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Die atompolitische Wende der Bundesregierung hatte zahlreichen Spekulationen und Befürchtungen Raum gegeben. Es wurde gemutmaßt, dass Deutschland zum Nettostromimporteur werden könnte, sollten die Kraftwerke (wie im Sommer 2011 beschlossen) dauerhaft außer Betrieb bleiben. Darüber hinaus nahm man an, dass die in Deutschland entfallende Stromerzeugung durch Kohlekraftwerke oder durch Importe aus französischen oder tschechischen Atomkraftwerken ersetzt würde und dass Strompreise sowie CO2-Emissionen deutlich ansteigen würden. Inzwischen liegen vorläufige Energiebilanzen und Marktdaten für das Jahr 2011 vor, die viele dieser Befürchtungen widerlegen. Der hier vorgenommene Ausblick auf die mögliche Entwicklung in den kommenden Jahren zeigt zudem, dass die Bilanz von 2011 keine Momentaufnahme sein muss, sondern dass der gegenüber 2010 wegfallende Kernenergiestrom - bilanziell gesehen - voraussichtlich bereits ab 2013 allein durch eine erhöhte regenerative Stromerzeugung kompensiert werden kann.
Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the government put forward a law - passed in parliament by a large majority - that calls for a complete nuclear phase-out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs.
The immediate closure of 8 NPPs and the plans for a complete nuclear phase-out within little more than a decade, raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Some observers feared power supply shortages, increasing CO2-emissions and a need for Germany to become a net importer of electricity.
Now - a little more than a year after the phase-out law entered into force - this paper examines these concerns using (a) recent statistical data on electricity production and demand in the first 15 months after the German government's immediate reaction to the Fukushima accident and (b) reviews the most recent projections and scenarios by different stakeholders on how the German electricity system may develop until 2025, when NPPs will no longer be in operation.
The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, provided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011.
If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electricity importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.
The basic materials industries are a cornerstone of Europe's economic prosperity, increasing gross value added and providing around 2 million high-quality jobs. But they are also a major source of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite efficiency improvements, emissions from these industries were mostly constant for several years prior to the Covid-19 crisis and today account for 20 per cent of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions.
A central question is therefore: How can the basic material industries in the EU become climate-neutral by 2050 while maintaining a strong position in a highly competitive global market? And how can these industries help the EU reach the higher 2030 climate target - a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55 per cent relative to 1990 levels?
In the EU policy debate on the European Green Deal, many suppose that the basic materials industries can do little to achieve deep cuts in emissions by 2030. Beyond improvements to the efficiency of existing technologies, they assume that no further innovations will be feasible within that period. This study takes a different view. It shows that a more ambitious approach involving the early implementation of key low-carbon technologies and a Clean Industry Package is not just possible, but in fact necessary to safeguard global competitiveness.
The present brief analysis provides an overview about costs and benefits of the promotion of renewable energies in the framework of the EEG. We describe the development of the EEG apportionment in recent years, and its possible development in coming years. Furthermore, the analysis examines the merits of some of the most commonly expressed points of criticism against the EEG. Finally, we examine the extent to which the calculations regarding the costs of the expansion of photovoltaics, which are often raised in the media, are correct, and how they are to be interpreted.
Die in Paris Ende 2015 beschlossene Vereinbarung gibt das Ziel vor, die Erderwärmung bis 2100 auf deutlich unter 2 Grad Celsius zu begrenzen, möglichst aber auf unter 1,5 Grad Celsius. Die vorliegende Studie setzt sich mit der Frage von Fridays for Future Deutschland auseinander, welche Dimension von Veränderungen im deutschen Energiesystem erforderlich wären, um einen angemessenen Beitrag für das Erreichen der 1,5-Grad-Grenze leisten zu können. Nach Abschätzung des Weltklimarates, dem Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), lassen sich mit dieser Temperaturgrenze die Risiken und Auswirkungen des Klimawandels gegenüber einer stärkeren Erderwärmung erheblich verringern.
Die Autorinnen und Autoren haben dabei den Budgetansatz des Sachverständigenrats für Umweltfragen (SRU) der Bundesregierung zugrunde gelegt. Um das 1,5-Grad-Ziel mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 Prozent zu erreichen, ist das Restbudget an damit verträglichen Treibhausgasemissionen eng begrenzt. Für Deutschland bleibt gemäß des Sachverständigenrats für Umweltfragen ab dem Jahr 2020 noch ein Restbudget von 4,2 Gigatonnen CO2. Dabei geht der Sachverständigenrat von der Annahme aus, dass auf globaler Ebene jedem Menschen für die Zukunft ein gleiches Pro-Kopf-Emissionsrecht zugestanden werden soll. Mit dieser Klimaschutzvorgabe geht er deutlich weiter als die aktuellen politischen Vorgaben der Europäischen Union und der Bundesregierung, die diese für sich aus den Pariser Klimaschutzvereinbarungen ableiten.
Die vom SRU formulierte Zielmarke lässt sich einhalten, wenn das Energiesystem (Energiewirtschaft, Industrie, Verkehr und Gebäudewärme) bis zum Jahr 2035 CO2-neutral aufgestellt wird und die Emissionen insbesondere in den nächsten Jahren bereits überproportional stark gesenkt werden können.
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die technische und in gewissem Maße auch die ökonomische Machbarkeit einer Transformation zur CO2-Neutralität bis 2035. Ob sich dieses Ziel jedoch tatsächlich realisieren lässt, hängt auch maßgeblich von der gesellschaftlichen Bereitschaft und einem massiven politischen Fokus auf die notwendige Transformation ab. Die Studie gibt somit Aufschluss darüber, inwiefern es grundlegende technologische und wirtschaftliche Hindernisse für die CO2-Neutralität 2035 gibt; nicht jedoch ob die Umsetzung realpolitisch tatsächlich gelingen kann bzw. was dafür im Einzelnen getan werden muss. Neben den technischen und ökonomischen Herausforderungen einer Transformation hin zu CO2-Neutralität bestehen zentrale Herausforderungen auch in institutioneller und kultureller Hinsicht, zum Beispiel bei Themen wie der Akzeptanz für einen starken Ausbau von Erneuerbaren-Energien-Anlagen und von Energieinfrastrukturen oder hinsichtlich der Notwendigkeit eines deutlich veränderten Verkehrsverhaltens.
This report was prepared by the Wuppertal Institute in cooperation with the German Economic Institute as part of the SCI4climate.NRW project. The report aims to shed light on the possible phenomenon that the availability and costs of "green" energy sources may become a relevant location factor for basic materials produced in a climate-neutral manner in the future.
For this purpose, we introduce the term "Renewables Pull". We define Renewables Pull as the initially hypothetical phenomenon of a shift of industrial production from one region to another as a result of different marginal costs of renewable energies (or of secondary energy sources or feedstocks based on renewable energies).
Shifts in industrial production in the sense of Renewables Pull can in principle be caused by differences in the stringency of climate policies in different countries, as in the case of Carbon Leakage. Unlike Carbon Leakage, however, Renewables Pull can also occur if similarly ambitious climate policies are implemented in different countries. This is because Renewables Pull is primarily determined by differences in the costs and availability of renewable energies. In addition, Renewables Pull can also be triggered by cost reductions of renewable energies and by changing preferences on the demand side towards climate-friendly products. Another important difference to Carbon Leakage is that the Renewables Pull effect does not necessarily counteract climate policy.
Similar to Carbon Leakage, it is to be expected that Renewables Pull could become relevant primarily for very energy-intensive products in basic materials industries. In these sectors (e.g. in the steel or chemical industry), there is also the possibility that relocations of specific energy-intensive parts of the production process could trigger domino effects. As a result, large parts of the value chains previously existing in a country or region could also be subjected to an (indirect) Renewables Pull effect.
For the federal state of NRW, in which the basic materials industry plays an important role, the possible emergence of Renewables Pull is associated with significant challenges as climate policy in Germany, the EU and also worldwide is expected to become more ambitious in the future.
This report aims to enable and initiate a deeper analysis of the potential future developments and challenges associated with the Renewables Pull effect. Thus, in the final chapter of the report, several research questions are formulated that can be answered in the further course of the SCI4climate.NRW project as well as in other research projects.
On behalf of the Port of Rotterdam Authority, the Wuppertal Institute developed three possible pathways for a decarbonised port of Rotterdam until 2050. The port area is home to about 80 per cent of the Netherlands' petrochemical industry and significant power plant capacities. Consequently, the port of Rotterdam has the potential of being an international leader for the global energy transition, playing an important role when it comes to reducing CO2 emissions in order to deliver on the EU's long-term climate goals.
The three decarbonisation scenarios all built on the increasing use of renewables (wind and solar power) and the adoption of the best available technologies (efficiency). The analysis focuses on power plants, refineries and the chemical industry, which together are responsible for more than 90 per cent of the port area's current CO2 emissions.
The decarbonisation scenarios describe how CO2 emissions could be reduced by 75 to 98 per cent in 2050 (compared to 2015). Depending on the scenario, different mitigation strategies are relied upon, including electrification, closure of carbon cycles or carbon capture and storage (CCS). The study includes recommendations for local companies, the Port Authority as well as policy makers. In addition, the study includes a reference scenario, which makes it clear that a "business as usual" mentality will fall well short of contributing adequately to the EU's long-term climate goals.