Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a new mechanism for Parties to cooperate in achieving their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). One key innovation of the Article 6.4 mechanism is its objective to "deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions" (Art. 6.4(d)). This report develops recommendations on how to implement this objective. A key difficulty lies in the fact that even basics of how the mechanism is supposed to function have so far not been clarified by the Parties. The report therefore first sketches out what has so far been agreed and discussed on the mechanism’s activity cycle. Second, as the concept of overall mitigation has so far also not been clearly defined by Parties, the report derives a working definition from the language that was agreed in the Paris Agreement. In the next step, the report provides a survey of the options to achieve overall mitigation that have so far been discussed in the relevant literature and in the Article 6 negotiations. Many of these options were developed in the context of the Kyoto mechanisms. The report therefore discusses to what extent the options are also applicable under the Paris Agreement or whether adjustments need to be made. In the following, the options that are applicable under the Agreement are assessed on the basis of a number of criteria. The report concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations.
City-wide programmes of activities : an option for significant emission reductions in cities?
(2012)
More and more companies are announcing their intention to become climate-neutral and numerous companies already offer climate-neutral products or services: From climate-neutral parcel delivery to air travel. But what exactly do the companies' net-zero targets mean? Is the target set ambitious? And what role does offsetting play, i.e., purchasing carbon credits that are accounted against the company's own climate target? The approaches behind the proclaimed targets are often difficult to understand. Against this background, this Zukunftsimpuls provides ten recommendations for the definition and implementation of neutrality targets. Among other things, the authors advocate the use of a robust database as the basis for net-zero targets, emphasize the importance of transparent communication, and highlight the role that offsetting should play. Purchased carbon credits should make as limited a contribution as possible for meeting climate targets and should only be used to offset emissions that cannot be reduced or avoided. More generally, net-zero targets should not be made the sole criterion for ambitious climate strategies. Rather, they are a building block of a much more comprehensive strategy of corporate climate action.
Immer mehr Unternehmen verkünden, klimaneutral sein zu wollen und zahlreiche Firmen bieten bereits klimaneutrale Produkte oder Dienstleistungen an: Von der klimaneutralen Paketzustellung bis zur Flugreise. Doch was bedeuten die Neutralitätsziele der Unternehmen genau? Ist das gesetzte Ziel ambitioniert? Und welche Rolle spielt Offsetting, also der Ankauf von Klimaschutzzertifikaten und deren Anrechnung auf das eigene Klimaschutzziel? Die hinter den verkündeten Zielen stehenden Ansätze sind häufig nur schwer nachvollziehbar. Vor diesem Hintergrund gibt der vorliegende Zukunftsimpuls zehn Empfehlungen für die Festlegung und Umsetzung von Neutralitätszielen. Die Autorinnen und Autoren sprechen sich dabei unter anderem für die Nutzung einer robusten Datenbasis als Grundlage für Neutralitätsziele aus, betonen die Bedeutung einer transparenten Kommunikation und zeigen auf, welche Rolle Offsetting spielen sollte. So sollten angekaufte Klimaschutz-Zertifikate einen möglichst begrenzten Beitrag zur Zielerfüllung leisen und ausschließlich zum Ausgleich von Emissionen genutzt werden, die nicht reduziert oder vermieden werden können. Insgesamt sollten Neutralitätsziele nicht zum alleinigen Kriterium für ambitionierten Klimaschutz von Unternehmen gemacht werden, sie stellen vielmehr ein Baustein einer weitaus umfassenderen unternehmerischen Klimaschutzstrategie dar.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is in crisis. More and more market participants are leaving the sector. In the light of this development, some argue that governments should step in as buyers of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). Given the limited volumes of public funding, however, governments will have to prioritise some projects over others. This policy brief therefore analyses national purchase programmes and multilateral carbon funds in order to identify criteria public investors are applying in the selection of the projects they finance. The aim is to identify a vision of a high quality CDM project that be can be made use of when designing a possible support programme.
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 provides the basis for future international cooperation on the field of climate change mitigation. While truly global in reach, the agreement will however result in an increasingly complex new climate regime: Instead of using a uniform formula, Parties are allowed to autonomously define their NDCs (nationally determined contributions), resulting in a large diversity of contributions. This poses significant challenges for emissions accounting and the transfer of emission units.
This Policy Paper explores how these challenges can be addressed by analysing different types of NDCs and assessing their compatibility with the export and use of emission units. On that basis, the authors develop opt-in provisions for Parties willing to participate in unit transfers under the new climate regime and illustrate how potential risks to environmental integrity can be addressed.
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, former debates about generating carbon credits on the basis of national policies have resurged. National policies have not been eligible as project activities under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms. The Paris Agreement opens the possibility for such policy crediting but also provides an entirely new context: Universal participation, ambitious long-term targets and nationally defined contributions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambitious over time. As this paper shows, these changes in the framework conditions add an additional layer of complexity to policy-based cooperation.
The paper explores the potential for policy-based cooperation by first briefly presenting the regulatory basis provided by the Paris Agreement before outlining a prototype for policy-based cooperation and its key challenges.
This report explores the future role of the voluntary carbon market and its potential to contribute to raising the ambition of climate policy. For this purpose, desk research was complemented by interviews with voluntary carbon market representatives. The report finds that the current roles of the voluntary market are set to change fundamentally due to the Paris Agreement. For the future of the voluntary market as an investor, three roles were identified, each of which is associated with specific challenges: The market may maintain its current role of buyer of carbon neutrality credits, it may become a supporter of NDC implementation, or it may become a driver of ambition. With regard to the future role of private certification standards, the Paris Agreement may hold the possibility of using such standards in the context of compliance activities. Overall, the findings indicate that the voluntary market has some potential to contribute to ambition raising. Whether this potential will actually be unlocked depends on how the concept of ambition raising will be operationalized under the Paris Agreement and to what degree it can be integrated into the voluntary market's activities and business models.
This paper analyses the risks to environmental integrity associated to the transfers of mitigation outcomes in the context of Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement and provides an overview on approaches and tools that could be used for addressing them. The analysis shows that some of the environmental integrity risks can be dealt with at the technical level. This relates, inter alia, to the risks of mitigation outcomes being unreal or non-permanent as well as to carbon leakage and rebound effects. Here, robust MRV provisions should be established. Other risks will be difficult to address without touching the new and open structure of the Paris Agreement. This applies, for example, to risks associated to the diverse nature of NDCs, and requires further investigation.