. The shape of the new agreement is emerging only slowly, including the role market mechanisms will play.
To gauge the potential scope of market mechanisms in the forthcoming Paris agreement, this paper surveys the submitted INDCs on the question to what extent they envisage the use of market mechanisms. In detail, the paper looks at five questions for each INDC:
- Does the INDC make any mention of market mechanisms?
- Does the Party plan to use market mechanisms to achieve its contribution to the Paris agreement?
- If a Party intends to use market mechanisms, does the INDC specify which mechanisms or types of units the country intends to use?
- Does the Party quantify the extent to which it intends to use market mechanisms? Under the Kyoto Protocol, use of mechanisms has been supposed to be supplemental to domestic action, though this principle has never been quantified.
- Does the Party specify how the use of mechanisms will ensure environmental integrity and avoid double counting?
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, former debates about generating carbon credits on the basis of national policies have resurged. National policies have not been eligible as project activities under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms. The Paris Agreement opens the possibility for such policy crediting but also provides an entirely new context: Universal participation, ambitious long-term targets and nationally defined contributions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambitious over time. As this paper shows, these changes in the framework conditions add an additional layer of complexity to policy-based cooperation.
The paper explores the potential for policy-based cooperation by first briefly presenting the regulatory basis provided by the Paris Agreement before outlining a prototype for policy-based cooperation and its key challenges.
While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current actions of the Parties to the Agreement fall far short of these goals. The Global Stocktake (GST), established in Art. 14 of the PA, may help narrow this gap between ambition and action: its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the collective progress of the international community towards Paris goals. While some general modalities on how to conduct the GST have been adopted, the details are still to be determined.
The objective of this report is to analyze existing international regimes as regards their review processes, the contribution of these review processes to various governance functions and, finally, to derive lessons for the GST. Processes analyzed include:
the design of the upcoming Global Stocktake itself,
the Talanoa Dialogue (TD) which is the direct precursor of the GST,
the Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), which features a regular stocktaking process focused on progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
the review processes of the UN human rights system (UNHRS) and
the review processes and assessment panels of the Montreal Protocol (MP).
The analysis of each review process is organised in four section: (1) political background and context, (2) technical and organisational details of the processes, (3) interface between the political and technical processes, and (4) how the review processes contribute to achieving the objectives of the respective regime, particularly governance functions of the regime (guidance and signal, transparency and accountability, and knowledge and learning).
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement explicitly acknowledges the need to incentivize and facilitate the participation of private entities in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), private sector actors had already the opportunity to participate in a new and fast-growing market. However, they faced numerous challenging investment barriers. The study provides an overview on key factors and barriers determining private sector participation in Article 6 mechanisms. It distinguishes between the three topics demand side factors, rules and standards for market mechanisms, and supply side factors and provides for each of them options to mitigate or overcome barriers.
In a short analysis, it further explores three of the identified options:
- Improving the design and support of national systems and capacities is an important pre-requisite for the private sector to be able to generate and sell ITMOs
- The up-scaling of mitigation activities e. g. through (sub-) sector level crediting, and policy crediting helps private sector actors to benefit from economies of scale
- Exploring the potential of digitization of measuring, reporting and verification (MRV), e. g. the use of sensors, internet of things, artificial intelligence and blockchain to make the project cycle more efficient and reduce transaction costs.
Overall, the report stresses the importance of host country readiness to provide the private sector with a robust and trusted environment that allows for the adoption of Article 6 mechanisms.
The new mechanism defined under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement is supposed to allow for international cooperation with regard to climate change mitigation and thereby enable an increase in overall mitigation. Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism under Article 6.4 should also make sure that it is not be in conflict with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions but even better foster national pathways leading to this objective. Building this into the mechanism requires to shift the focus from short- and mid-term considerations to the long-term perspective in one way or another.
This discussion paper explores three different approaches that may help to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalization of Article 6.4, namely positive and negative lists, additionality with regard to a baseline consistent with both, NDCs and long-term targets, as well as adaptation of existing instruments and criteria from climate finance. The detailed discussion of the ap-proaches shows that the approaches should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as comple-mentary to each other. From the analyses, two storylines emerge how to combine aspects of the differ-ent approaches in a reasonable way to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions under Article 6.4.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a new mechanism for Parties to cooperate in achieving their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). One key innovation of the Article 6.4 mechanism is its objective to "deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions" (Art. 6.4(d)). This report develops recommendations on how to implement this objective. A key difficulty lies in the fact that even basics of how the mechanism is supposed to function have so far not been clarified by the Parties. The report therefore first sketches out what has so far been agreed and discussed on the mechanism’s activity cycle. Second, as the concept of overall mitigation has so far also not been clearly defined by Parties, the report derives a working definition from the language that was agreed in the Paris Agreement. In the next step, the report provides a survey of the options to achieve overall mitigation that have so far been discussed in the relevant literature and in the Article 6 negotiations. Many of these options were developed in the context of the Kyoto mechanisms. The report therefore discusses to what extent the options are also applicable under the Paris Agreement or whether adjustments need to be made. In the following, the options that are applicable under the Agreement are assessed on the basis of a number of criteria. The report concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes mechanisms for Parties to "pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions [...]" (Article 6.1). I. e. the mechanisms are explicitly designed to foster higher ambition. However, without additional guidance and rules, the economic incentives of carbon markets may work against increasing host country ambition. For example, setting ambitious NDC targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country can transfer abroad. The report presents four options on how the risks can be ad-dressed and ambition can be increased: (1) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability; (2) Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries; (3) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism; (4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism. These options are assessed and recommendations are provided on how they could be implemented.