While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current actions of the Parties to the Agreement fall far short of these goals. The Global Stocktake (GST), established in Art. 14 of the PA, may help narrow this gap between ambition and action: its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the collective progress of the international community towards Paris goals. While some general modalities on how to conduct the GST have been adopted, the details are still to be determined.
The objective of this report is to analyze existing international regimes as regards their review processes, the contribution of these review processes to various governance functions and, finally, to derive lessons for the GST. Processes analyzed include:
the design of the upcoming Global Stocktake itself,
the Talanoa Dialogue (TD) which is the direct precursor of the GST,
the Agenda 2030 High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), which features a regular stocktaking process focused on progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
the review processes of the UN human rights system (UNHRS) and
the review processes and assessment panels of the Montreal Protocol (MP).
The analysis of each review process is organised in four section: (1) political background and context, (2) technical and organisational details of the processes, (3) interface between the political and technical processes, and (4) how the review processes contribute to achieving the objectives of the respective regime, particularly governance functions of the regime (guidance and signal, transparency and accountability, and knowledge and learning).
The new mechanism defined under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement is supposed to allow for international cooperation with regard to climate change mitigation and thereby enable an increase in overall mitigation. Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism under Article 6.4 should also make sure that it is not be in conflict with the long-term goal of net-zero GHG emissions but even better foster national pathways leading to this objective. Building this into the mechanism requires to shift the focus from short- and mid-term considerations to the long-term perspective in one way or another.
This discussion paper explores three different approaches that may help to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions in the operationalization of Article 6.4, namely positive and negative lists, additionality with regard to a baseline consistent with both, NDCs and long-term targets, as well as adaptation of existing instruments and criteria from climate finance. The detailed discussion of the ap-proaches shows that the approaches should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as comple-mentary to each other. From the analyses, two storylines emerge how to combine aspects of the differ-ent approaches in a reasonable way to foster the long-term objective of net-zero GHG emissions under Article 6.4.
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes mechanisms for Parties to "pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions [...]" (Article 6.1). I. e. the mechanisms are explicitly designed to foster higher ambition. However, without additional guidance and rules, the economic incentives of carbon markets may work against increasing host country ambition. For example, setting ambitious NDC targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country can transfer abroad. The report presents four options on how the risks can be ad-dressed and ambition can be increased: (1) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability; (2) Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries; (3) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism; (4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism. These options are assessed and recommendations are provided on how they could be implemented.
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement explicitly acknowledges the need to incentivize and facilitate the participation of private entities in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), private sector actors had already the opportunity to participate in a new and fast-growing market. However, they faced numerous challenging investment barriers. The study provides an overview on key factors and barriers determining private sector participation in Article 6 mechanisms. It distinguishes between the three topics demand side factors, rules and standards for market mechanisms, and supply side factors and provides for each of them options to mitigate or overcome barriers.
In a short analysis, it further explores three of the identified options:
- Improving the design and support of national systems and capacities is an important pre-requisite for the private sector to be able to generate and sell ITMOs
- The up-scaling of mitigation activities e. g. through (sub-) sector level crediting, and policy crediting helps private sector actors to benefit from economies of scale
- Exploring the potential of digitization of measuring, reporting and verification (MRV), e. g. the use of sensors, internet of things, artificial intelligence and blockchain to make the project cycle more efficient and reduce transaction costs.
Overall, the report stresses the importance of host country readiness to provide the private sector with a robust and trusted environment that allows for the adoption of Article 6 mechanisms.
This policy paper reviews the concept of additionality in the context of the Paris Agreement. Additionality is a key criterion that helps to maintain the environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement, especially when units created under Article 6.2 or 6.4 are used for offsetting purposes whether that is by Parties in order to meet their NDCs or whether by other entities with legal mitigation obligations.
It does so by first reviewing key concepts such as offsetting, environmental integrity, and baseline. Subsequently, it explores the context of additionality under the Paris Agreement. More specifically it discusses what should be counted as the baseline for additionality demonstration. The subsequent chapter then highlights the challenges with establishing additionality, that is establishing a causal relationship between a policy intervention and a proposed activity. Finally, the Policy Paper discusses aspects of international governance with respect to additionality.
Die internationale Klimapolitik tritt in ein neues Zeitalter unter teils widersprüchlichen Vorzeichen ein: Während das US-Wahlergebnis auf erschwerte Rahmenbedingungen für die Bekämpfung des Klimawandels hindeutet, konnten auf der UN-Ebene bei der COP22 in Marrakech einige Fortschritte erzielt werden. Lukas Hermwille und Wolfgang Obergassel zeigen die verschiedenen Szenarien auf, die sich damit für eine ambitionierte internationale Klimapolitik ergeben.
On 8 November 2016, Donald Trump was elected to become the 45th President of the United States of America. In his campaign, he repeatedly expressed his intention to "cancel the Paris Agreement". How can the course set with the adoption of the Paris Agreement be continued independently of the developments in the US? The authors sketch possible consequences of the sea change of US climate policy for the international negotiation process and identify options for a "Trump-resilient" way forward.
There is general agreement that preventing dangerous climate change requires a fundamental transformation of the global economy. Regarding carbon markets, the EU, for example, has called for the new market-based mechanism (NMM) to be established under the UNFCCC to "facilitate transition towards low carbon economy and attract further international investment". This JIKO Policy Paper discusses the transformative potential of the NMM and how it should be structured to maximize transformative impact.
The analysis shows that details in the arrangements of the scheme, such as allocation of allowances can significantly influence the incentive structure of the instrument and hence its potential to contribute to transformational change. The authors conclude that carbon pricing is necessary but is by itself not sufficient to redeem the various types of market failures that have led to the unsustainable global socio-economic system we are deemed to change. An NMM should therefore be tailored to complement other national policies.
A sectoral perspective can help the Global Stocktake (GST) to effectively achieve its objective to inform Parties' in enhancing subsequent NDCs and in enhancing international cooperation. Specifically, granular and actionable sectoral lessons, grounded in country-driven assessments, should be identified and elaborated. To be effective, conversations on sectoral transformations need to synthesise key challenges and opportunities identified in the national analyses and link them to international enablers; focus on systemic interdependencies, involve diverse actors, and be thoroughly prepared including by pre-scoping points of convergences and divergence across transformations. We specifically recommend that:
the co-facilitators of the Technical Dialogue use their (limited) mandate to facilitate an effective conversationon sectoral transformations e.g. by organising dedicated informal seminars in between formal negotiation sessions;
key systemic transformations necessary toachieve net-zero by mid-century should be spelled out and included in the final decision or political declaration of the GST; and
the political outcome of the GST should mandate follow-up processes at the regional level and encourage national-level conversations to translate the collective messages from GST into actionable and sector-specific policy recommendations.
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 provides the basis for future international cooperation on the field of climate change mitigation. While truly global in reach, the agreement will however result in an increasingly complex new climate regime: Instead of using a uniform formula, Parties are allowed to autonomously define their NDCs (nationally determined contributions), resulting in a large diversity of contributions. This poses significant challenges for emissions accounting and the transfer of emission units.
This Policy Paper explores how these challenges can be addressed by analysing different types of NDCs and assessing their compatibility with the export and use of emission units. On that basis, the authors develop opt-in provisions for Parties willing to participate in unit transfers under the new climate regime and illustrate how potential risks to environmental integrity can be addressed.