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This paper discusses options to increase mitigation ambition in crediting mechanisms that serve the Paris Agreement (PA), such as the Article 6.4 mechanism. Under the Clean Development Mechanism and other crediting mechanisms, baselines have been specified in the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) intensity factors and linked to business-as-usual developments. This means that with increasing production of goods and services through carbon market activities, absolute emissions may increase or fall only slowly. At a global level, such an approach widens the "emissions gap". To enable continued use of emissions intensity baselines in crediting mechanisms while being in line with the PA’s goal to pursue efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5˚C, we propose to apply an "ambition coefficient" to emissions intensities of technologies when establishing the baseline. This coefficient would decrease to reflect increasing ambition over time, and reach zero when a country needs to reach net zero emissions. Due to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the coefficient would fall more quickly for developed than for developing countries. The latter would be able to generate emission reduction credits well beyond 2050, while for the former, crediting would stop around 2035 or before. An ambition coefficient approach would generate certainty for carbon market investors and preserve trust in international carbon markets that operate in line with the agreed, long-term ambition of the international climate regime.
Research on environmental behaviour is often overlooked in literature on regime destabilization in energy transitions. This study addresses that gap by focusing on socio-political and demographic factors shaping support for carbon regime destabilization policies in one of the most carbon-intensive regions of Europe. Carbon-intensive industries, especially coal mining and coal-based power generation, are often concentrated in a few carbon-intensive regions. Therefore, decarbonization actions will affect those regions particularly strongly. Correspondingly, carbon-intensive regions often exert significant political influence on the two climate mitigation policies at the national level. Focusing on Poland, we investigate socio-political and demographic factors that correlate with the approval or rejection of the two climate mitigation policies: increasing taxes on fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal and using public money to subsidize renewable energy such as wind and solar power in Poland and its carbon-intensive Silesia region. Using logistic regression with individual-level data derived from the 2016 European Social Survey (ESS) and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), we find party-political ideology to be an important predictor at the national level but much less so at the regional level. Specifically, voting for right-wing party is not a divisive factor for individual support of the two climate mitigation policies either nationally or regionally. More interestingly, populism is a strong factor in support of increasing taxes on fossil fuel in the carbon-intensive Silesia region but is less important concerning in support of using public money to subsidize renewable energy in Poland overall. These results show the heterogeneity of right-wing party and populism within the support for the two climate mitigation policies. Socio-demographic factors, especially age, gender, education level, employment status, and employment sector, have even more complex and heterogeneous components in support of the two climate mitigation policies at the national and regional levels. Identifying the complex socio-political and demographic factors of climate mitigation policies across different national versus carbon-intensive regional contexts is an essential step for generating in situ decarbonization strategies.
The gap between the internationally agreed climate objectives and tangible emissions reductions looms large. We explore how the supreme decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Conference of the Parties (COP), could develop to promote more effective climate policy. We argue that promoting implementation of climate action could benefit from focusing more on individual sectoral systems, particularly for mitigation. We consider five key governance functions of international institutions to discuss how the COP and the sessions it convenes could advance implementation of the Paris Agreement: guidance and signal, rules and standards, transparency and accountability, means of implementation, and knowledge and learning. In addition, we consider the role of the COP and its sessions as mega-events of global climate policy. We identify opportunities for promoting sectoral climate action across all five governance functions and for both the COP as a formal body and the COP sessions as conducive events. Harnessing these opportunities would require stronger involvement of national ministries in addition to the ministries of foreign affairs and environment that traditionally run the COP process, as well as stronger involvement of non-Party stakeholders within formal COP processes.
A sectoral perspective can help the Global Stocktake (GST) to effectively achieve its objective to inform Parties' in enhancing subsequent NDCs and in enhancing international cooperation. Specifically, granular and actionable sectoral lessons, grounded in country-driven assessments, should be identified and elaborated. To be effective, conversations on sectoral transformations need to synthesise key challenges and opportunities identified in the national analyses and link them to international enablers; focus on systemic interdependencies, involve diverse actors, and be thoroughly prepared including by pre-scoping points of convergences and divergence across transformations. We specifically recommend that:
the co-facilitators of the Technical Dialogue use their (limited) mandate to facilitate an effective conversationon sectoral transformations e.g. by organising dedicated informal seminars in between formal negotiation sessions;
key systemic transformations necessary toachieve net-zero by mid-century should be spelled out and included in the final decision or political declaration of the GST; and
the political outcome of the GST should mandate follow-up processes at the regional level and encourage national-level conversations to translate the collective messages from GST into actionable and sector-specific policy recommendations.
This chapter reconstructs the main actors, objectives and the pertinent contextual factors that co-determined the German coal phase-out. The German decision to phase out coal no later than 2038 was prepared by intense negotiations under the German "coal commission". It was tasked with finding an end date for coal-fired electricity generation and proposing ways and means to support coal workers and the affected regions. This latter objective was the dominant one, supported by a coalition of trade unions, industry, state-level governments as well as major political parties fearing a surge of far-right populism. Meanwhile, meeting the German climate targets was a key condition in the mandate of the coal commission. Yet, the German targets date back to 2010 and are not aligned with the more ambitious objectives enshrined in the Paris Agreement. This explains why the German coal phase-out schedule is so late and so expensive.
The twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Sharm el-Sheikh made history by for the first time ever discussing and ultimately even agreeing to establish a fund to address loss and damage caused by climate change. However, the conference did little to limit the occurrence of loss and damage in the first place by containing the extent of climate change. This article discusses the conference's outcomes in the areas of mitigation and adaptation, loss and damage, the Global Stocktake, cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, climate finance, and gender-responsiveness. While modest progress can be observed, it is too slow to actually achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This pace is leading many, not least the most vulnerable countries, to search for parallel arenas of cooperation.