Zukünftige Energie- und Industriesysteme
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The Sino-German project "Low Carbon Future Cities" (LCFC) aims to develop a low carbon strategy for its Chinese pilot city Wuxi. The strategy primarily focuses on carbon mitigation, but also considers links with the issues of resource efficiency and adaption to climate change. This report written by Daniel Vallentin, Carmen Dienst and Chun Xia offers strategic examples of good practice and makes recommendations to Wuxi city government about the changes that key sectors can adopt in order to comply with its low carbon targets. The recommendations are based on scientific analyses which were undertaken earlier in the LCFC project.
As part of the discussion on a new international climate agreement, which is supposed to be concluded by 2015, the European Commission conducted a stakeholder consultation, to which the Wuppertal Institute contributed. The Wuppertal Institute suggests that Parties should revisit the widely shared assumption that there is a trade-off between climate protection and economic well-being. The problem is not so much the macro-economic outlook. The problem is that climate policy causes substantial distributional impacts and thus naturally leads to resistance. The Wuppertal Institute recommends to reconsider the political wisdom of the quantity-based approach that climate policy has so far been based on. As long as emissions are seen as inextricably linked to economic well-being, framing commitments in terms of emission reductions directly triggers the perspective of seeing climate protection as an economic loss. Commitments should ideally be multi-dimensional. Possible types of commitments to consider may include scaling up certain climate-friendly technologies, improving energy efficiency, limiting fossil fuel use and fossil fuel extraction, or emission price commitments. The strongest mobilisation of political support might perhaps be achieved by framing commitments as a joint international undertaking to provide universal access to sustainable energy services by a specific date.
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, and the consequent accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. Reactions to the accident in three major economies Japan, the UK, and Germany, all of whom were committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident are examined. In Japan and Germany, the accident precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate change policies. The status of the energy and climate change policies in each country prior to the accident is assessed, the responses to the accident are described, and the possible impacts on their positions in the international climate negotiations are analysed. Finally, the three countries' responses are compared and some differences between them observed. Some reasons for their different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, are identified. Policy relevance: The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low-cost electricity, low-carbon energy supply, and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident, which followed the Japanese tsunami of March 2011, has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. The responses to Fukushima are assessed for the UK, Germany, and Japan. Before the accident, all three countries considered nuclear as playing a significant part in climate mitigation strategies. Although the UK Government has continued to support nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements, Japan and Germany have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit according to different timescales. The factors that explain the different decisions are examined, including patterns of energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements, and public attitudes to risk. The implications for the international climate negotiations are also assessed.
Conventional new buildings in OECD countries with a history of building codes save about 50 % of energy compared to average buildings in the building stock. This improvement, however, is not enough to create a building standard with low lifetime costs nor to reach long-term climate protection targets. Much higher energy savings can already be achieved through proven high-efficiency building concepts bringing net economic benefits among other advantages.
A strategic approach to integrated building design is the key to achieving these high-energy savings at low or no extra cost in residential buildings. In our paper we describe the "Easy Efficiency Approach", which can reduce primary energy consumption by 40 to 60 % compared to conventional new building standards, or by 70% to 80% when compared to the primary energy consumption of the existing building stock, and should be regarded as the minimum. This strategy focuses on low-cost options, mainly passive options. Although it can already significantly reduce energy consumption, this first step will not be sufficient to reach long-term climate protection goals. It is thus necessary to implement and support what we call an "Advanced Efficiency Approach", with savings up to 90% , as compared to new building standards, as soon as possible to avoid lock-in effects. Further improvements, especially through the active use of renewable energies, reduce the net primary energy demand to 0 % and beyond.
According to the chosen strategy clearly defined energy performance ranges, with reference to possible savings, for different climate zones worldwide are given. In verifying this approach simulations with BAT (Best Available Technologies) buildings of different types (single family, multi family, high rise) were carried out in close cooperation with project partners. This data has also been verified through an empirical database of built examples both for energy consumption as well their economic soundness.
Wasserelektrolyse und regenerative Gase als Schlüsselfaktoren für die Energiesystemtransformation
(2013)
Die Entscheidung für ein von volatilen Erzeugungsquellen dominiertes Stromsystem stellt an die Stabilisierung des Systems neue Anforderungen. Zugleich bieten sich neue Optionen. Die bisherige Asymmetrie, nach der für die Stabilisierung die Kraftwerksseite verantwortlich sei, ist überkommene Praxis, deswegen auch heute habituell naheliegend, aber vermutlich nicht länger effizient. Die im Titel genannten nachfrageseitigen Ausgleichsoptionen (SE & DSM) bieten sich an. Im Beitrag wird deren Potential abgeschätzt. In vier Gestaltungsfeldern wird zudem gefragt, ob die bislang von der Politik gegebenen rechtlichen Mandate konsequent SE & DSM als Option berücksichtigen. Das Ergebnis ist viermal (weitgehende) Fehlanzeige.
Das Verfahren der Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung in der Stromnetz-Ausbauplanung : eine erste Bewertung
(2013)
Der Ausbau der Netze stellt nicht nur technisch, sondern auch politisch und rechtlich eine Herausforderung dar. Einigermaßen Einigkeit besteht wohl darüber, dass das Stromnetz im Zuge der Energiewende um- und ausgebaut werden muss. Darüber hinaus herrschen jedoch beträchtliche Differenzen zwischen der Öffentlichkeit sowie den Übertragungsnetzbetreibern und der Bundesnetzagentur in der Frage, welches Maß an Ausbau notwendig ist. Dies sollte sich im Prozess der Aufstellung des Bundesbedarfsplans Stromnetze in einem sauberen Kompromiss lösen lassen. Eine Analyse des ersten Erstellungsprozesses legt jedoch verschiedene Fehlentwicklungen offen, die rasch angepackt werden sollten.
Ausgangspunkt einer Bewertung des Standes der Energiewende ist die Verständigung darüber, was sie konkret umfasst. Hier bietet sich die Zielmatrix des Energiekonzepts der Bundesregierung vom Herbst 2010 an, die allerdings um folgende Punkte zu erweitern ist: vollständiger Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie bis zum Jahr 2022; Steigerung des Anteils der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung an der gesamten Stromerzeugung bis 2020 auf 25 Prozent.
Only three days after the beginning of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, Japan, on 11 March 2011, the German government ordered 8 of the country's 17 existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) to stop operating within a few days. In summer 2011 the government put forward a law - passed in parliament by a large majority - that calls for a complete nuclear phase-out by the end of 2022. These government actions were in contrast to its initial plans, laid out in fall 2010, to expand the lifetimes of the country's NPPs.
The immediate closure of 8 NPPs and the plans for a complete nuclear phase-out within little more than a decade, raised concerns about Germany's ability to secure a stable supply of electricity. Some observers feared power supply shortages, increasing CO2-emissions and a need for Germany to become a net importer of electricity.
Now - a little more than a year after the phase-out law entered into force - this paper examines these concerns using (a) recent statistical data on electricity production and demand in the first 15 months after the German government's immediate reaction to the Fukushima accident and (b) reviews the most recent projections and scenarios by different stakeholders on how the German electricity system may develop until 2025, when NPPs will no longer be in operation.
The paper finds that Germany has a realistic chance of fully replacing nuclear power with additional renewable electricity generation on an annual basis by 2025 or earlier, provided that several related challenges, e.g. expansion of the grids and provision of balancing power, can be solved successfully. Already in 2012 additional electricity generation from renewable energy sources in combination with a reduced domestic demand for electricity will likely fully compensate for the reduced power generation from the NPPs shut down in March 2011.
If current political targets will be realised, Germany neither has to become a net electricity importer, nor will be unable to gradually reduce fossil fuel generated electricity. Whether the reduction in fossil fuel use will be sufficient to adequately contribute to national greenhouse gas mitigation targets significantly depends on an active policy to promote electricity savings, continuous efforts to increase the use of renewables and a higher share of natural gas (preferably used in combined heat and power plants) in fossil fuel power generation.
Several low-carbon energy roadmaps and scenarios have recently been published by the European Commission and the International Energy Agency (IEA) as well as by various stakeholders such as Eurelectric, ECF and Greenpeace. Discussions of these studies mainly focus on technology options available on the electricity supply side and mostly omit the significant challenges that all of the scenarios impose on the energy demand side.
A comparison of 5 decarbonisation scenarios from 4 of the most relevant recent scenario studies for the EU shows that all of them imply significant efficiency improvements in traditional appliances, usually well above levels historically observed over longer periods of time. At the same time they assume substantial electrification of transportation and heating. The scenarios suggest that both of these challenges need to be tackled successfully for decarbonising the energy system.
With shares of renewable electricity reaching at least 60 % of supply in 2050 in almost all of the decarbonisation scenarios, the adaptation of demand to variable supply becomes increasingly important. This aspect of demand side management should therefore be part of any policy mix aiming for a low-carbon power system.
Based on a quantitative analysis of 5 decarbonisation scenarios and a comparison with historical evidence we derive the (implicit) new challenges posed by the current low-carbon roadmaps and develop recommendations for energy policy on the electricity demand side.