Although it is not part of what has been called the "ambition mechanism" or "ratchet mechanism", Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also has an explicit requirement to promote ambition. Article 6 specifically highlights that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions. Despite the common purpose, the two elements have to date been discussed mostly in isolation, both in the negotiations as well as in the wider literature. This JIKO Policy Paper sets out to change this by exploring the relationship between Article 6 and the Global Stocktake.
This policy paper reviews the concept of additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement. Additionality is a key criterion that helps to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, especially when units created under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting purposes whether that is by Parties in order to meet their NDCs or whether by other entities with legal mitigation obligations.
It does so by first reviewing key concepts such as offsetting, environmental integrity, and baseline. Subsequently, it explores the context of additionality under the Paris Agreement. More specifically it discusses what should be counted as the baseline for additionality demonstration. The subsequent chapter then highlights the challenges with establishing additionality, that is establishing a causal relationship between a policy intervention and a proposed activity. Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of international governance with respect to additionality.
Many hope that the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement can become a catalyst for increased mitigation ambition over time. Based on different theories of change, this paper outlines four governance functions for the Global Stocktake. It can contribute to the Paris Agreement as a pacemaker (stimulating and synchronizing policy processes across governance levels), by ensuring accountability of Parties, by enhancing ambition through benchmarks for action and transformative learning, and by reiterating and refining the guidance and signal provided from the Paris Agreement. The paper further outlines process- and information-related preconditions that would enable an ideal Global Stocktake.
Technology cooperation : update on the technology mechanism and options for using carbon markets
(2014)
This policy brief provides a general overview on the setup of the UNFCCC's Technology Mechanism, exploring potential synergies between the mechanism and carbon market instruments such as the CDM.
There are two branches of the Technology Mechanism: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), which is tasked to give political advice, and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), providing support and fostering the operationalization of technology transfer. Both institutions strongly focus on capacity building.
The CDM, instead, has contributed to technology transfer in practice. However, the transfer has largely focused on equipment and basic operational knowledge. The transfer of knowledge to adapt, advance and innovate has been limited so far.
Therefore, the two mechanisms could well complement each other. In theory, Programmes of Activities and Standardized Baselines under the CDM could be a means for developing country governments to strategically address financial barriers to technology transfer.
This policy brief discusses the opportunities and obligations of host country DNAs within the Standardized Baselines framework and identifies options for strategic intervention. Host countries can, for example, intervene by selecting the right sectors for which they develop an SB in the first place. DNAs can also tailor their SBs to some extent to support certain technologies, fuels or feed- stocks over others by choosing the right level of aggregation of the sector to be covered. Last but not least, the paper discusses the DNAs' role in managing the data for the development and maintenance of the SB. Host countries should take full advantage of potential synergies between data collection for SBs and other data intensive processes such as national greenhouse gas inventories or national statistics. SBs and the data gathered in the process of developing them can also be a basis for the development of other mitigation instruments such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) or New Market Mechanisms (NMM).
US-Präsident Donald Trump verkündete am Nachmittag des 1. Juni 2017 im Rosengarten des Weißen Hauses, dass er das Pariser Klimaabkommen aus dem Jahr 2015 kündigen wolle. Was bedeutet dieser Schritt der USA für den globalen Klimaschutz? Dieser in brief zeigt, in welcher Weise die an Klimaschutz interessierten Staaten sich am besten organisieren, um das Pariser Klimaabkommen und die globale Klimapolitik erfolgreich weiterzuführen.
On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected to become the 45th President of the United States of America. In his campaign, he repeatedly expressed his intention to "cancel the Paris Agreement". How can the course set with the adoption of the Paris Agreement be continued independently of the developments in the US? Lukas Hermwille and Wolfgang Obergassel sketch possible consequences of the sea change of US climate policy for the international negotiation process and identify options for a "Trump-resilient" way forward.
This paper analyses the risks to environmental integrity associated to the transfers of mitigation outcomes in the context of Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement and provides an overview on approaches and tools that could be used for addressing them. The analysis shows that some of the environmental integrity risks can be dealt with at the technical level. This relates, inter alia, to the risks of mitigation outcomes being unreal or non-permanent as well as to carbon leakage and rebound effects. Here, robust MRV provisions should be established. Other risks will be difficult to address without touching the new and open structure of the Paris Agreement. This applies, for example, to risks associated to the diverse nature of NDCs, and requires further investigation.
This Policy Brief outlines the "identity crisis" in which voluntary carbon standards find themselves after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. It describes how the new international legal framework threatens to undermine the legitimation and credibility of voluntary carbon standards and discusses first ideas how the arising challenges could be dealt with.
Carbon markets in a <2 °C world : will there be room for international carbon trading in 2050?
(2016)
This JIKO Policy Paper analyses a series of very ambitious mitigation scenarios and complements this analysis with a review of several sectoral technology roadmaps. The results are quite clear: there is no reason to believe that international carbon trading will become obsolete any time soon. Whether or not international carbon trading is to play a role in international climate protection efforts is in the end not a physical or economic question, but a political one.
Die internationale Klimapolitik tritt in ein neues Zeitalter unter teils widersprüchlichen Vorzeichen ein: Während das US-Wahlergebnis auf erschwerte Rahmenbedingungen für die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels hindeutet, konnten auf der UN-Ebene bei der COP22 in Marrakech einige Fortschritte erzielt werden. Lukas Hermwille und Wolfgang Obergassel zeigen die verschiedenen Szenarien auf, die sich damit für eine ambitionierte internationale Klimapolitik ergeben.
On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected to become the 45th President of the United States of America. In his campaign, he repeatedly expressed his intention to "cancel the Paris Agreement". How can the course set with the adoption of the Paris Agreement be continued independently of the developments in the US? The authors sketch possible consequences of the sea change of US climate policy for the international negotiation process and identify options for a "Trump-resilient" way forward.
In the Paris Agreement, the governments of the world have pledged to attain climate neutrality in the second half of this century. More precisely, in Art. 4.1 parties agreed to "achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases". However, the collective as well as the majority of measures by individual countries fall short of embarking on a pathway towards that objective. But nevertheless, an increasing number of actors - countries, sub-national entities, as well as corporations - have stepped up their efforts and set themselves carbon neutrality goals.
In this Policy Brief Lukas Hermwille and Markus Gornik portray the commitments of Costa Rica, Norway, Sweden, the City of Melbourne, Australia and the corporation Microsoft. All cases have set themselves ambitious neutrality goals and have implemented measures to achieve them. However, none of the cases will be able to achieve accomplish neutrality on their own, at least not on short-term. The remaining emissions will be compensated using carbon credits either from domestic offset schemes (Costa Rica) or from international schemes.
For the time being, voluntary carbon neutrality goals, as presented in this Policy Brief, are an effective way to demonstrate leadership in climate protection. For the near future, pioneering actors that set voluntary carbon or climate neutrality goals could provide a significant source of demand for international carbon credits.
There is general agreement that preventing dangerous climate change requires a fundamental transformation of the global economy. Regarding carbon markets, the EU, for example, has called for the new market-based mechanism (NMM) to be established under the UNFCCC to "facilitate transition towards low carbon economy and attract further international investment". This JIKO Policy Paper discusses the transformative potential of the NMM and how it should be structured to maximize transformative impact.
The analysis shows that details in the arrangements of the scheme, such as allocation of allowances can significantly influence the incentive structure of the instrument and hence its potential to contribute to transformational change. The authors conclude that carbon pricing is necessary but is by itself not sufficient to redeem the various types of market failures that have led to the unsustainable global socio-economic system we are deemed to change. An NMM should therefore be tailored to complement other national policies.