REDD crediting vs. REDD funds : how avoided deforestation under the UNFCCC should be financed
(2010)
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes mechanisms for Parties to "pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions [...]" (Article 6.1). I. e. the mechanisms are explicitly designed to foster higher ambition. However, without additional guidance and rules, the economic incentives of carbon markets may work against increasing host country ambition. For example, setting ambitious NDC targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country can transfer abroad. The report presents four options on how the risks can be ad-dressed and ambition can be increased: (1) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability; (2) Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries; (3) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism; (4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism. These options are assessed and recommendations are provided on how they could be implemented.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement explicitly acknowledges the need to incentivize and facilitate the participation of private entities in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), private sector actors had already the opportunity to participate in a new and fast-growing market. However, they faced numerous challenging investment barriers. The study provides an overview on key factors and barriers determining private sector participation in Article 6 mechanisms. It distinguishes between the three topics demand side factors, rules and standards for market mechanisms, and supply side factors and provides for each of them options to mitigate or overcome barriers.
In a short analysis, it further explores three of the identified options:
- Improving the design and support of national systems and capacities is an important pre-requisite for the private sector to be able to generate and sell ITMOs
- The up-scaling of mitigation activities e. g. through (sub-) sector level crediting, and policy crediting helps private sector actors to benefit from economies of scale
- Exploring the potential of digitization of measuring, reporting and verification (MRV), e. g. the use of sensors, internet of things, artificial intelligence and blockchain to make the project cycle more efficient and reduce transaction costs.
Overall, the report stresses the importance of host country readiness to provide the private sector with a robust and trusted environment that allows for the adoption of Article 6 mechanisms.
Although it is not part of what has been called the "ambition mechanism" or "ratchet mechanism", Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also has an explicit requirement to promote ambition. Article 6 specifically highlights that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions. Despite the common purpose, the two elements have to date been discussed mostly in isolation, both in the negotiations as well as in the wider literature. This JIKO Policy Paper sets out to change this by exploring the relationship between Article 6 and the Global Stocktake.
This Policy Brief outlines the "identity crisis" in which voluntary carbon standards find themselves after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. It describes how the new international legal framework threatens to undermine the legitimation and credibility of voluntary carbon standards and discusses first ideas how the arising challenges could be dealt with.
This JIKO Policy Paper explores how Parties using Article 6 can increase their mitigation ambition. Building on a broad definition of ambition raising which puts the intensification of climate change mitigation targets and actions by Parties at its centre, eight different ambition raising options are identified. The analysis shows that these options are associated with different technical, institutional and political challenges, calling for a combination of different ambition raising options.
Using results-based finance for climate action : existing initiatives and the role of the CDM
(2014)
Results-based finance is receiving increasing attention, being considered as a potential key funding mode in climate finance. The Clean Development Mechanism has been cited to potentially contribute to this goal. Against this background, the policy brief outlines the rationale of the concept and analyses six climate change mitigation initiatives that build on the results-based finance approach. The analysis puts a special focus on the role of the CDM.
This paper analyses the risks to environmental integrity associated to the transfers of mitigation outcomes in the context of Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement and provides an overview on approaches and tools that could be used for addressing them. The analysis shows that some of the environmental integrity risks can be dealt with at the technical level. This relates, inter alia, to the risks of mitigation outcomes being unreal or non-permanent as well as to carbon leakage and rebound effects. Here, robust MRV provisions should be established. Other risks will be difficult to address without touching the new and open structure of the Paris Agreement. This applies, for example, to risks associated to the diverse nature of NDCs, and requires further investigation.
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 provides the basis for future international cooperation on the field of climate change mitigation. While truly global in reach, the agreement will however result in an increasingly complex new climate regime: Instead of using a uniform formula, Parties are allowed to autonomously define their NDCs (nationally determined contributions), resulting in a large diversity of contributions. This poses significant challenges for emissions accounting and the transfer of emission units.
This Policy Paper explores how these challenges can be addressed by analysing different types of NDCs and assessing their compatibility with the export and use of emission units. On that basis, the authors develop opt-in provisions for Parties willing to participate in unit transfers under the new climate regime and illustrate how potential risks to environmental integrity can be addressed.
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, former debates about generating carbon credits on the basis of national policies have resurged. National policies have not been eligible as project activities under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms. The Paris Agreement opens the possibility for such policy crediting but also provides an entirely new context: Universal participation, ambitious long-term targets and nationally defined contributions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambitious over time. As this paper shows, these changes in the framework conditions add an additional layer of complexity to policy-based cooperation.
The paper explores the potential for policy-based cooperation by first briefly presenting the regulatory basis provided by the Paris Agreement before outlining a prototype for policy-based cooperation and its key challenges.
This report explores the future role of the voluntary carbon market and its potential to contribute to raising the ambition of climate policy. For this purpose, desk research was complemented by interviews with voluntary carbon market representatives. The report finds that the current roles of the voluntary market are set to change fundamentally due to the Paris Agreement. For the future of the voluntary market as an investor, three roles were identified, each of which is associated with specific challenges: The market may maintain its current role of buyer of carbon neutrality credits, it may become a supporter of NDC implementation, or it may become a driver of ambition. With regard to the future role of private certification standards, the Paris Agreement may hold the possibility of using such standards in the context of compliance activities. Overall, the findings indicate that the voluntary market has some potential to contribute to ambition raising. Whether this potential will actually be unlocked depends on how the concept of ambition raising will be operationalized under the Paris Agreement and to what degree it can be integrated into the voluntary market's activities and business models.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is in crisis. More and more market participants are leaving the sector. In the light of this development, some argue that governments should step in as buyers of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Given the limited volumes of public funding, however, governments will have to prioritise some projects over others. This policy brief therefore analyses national purchase programmes and multilateral carbon funds in order to identify criteria public investors are applying in the selection of the projects they finance. The aim is to identify a vision of a high quality CDM project that be can be made use of when designing a possible support programme.