Energy sufficiency is one of the three energy sustainability strategies, next to energy efficiency and renewable energies. We analyse to what extent European governments follow this strategy, by conducting a systematic document analysis of all available European National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and Long-Term Strategies (LTSs). We collect and categorise a total of 230 sufficiency-related policy measures, finding large differences between countries. We find most sufficiency policies in the transport sector, when classifying also modal shift policies to change the service quality of transport as sufficiency policies. Types of sufficiency policy instruments vary considerably from sector to sector, for instance the focus on financial incentives and fiscal instruments in the mobility sector, information in the building sector, and financial incentive/tax instruments in cross-sectoral application. Regulatory instruments currently play a minor role for sufficiency policy in the national energy and climate plans of EU member states. Similar to energy efficiency in recent decades, sufficiency still largely referred to as micro-level individual behaviour change or necessary exogenous trends that will need to take place. It is not treated yet as a genuine field of policy action to provide the necessary framework for enabling societal change.
On the pathway to climate neutrality, EU member states are obliged to submit national energy and climate plans (NECPs) with planned policies and measures for decarbonization until 2030 and long-term strategies (LTSs) for further decarbonization until 2050. We analysed the 27 NECPs and 15 LTSs submitted by October 2020 using an interrater method. This paper focuses on energy sufficiency policies and measures in the transport sector.
We found a total of 236 sufficiency policy measures with more than half of them (53 %) in the transport/mobility sector. Additionally, we found 41 measures that address two or more sectors (cross-sectoral measures). From the explicit sufficiency measures within the transport sector, 82 % aim at modal shift. A reduction of transport volumes is much less addressed. Countries plan to use mainly fiscal and economic instruments. Those are in many cases investments in infrastructure of low-carbon transport modes and taxation instruments. Plans on decarbonisation measures are also frequently mentioned. The majority of cross-sectoral measures are carbon taxes or tax reforms, also economic instruments.
On the one hand it is encouraging that Member States strongly emphasize the transport sector in their NECPs and LTSs - at least quantitatively and concerning sufficiency measures - because this sector has been the worst-performing in climate mitigation so far. On the other hand, the measures described seem not sufficient to reach ambitious climate targets, and we doubt that the presented set of policy instruments will get the transport sector on track to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in the necessary extent.
Impact chains are used in many different fields of research to depict the various impacts of an activity and to visualize the system in which this activity is embedded. Research has not yet conceptualized impact chains specifically for energy sufficiency policies. We develop such a concept based on current evaluation approaches and extend these by adding qualitative elements such as success factors and barriers. Furthermore, we offer two case studies in which we test this concept with the responsible climate action managers. We also describe options for integrating these impact chains into different types of energy models, which are key tools in policy consulting.
Energiesparen ist durch den Krieg in der Ukraine das Gebot der Stunde, um uns unabhängig von russischen Energieträgern zu machen; vor Kriegsbeginn spielte dieses Thema keine allzu große Rolle in der breiteren politischen Diskussion. In Szenarien und Strategien, wie mittel- und langfristige Klimaziele erreicht werden könnten, gewann das Thema Energiesparen durch Energiesuffizienz in den vergangenen Jahren hingegen immer mehr an Bedeutung, wobei die technischen Strategien Effizienz und Konsistenz, also die Umstellung auf erneuerbare Energien, noch immer maßgebend sind.
In diesem Beitrag zeigen wir, welche Rolle das Senken des Energieverbrauches spielt, um Klimaziele zu erreichen, und warum dies eine geeignete Möglichkeit ist, multiple Krisen gleichzeitig zu lösen. In Hinblick darauf ist Energiesuffizienz unabdingbarer Bestandteil möglicher Lösungsstrategien. Außerdem skizzieren wir, welche kurz, mittel- und langfristigen Politikinstrumente derzeit diskutiert werden, und ergänzen dies um weitere Ideen zu Einsparpotenzialen sowie um Umsetzungsbeispiele.
There is a growing body of scientific evidence supporting sufficiency as an inevitable strategy for mitigating climate change. Despite this, sufficiency plays a minor role in existing climate and energy policies. Following previous work on the National Energy and Climate Plans of EU countries, we conduct a similar content analysis of the recommendations made by citizen assemblies on climate change mitigation in ten European countries and the EU, and compare the results of these studies. Citizen assemblies are representative mini-publics and enjoy a high level of legitimacy.
We identify a total of 860 mitigation policy recommendations in the citizen assemblies' documents, of which 332 (39 %) include sufficiency. Most of the sufficiency policies relate to the mobility sector, the least relate to the buildings sector. Regulatory instruments are the most often proposed means for achieving sufficiency, followed by fiscal and economic instruments. The average approval rate of sufficiency policies is high (93 %), with the highest rates for regulatory policies.
Compared to National Energy and Climate Plans, the citizen assembly recommendations include a significantly higher share of sufficiency policies (factor three to six) with a stronger focus on regulatory policies. Consequently, the recommendations can be interpreted as a call for a sufficiency turn and a regulatory turn in climate mitigation politics. These results suggest that the observed lack of sufficiency in climate policy making is not due to a lack of legitimacy, but rather reflects a reluctance to implement sufficiency policies, the constitution of the policy making process and competing interests.
Sufficiency measures are potentially decisive for the decarbonisation of energy systems but rarely considered in energy policy and modelling. Just as efficiency and renewable energies, the diffusion of demand-side solutions to climate change also relies on policy-making. Our extensive literature review of European and national sufficiency policies fills a gap in existing databases. We present almost 300 policy instruments clustered into relevant categories and publish them as "Energy Sufficiency Policy Database". This paper provides a description of the data clustering, the set-up of the database and an analysis of the policy instruments. A key insight is that sufficiency policy includes much more than bans of products or information tools leaving the responsibility to individuals. It is a comprehensive instrument mix of all policy types, not only enabling sufficiency action, but also reducing currently existing barriers. A policy database can serve as a good starting point for policy recommendations and modelling, further research is needed on barriers and demand-reduction potentials of sufficiency policy instruments.
The key role of sufficiency for low demand-based carbon neutrality and energy security across Europe
(2024)
A detailed assessment of a low energy demand, 1.5 °C compatible pathway is provided for Europe from a bottom-up, country scale modelling perspective. The level of detail enables a clear representation of the potential of sufficiency measures. Results show that by 2050, 50% final energy demand reduction compared to 2019 is possible in Europe, with at least 40% of it attributable to various sufficiency measures across all sectors. This reduction enables a 77% renewable energy share in 2040 and 100% in 2050, with very limited need for imports from outside of Europe and no carbon sequestration technologies. Sufficiency enables increased fairness between countries through the convergence towards a more equitable share of energy service levels. Here we show, that without sufficiency measures, Europe misses the opportunity to transform energy demand leaving considerable pressure on supply side changes combined with unproven carbon removal technologies.
Using impact chains for a feasibility assessment of sufficiency policies in the mobility sector
(2024)
Energy savings through modal shift and demand reduction (avoid) are key to decarbonising the transport sector. This is the aim of transport sufficiency policies. Some of them are already implemented and serve as best practice examples, and there are many planned and proposed policies, e.g., in the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) of EU Member States and in the literature on decarbonisation of the transport sector.
The European Sufficiency Policy Database of the Energy Sufficiency junior research group (EnSu) currently contains 120 sufficiency policies for passenger transport, grouped into seven different policy strategies and covering different types of policy instruments. In this paper, we take a closer look at 74 of them.
Methodologically, we refer to the concept of impact chains as developed by Zell-Ziegler and Thema (2022) and analyse the chain from policy stimulus to impact with a particular focus on those factors that seem relevant to the feasibility of policy implementation.
In our feasibility assessment, we seek to answer the following questions: 1) How do particular policy instruments work from cause to effect and what can we learn from them for implementation feasibility? 2) Within a particular policy strategy, how do individual policy instruments differ in terms of implementation feasibility? 3) Does implementation feasibility vary between instrument types?
Regarding the first question, we take the impact chain of the good practice example of "superblocks" in Barcelona - neighbourhoods with restricted car access - as an example of a policy that could also be implemented in cities in Germany as well. We conclude that this can work well if good public transport is available and administrations are flexible in their urban planning. However, barriers and risks such as the risk of gentrification or protests from local shopkeepers should not be neglected and must be taken seriously. All of the other 73 impact chains, which cannot be described in such detail, are provided in a supplementary table.
Regarding the second question, we focus our analysis on the enabling and hindering factors of policy instruments. We find that policies with many supporting factors often also have many barriers and risks. This is mainly because they are meta-level policies with more diverse relevant factors. The policy strategy "Reduce trips: local supply" has the most risks and the promotion of active transport has the least, suggesting a no-regret policy. Another pattern we see is that pull policies (such as incentives or infrastructure) have fewer barriers than push policies (such as banning air travel and converting road space to cycling and walking).
On the third question, we find out that regulatory instruments do not have the most risks (but do have the most barriers) and even have the most supporting factors compared to economic and fiscal instruments. In conclusion, this analysis supports a detailed consideration of decarbonisation options for passenger transport and paves the way for further research on a comprehensive policy mix in this sector.
