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The new mechanism under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement is to be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). However, so far there is no clarity what role exactly the supervisory body (Body) is to play. Against this background, this JIKO Policy Paper analyses different governance options for Art. 6.4.
The paper first reflects the objectives of the new mechanism and on what the role of the mechanism as a whole should be. The paper then summarises what has already been agreed on the functioning of the mechanism and elaborates what steps will be needed to generate transferrable emission reductions under the Article 6.4 mechanism. On this basis, the paper develops criteria for how to decide what role the Body should have, and then discusses what role the Body and the other actors that are involved in the mechanism could have in each of the steps of the activity cycle.
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, former debates about generating carbon credits on the basis of national policies have resurged. National policies have not been eligible as project activities under the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms. The Paris Agreement opens the possibility for such policy crediting but also provides an entirely new context: Universal participation, ambitious long-term targets and nationally defined contributions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambitious over time. As this paper shows, these changes in the framework conditions add an additional layer of complexity to policy-based cooperation.
The paper explores the potential for policy-based cooperation by first briefly presenting the regulatory basis provided by the Paris Agreement before outlining a prototype for policy-based cooperation and its key challenges.
Although it is not part of what has been called the "ambition mechanism" or "ratchet mechanism", Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also has an explicit requirement to promote ambition. Article 6 specifically highlights that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions. Despite the common purpose, the two elements have to date been discussed mostly in isolation, both in the negotiations as well as in the wider literature. This JIKO Policy Paper sets out to change this by exploring the relationship between Article 6 and the Global Stocktake.
Many hope that the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement can become a catalyst for increased mitigation ambition over time. Based on different theories of change, this paper outlines four governance functions for the Global Stocktake. It can contribute to the Paris Agreement as a pacemaker (stimulating and synchronizing policy processes across governance levels), by ensuring accountability of Parties, by enhancing ambition through benchmarks for action and transformative learning, and by reiterating and refining the guidance and signal provided from the Paris Agreement. The paper further outlines process- and information-related preconditions that would enable an ideal Global Stocktake.
This policy paper reviews the concept of additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement. Additionality is a key criterion that helps to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, especially when units created under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting purposes whether that is by Parties in order to meet their NDCs or whether by other entities with legal mitigation obligations.
It does so by first reviewing key concepts such as offsetting, environmental integrity, and baseline. Subsequently, it explores the context of additionality under the Paris Agreement. More specifically it discusses what should be counted as the baseline for additionality demonstration. The subsequent chapter then highlights the challenges with establishing additionality, that is establishing a causal relationship between a policy intervention and a proposed activity. Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of international governance with respect to additionality.
The objective of this paper is to analyse and make recommendations on a safeguard system for Article 6 that aims at preventing potential harm that mitigation activities may cause on the ground to local stakeholders and the environment. Following some definitory aspects of what and how to safeguard, the paper analyses a number of safeguard systems and do no harm principles as well as tools to implement them. It then gives an overview on Parties' views on the matter, as uttered in their latest submissions on Art. 6 options, as well as an overview of the references in the UNFCCC's SBSTA Chair's text with respect to sustainable development, safeguards, and human rights issues. The paper closes with recommendations on a possible safeguard system for Article 6.
This JIKO Policy Paper explores how Parties using Article 6 can increase their mitigation ambition. Building on a broad definition of ambition raising which puts the intensification of climate change mitigation targets and actions by Parties at its centre, eight different ambition raising options are identified. The analysis shows that these options are associated with different technical, institutional and political challenges, calling for a combination of different ambition raising options.
This governance brief aims to provide practical examples on how investments in urban infrastructure, clean energy, and energy efficiency can be implemented; and how these are embedded in multi-level governance, experimentation, and policy-learning. It draws on examples from the German energy system transition, which can be understood as a large-scale, real-life laboratory for the governance of a sustainability transition of an entire national energy system. The federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia's experience illustrates the complexity of the governance challenge of implementing low-carbon system transitions.
In this policy paper we discuss policy instruments which can help to decarbonise passenger cars in the European Union. We elaborate to what extent these policy instruments are effective, technology-neutral, predictable, cost-effective and enforceable. Based on these criteria, we develop recommendations for the European Union and its Member States on (1) how to shape their policy frameworks in order to achieve existing climate change mitigation targets; (2) how to support car manufacturers in selling innovative and competitive products; and (3) how to encourage consumers in Europe to purchase appropriate vehicles.
We conclude that favourable policy instruments are used, but there is a strong need for adjustment and further development. The effectiveness of the current EU emission standard should be further increased by turning away from granting "super-credits" and introducing a size-based (instead of weight-based) credit system. Moreover, its overall ambition is questionable and the existing compliance mechanisms should be sharpened.
Fuel taxes are an effective means to push consumers to buy energy-efficient cars. However, a sharp increase may not have the desired effects. Instead, the Member States should harmonise their excise duties at the level of those Member States, which currently impose the highest taxes (Netherlands, Italy). This includes the abolition of any diesel tax bonus. An introduction and harmonisation of vehicle taxes (purchase and circulation) should be based on a vehicle's energy consumption. Additionally, reformation efforts should aim to change the taxation of company cars in a way that vehicle sizes are reduced over time.
Ambitious Member States may also want to introduce a sales quota for electric vehicles. Sales quotas are a very cost-effective policy instrument provided that the mandated technology will achieve a certain market share. This may be assumed for battery-electric vehicles. Further supportive instruments that should be considered are eco-labelling, public procurement and purchase incentives. However, the latter instrument's effectiveness is debatable and its implementation should therefore not be a Member State's priority.