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The current global momentum for carbon pricing has lately produced innovative hybrids: carbon taxes allowing the use of offsets from emission sources not targeted by the carbon tax for compliance with the tax load. This study aims at filling the knowledge gap in existing literature by exploring the potential impacts of domestic offset components in carbon taxes on mitigation of national emissions, including the country examples Colombia, Mexico and South Africa.
The findings indicate that the use of offsets in carbon taxes may significantly influence mitigation of national emissions both positively and negatively. On the one hand, this model may result in real emission reductions from offset projects and positive spillover effects of efforts to reduce emissions from emission sources covered by the carbon tax to other emission sources. Furthermore, the offsetting component can be used as a bargaining chip in political negotiations facilitating the introduction of mitigation policies and measures and/or strengthening their ambition level. On the other hand, it also entails serious risks: Offsetting could compromise the environmental integrity of the carbon tax through low-quality offsets. Furthermore, offsets reduce incentives to curb emissions in the emission sources covered by the carbon tax, potentially leading to carbon lock-in effects. Moreover, an offsetting component could provoke opposition to further climate policies and measures for emission sources generating offsets, as replacing the offsetting component with mandatory emission reduction policies would eliminate revenues from offset credits. General opposition of stakeholder groups to the introduction of offsets may even hinder the introduction of carbon pricing instruments and offsetting altogether.
The study identifies options that could be employed to increase potential positive effects of introducing an offset component to a carbon tax and mitigate related risks, pointing to the country examples included, where appropriate.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a new mechanism for Parties to cooperate in achieving their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). One key innovation of the Article 6.4 mechanism is its objective to "deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions" (Art. 6.4(d)). This report develops recommendations on how to implement this objective. A key difficulty lies in the fact that even basics of how the mechanism is supposed to function have so far not been clarified by the Parties. The report therefore first sketches out what has so far been agreed and discussed on the mechanism’s activity cycle. Second, as the concept of overall mitigation has so far also not been clearly defined by Parties, the report derives a working definition from the language that was agreed in the Paris Agreement. In the next step, the report provides a survey of the options to achieve overall mitigation that have so far been discussed in the relevant literature and in the Article 6 negotiations. Many of these options were developed in the context of the Kyoto mechanisms. The report therefore discusses to what extent the options are also applicable under the Paris Agreement or whether adjustments need to be made. In the following, the options that are applicable under the Agreement are assessed on the basis of a number of criteria. The report concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes mechanisms for Parties to "pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions [...]" (Article 6.1). I. e. the mechanisms are explicitly designed to foster higher ambition. However, without additional guidance and rules, the economic incentives of carbon markets may work against increasing host country ambition. For example, setting ambitious NDC targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country can transfer abroad. The report presents four options on how the risks can be ad-dressed and ambition can be increased: (1) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability; (2) Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries; (3) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism; (4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism. These options are assessed and recommendations are provided on how they could be implemented.
This report explores the future role of the voluntary carbon market and its potential to contribute to raising the ambition of climate policy. For this purpose, desk research was complemented by interviews with voluntary carbon market representatives. The report finds that the current roles of the voluntary market are set to change fundamentally due to the Paris Agreement. For the future of the voluntary market as an investor, three roles were identified, each of which is associated with specific challenges: The market may maintain its current role of buyer of carbon neutrality credits, it may become a supporter of NDC implementation, or it may become a driver of ambition. With regard to the future role of private certification standards, the Paris Agreement may hold the possibility of using such standards in the context of compliance activities. Overall, the findings indicate that the voluntary market has some potential to contribute to ambition raising. Whether this potential will actually be unlocked depends on how the concept of ambition raising will be operationalized under the Paris Agreement and to what degree it can be integrated into the voluntary market's activities and business models.
Offsetting enables countries and companies to meet part of their climate change mitigation obligations by using mitigation outcomes generated elsewhere - in lieu of own emission reductions. This report explores the future role of offset approaches and how they could be successfully integrated into a post-2020 climate regime by focusing both the supply and demand side. For this purpose, the report develops a conceptual approach that derives a normative vision of what should be considered a successful offset use in a top-down manner to then link this vision to specific factors on the ground in sectors and jurisdictions where offsets will be generated and used. It explores how these factors influence the successful operationalisation of the offset approach and how they can inform its design. In addition, the report also explores six conceptual design aspects to providing recommendations on how to take these factors into account during the design of the offset approach. Based on these findings, the authors derive overarching policy recommendations on the integration of offsets into carbon pricing schemes.
This report develops an evaluation framework that policymakers can use to identify whether offsets can add value and uphold environmental integrity of a compliance scheme. It uses a scoring framework on factors to: (1) identify which sectors have hard-to-abate emissions that can justify demanding offsets as cost-containment measures for ambitious climate policies; and (2) identify mitigation activities that are otherwise inaccessible, fosters sustainable development, and the extent to which it enables transformative sectoral action to be eligible to supply offsets. This evaluation framework identifies the optimal conditions that make factors successful in either having sectors demand offsets, or specific mitigation activities supply offsets. Sectoral emissions that are hard-to-abate are those that are technically unavoidable due to a lack and maturity of technologies, and therefore should be allowed to have cost-containment measures - such as offsets - to avoid adverse economic ramifications such as carbon leakage. Mitigation activities that can supply offsets are those that are currently inaccessible to local actor’s due to lack of access to technology, finance or capabilities. Allowing these mitigation activities to be eligible to supply offsets allows to pilot such activities and realize mitigation outcomes outside the original scope of the compliance scheme. This report has chosen selected sectors and mitigation activities to illustrate how this framework can be applied at the global level. It recognizes that country-specific factors can change the assessment of whether the offset approach will add value and uphold environmental integrity to proposed compliance schemes of a country. The report further proposes practical steps policymakers can do to undertake an evaluation at the national level.
The objective of this report is to use historical analysis to identify conditions that determine when offsets add value to compliance schemes while upholding environmental integrity. The indicators of success include: increased acceptance of introducing compliance schemes; raising ambition in subsequent compliance periods; the possibility to drive emission reductions outside the compliance sectors; promoting investments in sustainable development; and avoiding perverse incentives that undermine the stringency of the compliance scheme or compliance actors’ efforts in reducing their own emissions. Through undertaking in-depth case study analyzes on the effects of offsets in the European Union, Alberta, Australia, Colombia and Japan, the report identifies common conditions that explain why offsets were successful (or not) in achieving individual indicators. The report further identifies two common conditions that can help explain when offsets achieve all five indicators of success. The first is that policymakers need to be willing to design the compliance scheme to set and maintain a strong compliance price signal that justifies the need for incorporating cost containment measures, such as offsets, to avert negative political and economic ramifications. Relatedly, the second condition requires institutions, processes and infrastructure that govern both the compliance scheme and offsets to be well developed so that they can ensure offsets uphold the principles of environmental integrity, achieve sustainable development benefits, and act as a reliable cost containment measure to high compliance prices. The findings also highlight how difficult it is to achieve both conditions, as both domestic and international political economy factors determine whether policymakers and voters are willing to introduce and maintain compliance schemes that deliver effective action on climate.