There is an extensive potential for GHG emission reductions in the new EU member states and the EU accession countries by improving energy efficiency, investing in renewable energy supply and other measures, part of which could be tapped by JI. However, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and especially the recently adopted "Linking Directive" is probably going to have a significant impact on this JI potential. Especially two provisions are important:
The baseline of a project has to be based on the acquis communautaire, the environmental regulations of which are substantially higher than the Accession Countries' existing ones. Projects, which directly or indirectly reduce emissions from installations falling within the scope of the EU ETS, can only generate certificates if an equal number of EU allowances are cancelled. JI is thus put into direct competition with the EU ETS. In this paper we analyse the impact of these provisions first in theory and then country by country for six Central and East European countries that recently acceded the EU or are candidates for accession. As a result, we give an overview of the potential and the limitations of JI as an instrument for achieving emission reductions in the selected Accession Countries and provide important overview information to policy makers.
Industrialized countries have committed to providing "new and additional" funding to developing countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation. However, lack of a common definition of "new and additional" undermines the climate process. This article aims to contribute to the discussion on the principle of additionality by assessing possible definitions. The article first contextualizes the guiding principles that led to the endorsement of "new and additional" finance within the history of international climate negotiations. Second, we survey definitions of "new and additional" put forward by industrialized countries as well as further proposed definitions put forward by scholars. Third, we assess the respective strengths and weaknesses of these definitions.
Our analysis shows that there is no singular formula that would resolve the problem of how to define additionality. Definitions that would be politically acceptable to developed countries are subject to gaming while definitions that are technically robust are politically difficult. We conclude that a combination of using innovative sources and defining specific future levels of development assistance ex ante may offer the best prospects for resolving the climate finance conundrum.